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U.S. POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: MANAGING THE GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS TRIANGLE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:40 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call to order the Subcommittee on Europe. Today the Subcommittee holds a hearing on the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. This is an area of critical importance, but one often overlooked when compared to the whole of Europe, Russia and the Balkans. Located at the crossroads of three of most volatile regions in the world, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, Greece and Turkey provide the strategic anchor for southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean security and economic development.

The United States interests in the region with respect to the Balkans, the energy corridor, Iran and Iraq, and the southern flank of NATO requires an active and supportive foreign policy which ensures the friendship and cooperation of Greece and the stability of Turkey. U.S. Policy must promote a strong partnership with both countries and between both nations. The U.S. Should develop a stronger relationship with Greece. We fully appreciate Greece's role in the Balkans and the current attempts to improve Greek-Turkish relations.

The recent visit of Foreign Minister Papandreou to the Congress was, despite some Greek press assessments, a success precisely because the minister spent time discussing those very issues. The U.S. Should continue to promote Turkey's emergence as a fully democratic state able to complete the EU accession process and to fully participate in the economic opportunities of the region. We appreciate Turkey's commitment to NATO and their help in the Middle East. U.S. Policy must also serve to help remove the Aegean and Cyprus flashpoints between Greece and Turkey which muddy the new rapprochement taking place between the two critical allies and our friends.

Finally, a word on Cyprus. The status quo on instruments is totally unacceptable. The presence of a large third party military on the islands is not helpful. We support U.N.-sponsored negotiations

to help facilitate a settlement and are disappointed that talks have not been rescheduled. Both sides must get back to the negotiation table as soon as possible. We also recognize that no solution can be imposed from the outside. It must come from within.

To that end, we are disappointed that a solution has been so elusive. This is an especially important time to settle this issue because should Cyprus be welcomed into the EU, a decision many in this country support, not all Cypriots may stand to benefit. It is urgent that both sides put their past differences aside and work harder to reach a resolution of this matter. On this issue both Greece and Turkey must be more supportive and helpful.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Today, the Subcommittee holds a hearing on the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. This is an area of critical importance but one often overlooked when compared to the whole of Europe, Russia or the Balkans.

Located at the crossroads of three of the most volatile regions in the world—the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East—Greece and Turkey provide the strategic anchor for southeastern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean security and economic development.

United States interests in the region, with respect to the Balkans, the energy corridor, Iran and Iraq, and the southern flank of NATO requires an active and supportive foreign policy which ensures the friendship and cooperation of Greece and the stability of Turkey.

U.S. policy must promote a strong partnership with both countries and between both nations.

The U.S. should develop a stronger relationship with Greece. We fully appreciate Greece's role in the Balkans and the current attempts to improve Greek-Turkish relations. The recent visit of Foreign Minister Papandreou to the Congress was, despite some Greek press assessments, a success precisely because the Minister spent time discussing those very issues.

The U.S. should continue to promote Turkey's emergence as a fully democratic state able to complete the EU accession process and to fully participate in the economic opportunities of the region. We appreciate Turkey's commitment to NATO and their help in the Middle East.

U.S. policy must also serve to help remove the Aegean and Cyprus as flashpoints between Greece and Turkey which muddy the new rapprochement taking place between these two critical allies and friends.

Finally, a word on Cyprus. The status quo on Cyprus is unacceptable. The presence of a large, 3rd-party military force on the island is not helpful. We support U.N-sponsored negotiations to help facilitate a settlement and are disappointed that no new talks have been scheduled.. Both sides must get back to the negotiation table.

We also recognize that no solution can be imposed from the outside. It must come from within. To that end, we are disappointed that a solution has been so elusive. This is an especially important time to settle this issue because should Cyprus be welcomed into the European Union, a decision many in this country support, not all Cypriots may stand to benefit.

It is urgent that both sides put their past differences aside and work harder to reach a resolution of this matter. On this issue both Greece and Turkey must be supportive and helpful.

Today, we welcome our panel of experts who will share with the Subcommittee some of their insights into the importance of the region, the issues involved and how U.S. policy should be conducted

Mr. GALLEGLY. Today we welcome our panel of experts who will share with the Subcommittee Members some of their insights into the importance of the region and the issues involved, and on how U.S. policy should be conducted. Before we go to the witnesses, I

would like to defer to my good friend, the Ranking Member from Florida, Mr. Alcee Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this very timely hearing. Let me also welcome our distinguished panel who are joining us today. Welcome to all of you, and I very much look forward to your testimony. As you have already noted, Mr. Chairman, the Eastern Mediterranean is one of most vital to United States national security interest. Our relationships with each of the three nations that make up this region is important individually, and maybe more to the point collectively.

Over the course of my holding tenure in office within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have had the pleasure of meeting with parliamentarians from all of the countries we are dealing with today. Let me tell you, to the one, they are committed to a peaceful region. The United States must continue to be a leader in this regard. I join, as you do, Mr. Chairman, the scores of Congress Members that have been disappointed with the seeming stagnation within all sides in resolving issues with reference to Cyprus. There are truly legitimate concerns that need to be addressed before further positive movement might be achieved.

Let me not get bogged down with that one issue, though Mr. Chairman, as you know, I was recently in Prague to address the 50th anniversary of Radio Free Europe, and during a question-and-answer period, a journalist from the Aegean region asked me about the Balkans and how that could affect stability in what we are calling the Triangle at today's hearing. I could not have been more candid, and I would like to repeat some of my thoughts to this audience. The thrust of my remarks were this: If we, meaning the West, the United States, NATO, the European Union do not more aggressively engage in the Balkans, our friends in and around the southeastern Mediterranean will become less stable.

Mr. Chairman, there is real concern in Greece, as well there should be, about the spiralling violence in Macedonia. As was pointed out to Members of this Subcommittee recently, Skopje, Macedonia is only about 100 miles from the Greek border. Albania also borders Greece. If there is an incursion by guerillas into Greece, the probability that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus become involved in this quagmire seems unquestionable.

While there are a variety of issues that need to be discussed, and I am sure they will, including Cypress's accession to the EU, status of U.S. Forces in Greece, human rights issue in Turkey, continued cooperation to combat terrorist activities in Greece and the continuing financial crisis in Turkey.

I will close my formal remarks here, however, in the interest of time. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Hastings.

Mr. Sherman, do you have an opening remark?

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, I do.

Mr. GALLEGLY. My neighbor and friend from California, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. The senior member of the Ventura County delegation who should be thanked for holding these hearings on what may be the most contentious area of all areas that come under the

jurisdiction of this Subcommittee. One thing that is a bit odd with the way the Subcommittee structure has been put together is that our Subcommittee deals with Greece and Cyprus with you, but as a technical matter, Turkey is set on the Middle East Subcommittee. I sit on both Subcommittees. This is not an effort for me to prefer one to the other.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Would the gentleman yield. Just for the record this Committee now has full jurisdiction over Turkey as well.

Mr. SHERMAN. Great minds think alike and we have achieved something very important here.

Mr. HASTINGS. Pretty soon you will have the electricity problem solved in California.

Mr. SHERMAN. We are looking to Elton's leadership on that. But that is an outstanding announcement, I think, brings under one roof dealing with not only the Turkish, Turkey-Greece-Cyprus issue, but perhaps the other triangle, the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan issue, all under one roof and I think that is a good development.

I think that we in the United States should be encouraging Cyprus to become part of the European Union. I think it is borderline outrageous that the Turkish side would try to block something that is obviously in the interests of the people of Cyprus, and I think that even those of Turkish ethnicity who live on Cyprus, if honestly asked to give their opinion, would favor joining the European Union. I don't know whether this will be really focused on these hearings, but an environmental issue that is important is the Bosporus. We are going to see more and more oil going through there. And long before the invention of even the oil tanker, international law established that every country has a right to move its ships through the Bosporus.

I don't think it would be a terrible departure from international law if United States led the way to say yes, but you have to hire a local Turkish pilot to make sure you don't dump a bunch of oil. The freedom of the seas also means responsible use of the seas, particularly those dangerous straits. I commend the Chairman of the Committee for pointing out that we do have a foreign army stationed in Cyprus, and that we could go a long way toward peace, really get to peace there if the Cypriots solved the problem themselves and all foreign military forces were withdrawn.

I look forward to a bizonal federation under a single national government in Cyprus. I want to comment and urge the Administration, which I expect is represented here, to move forward toward having a special envoy for peace in Cyprus and between Turkey and Greece. I know there is a special coordinator in the State Department, but I think it would mean something to all parties to have a personal representative of President Bush give a very high profile toward solving this problem.

So I look forward to this issue getting the attention it deserves, both in the Administration and here in Congress. I commend my colleague for holding these hearings to make sure it gets the attention of this Subcommittee and I look forward to the kind of peace and prosperity that could exist in this region if some of these issues were resolved. I yield back.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman. Before we begin I would ask unanimous consent to insert into the record statements made by Representative Burton, Representative Bilirakis, Representative Maloney, Mr. Johnny Economy, President of AHEPA, and Mr. Eugene Rossides from the American Hellenic Institute. Without objection that will be the order.

[The statements of Mr. Burton, Mr. Bilirakis, and Mrs. Maloney follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for holding this hearing today. I would also like to wish you the best of luck in your role as the new Chairman of this subcommittee. You certainly will not be lacking in the number of problems that you will have to confront in the region.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the "Cyprus issue" is one that the United States Congress has taken an active interest in for almost three decades. Many Members of Congress hold a deep concern for the welfare of either the Turkish Cypriots or the Greek Cypriots and would like to see a resolution of the many issues that now divide the island. Despite these good intentions, however, I do enter today's hearing with a lot of trepidation. In the past, the Congress has not dealt with "Cyprus issue" in an even-handed manner. Hearings have been less concerned about finding a balanced, long-term political solutions and more concerned about denouncing Turkish Cypriots, demonizing Rauf Denktas, and pressuring Turkey to stop providing security for Turkish Cypriots on the northern part of Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, when I first looked at the list of witnesses who you have invited to testify here today, it immediately struck me as a very balanced group with a lot of experience on the "Cyprus issue." Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for your efforts in this area.

Nevertheless, while, I am cautiously optimistic that today's hearing will not follow the negative course of so many hearings in the past, I would like to make a few points that I hope all of today's participants will keep in mind as we approach the "Cyprus issue" today and in the future.

First, I want to emphasize that the division of Cyprus was not caused by Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, it was caused by Greece and Greek Cypriots. Prior to the Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1974, Turkish Cypriots had been forcibly expelled from their own government, and Turkish Cypriots were being slaughtered in tremendous numbers. It was to save lives and protect Turkish Cypriots from further slaughter that the Turkish military intervened on Cyprus.

How bad was the slaughter of Turkish Cypriots? Over the last several years, I have heard the word "genocide" thrown around loosely in the Congress and attached to a lot of tragedies that I do not believe merit the use of this term. With respect to Armenian suffering under the former Ottoman Empire, I have vigorously opposed the use of the word "genocide." However, for those Members of Congress who are inclined to attach the "genocide" term to Armenian suffering, I might suggest that you also consider applying this same term to the suffering experienced by Turkish Cypriots at the hands of Greeks and Greek Cypriots. That is how bad Turkish Cypriot suffering was prior to the Turkish military intervention.

Mr. Chairman, the second point that I would like to make is that today there is peace on Cyprus. There are probably more deaths in any major American city on any given day than there are deaths, resulting from ethnic conflict, in Cyprus during an entire year. Perhaps it is time to contemplate whether it might not be better to leave Cyprus divided, instead of trying to force people who do not like each other, do not trust each other, and do not want to associate with each other, together into one nation. It certainly cannot be argued that Cyprus is a vital national security interest of the United States. In fact, the only problem that Cyprus presents to the United States is when terrorists occasionally use the south as a safe haven.

Mr. Chairman, the third and final point that I would like to make has to do with "pressure." For years, several members of Congress have posited the theory that we need to apply pressure on Turkey so that Turkey will apply pressure on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to agree to a settlement favorable to Greek Cypriots. I would like to suggest that perhaps its time to apply pressure in the opposite direction. If members of this Congress are convinced that we need force Turkish and Greek Cypriots together, then maybe we should apply pressure Greece, not Turkey. Currently, Greece enforces a crippling economic embargo against the Turkish Re-

public of Northern Cyprus. When you consider the suffering that Turkish Cypriots suffered prior to 1974 and the suffering that they now must endure as a result of this economic embargo, it is no wonder that Turkish Cypriots cannot seriously believe that Greek Cypriots will be concerned for their well-being should the island ever be re-united. Therefore I would like to suggest that if Greek Cypriots really want prove that they care for Turkish Cypriots, they should end their economic embargo against them. I also believe that our State Department should seek an end to this embargo.

Mr. Chairman, again, I would like to commend you for holding this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

CYPRUS' ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

For the first time in their history, the people of Cyprus have the opportunity to seal their future by becoming part of the European Union. The European Union is about to embrace a large number of new members thus ending the artificial barriers erected by repeated wars and age-old feuds that kept Europe divided for so long. Upon accession to the European Union, Cyprus will, in its capacity as a full member, be firmly anchored to the western political and security structures, enhancing both geographically and qualitatively the operational capabilities of the Western world.

The Republic of Cyprus and the United States share a common tradition of respect for human rights, a faith in the power of democratic institutions, and a commitment to free market economics. Our two governments have similarly had close ties. Consequently, it is in the interest of the United States to see a strong and vibrant Cyprus which will enhance the future strength of our alliance. To that end, the most meaningful way to ensure that outcome is to promote Cyprus's membership in the European Union.

Union membership for Cyprus also has the potential to resolve some of the ongoing disputes in the Mediterranean region. At the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, Turkey was granted the status of a candidate country for accession to the EU. In accordance with the Accession Partnership Document of Turkey, which was endorsed by the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000, Turkey must strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring about a successful conclusion to the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The European Council decision taken in Helsinki in December 1999 also states that the Council's decision on accession for Cyprus will not be preconditioned on a settlement to the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, it is understood that accession negotiations with Turkey cannot begin until Turkey complies with the stipulations and conditions laid down by the by the European Council decisions in Helsinki, Copenhagen and Nice.

The United States government has strongly supported the Helsinki Conclusions both on the issue of Cyprus' accession and Turkey's candidacy for membership and should continue to do so. Additionally, serious efforts have been undertaken by the UN Secretary General to resume negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus. These efforts have always enjoyed the full support of the United States.

Regrettably, the implementation of these agreements has been thwarted by the intransigent position taken by the Turkish Government, with the full backing of the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash. Their refusal to participate in the UN sponsored talks until demands for recognition of Northern Cyprus as a separate state are met is unacceptable. In his recent testimony before the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell specifically enumerated Mr. Denktash as the main obstacle in developing a comprehensive solution to the problem.

It is obvious that resolution of the perennial dispute between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus remains the key to a successful and lasting settlement of the problem. Although the Helsinki decision does not consider a Greco-Turkish agreement on Cyprus a precondition for the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, such an agreement would remove any obstacles to the accession of Turkey to the European Union, benefitting all parties concerned in the current dispute.

First, it will permanently resolve the problem of Cyprus, which has been poisoning the relations among the parties to the conflict, their NATO allies, and the United States. Second, improvement in the relations between Greece and Turkey

will also strengthen the South-Eastern flank of NATO so it can function in its full capacity, unhindered by ancient frictions that have virtually prevented any cooperation between the two allies at periods in the past.

Third, an agreement between the conflicting parties will enhance stability and security in two troubled regions of the world, the Middle-East and the Balkans. These areas are vital to the national interests of the United States and any stabilizing influence might serve to facilitate other peace agreements.

In pursuing this goal, it should be made clear to the Turkish leadership and Mr. Denktash that their position on these issues is unsatisfactory. No effort should be made to appease the Turkish-Cypriot leader in order to entice his return to the negotiating table. Not only should he return, but he should negotiate in good faith in order to reach a comprehensive settlement within the framework provided for by the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes the establishment of a bizonal, bi-communal federation with a single international personality, sovereignty, and a single citizenship.

It would be in the best interest of Turkey to cooperate with the United Nations and the rest of the international community on Cyprus in order to advance its own goals for Union membership. So far we have seen that both Turkey and Mr. Denktash have sought to create preconditions on Cyprus' accession by tying that process to the resolution of a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. The United States should remind Turkey that any threat against the Republic of Cyprus will be met with strong determination and opposition and that Turkey does not possess any veto power over European Union membership. Promotion of Cyprus' membership will remove what has been a stumbling block in comprehensive settlement negotiations, and it will allow Turkey to strive toward the laudable goal of its own accession.

We are all standing at the threshold of a historic opportunity that will shape the futures of generations of Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks. We have an obligation to these future generations to secure their futures by contributing to the efforts to create a peaceful world.

It is precisely to stress the above stated points that I have felt compelled to submit a House Concurrent Resolution which expresses the United States' support for Cyprus' admission to the European Union according to the Helsinki Conclusions of 1999 which state that while a solution to the political crisis in Cyprus is preferable prior to EU accession, it is not a precondition for entry.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CAROLYN B. MALONEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

U.S. POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me with this opportunity to participate in today's hearing on our nation's policy in eastern Mediterranean, an area of the world that puts both our national security interests and our national values to the test. How we resolve the issues in the "Greece, Turkey, Cyprus Triangle" will have long-term implications for the future of NATO and the European Union, with implications for the stability of the Middle East. It will also demonstrate the strength of our stated commitments to the principles of democracy, human rights and respect for the sovereignty of small nations, as well as larger ones.

Next month, we will commemorate the 27th anniversary of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. The Turkish occupation, and the division of the island, continues to this day. The United States has played a significant role in the efforts to negotiate a resolution to the long-standing Cyprus conflict over the years, under the auspices of the United Nations. But, sadly, our efforts, to date, have not produced results. Unfortunately, talks have stalled in large part due to the refusal of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to return to the table. Mr. Denktash's self-declared "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' is recognized by no other nation—except our NATO ally Turkey. Turkey continues to support Denktash's intransigent policies, while maintaining an occupation force of some 35,000 troops.

These basic facts on the ground must be acknowledged and addressed, Mr. Chairman. But there are also developments in Cyprus that bode well for a much more hopeful future—a better future for all of the people of Cyprus, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike. It is these developments that I wish to address this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

Cyprus is among the leading candidate states for accession to the European Union in the EU's next enlargement. Furthermore, a settlement on the island is not a precondition for Cyprus's accession to the EU (according to the decision by the Euro-

pean Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999). Yet there is reason to hope that Cyprus accession could serve to spur efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. EU membership would clearly provide important economic, political and social benefits for the Cypriot people—and not just the Greek-Cypriots, I might add. Cyprus's EU accession will also serve long-term U.S. interests by creating a new environment of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region. A solution to the Cyprus problem will also provide an impetus for improved relations between two important American allies and NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, whose relations have often been troubled.

Cyprus has always been a high priority in U.S. foreign policy, for Administrations of both political parties. I am encouraged that the current Administration is maintaining continuity with the ongoing American support the UN Secretary General in his efforts to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single international personality and citizenship, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

But now is a time for the U.S. to increase its attention to Cyprus. One important way to do that is for the U.S. to strongly support the decision of the EU to admit Cyprus as member in its next enlargement.

That is why I, along with Congressman Mike Bilirakis, am introducing a Concurrent Resolution expressing the Sense of Congress that security, reconciliation, and prosperity for all Cypriots can be best be achieved within the context of membership in the European Union, which will provide significant rights and obligations for all Cypriots.

Our Resolution states that the status quo on Cyprus is unacceptable, and that the island and its people must be reunited in a bizonal, bicommunal federal Cyprus, on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. Accession by Cyprus to the EU could very well act as a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

Because of the importance of this issue, our Resolution calls for the various relevant agencies of our government to pursue vigorously and as an issue of high and urgent priority new initiatives that will help promote and achieve reunification, reconciliation, stability and prosperity on Cyprus.

Mr. Chairman, there may be voices at today's hearing suggesting that EU membership should follow resolution of the Cyprus issue. With all due respect, such an argument fails to take note of the history of the past 27 years. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has made all responsible concessions that could be reasonably asked of them, while hoping that the other side would negotiate in good faith—or that the pressure of the United States and the international community could somehow get the Denktash regime, and the Republic of Turkey itself, to behave more responsibly. Clearly, negotiations toward a settlement are at a standstill. The economic, social and political progress of the people of Cyprus should not and must not be held hostage to the stalling tactics of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and of Turkey. Life must go on. The people of Cyprus, who have achieved an economic miracle despite the hardships they have faced for the past quarter-century, have the right to integrate their booming economy into the European—and global—marketplace.

For Turkey, there is an incentive to playing a more constructive role: Turkey's own aspirations of EU membership. Therefore, rather than mandating that resolution of the Cyprus problem be a pre-condition of EU membership, in practice we may see just the opposite: EU membership for Cyprus creating the conditions for a solution to the division of the island.

As President Bush embarks on his first visit to Europe, there are many issues that divide the American Administration and the political leaders across the Atlantic. But one area where America and Europe should see eye to eye is on Cyprus's accession to the European Union and on the need to reunite Cyprus. Therefore, I hope that today's hearing, the introduction of this Resolution and everything else we do will serve to encourage our President and the leadership of our European allies to continue on the path toward rapid accession for Cyprus, and not be deterred by threats from any source, nor by the doubts raised by the naysayers. Cyprus's EU accession is good for the people of Cyprus—all the people of Cyprus—and it's good for U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Economy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHNNY ECONOMY, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN HELLENIC EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION (AHEPA)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), the nation's largest Hellenic heritage organization, we respectfully submit the position of the organization with respect to U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and we offer our opinions on what U.S. policy should be in the region in light of the Subcommittee on Europe's hearing scheduled for this Wednesday, June 13, 2001.

The basis for our position evolves from our recent Excursion to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, April 27 to May 7, 2001, where leaders of AHEPA met with the following key members of U.S. and foreign governments, as well as His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, the spiritual leader of approximately 300 million Orthodox Christians worldwide:

- U.S. Ambassador to Greece R. Nicholas Burns,
- U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald Bandler,
- Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Turkey, Jim Jeffrey,
- Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou,
- Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoris Niotis,
- Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Dr. Osman Faruk Logoglu,
- Turkish Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Yigit Alpogan, and
- President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides.

Further, we draw on statements taken by the U.S. Administration, both immediate past and current, and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which reinforce our position.

AHEPA has been credited by State Department officials for opening up an era of "Track Two" diplomacy that began with such initiatives as visiting Ankara on three occasions (1997, 1998, 2001) to meet with Turkish foreign ministry and military officials and crossing the "Green Line" that divides the island of Cyprus (May 2001) into the Republic of Cyprus and the illegally occupied area by Turkey in the north.

POSITION ON GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT

AHEPA supports the rapprochement effort by Greece and Turkey that has fostered and encouraged bilateral agreements with respect to: trade, the environment, cultural exchanges, tourism, joint law enforcement, and a reduction in arms procurement, among others. These initial agreements, along with any confidence building measures with respect to the military, are welcomed by AHEPA.

The next step is to raise the level of rapprochement to address the tougher issues of sovereignty in the Aegean and reaching a settlement in Cyprus. The Greek American community would like to see more positive developments especially with respect to Turkey.

We respectfully request the United States to continue its policy of supporting the rapprochement efforts between the two countries and to encourage it to bloom, leading to peace in the Aegean and a settlement based on international law and the rule of law with regard to both issues.

POSITION ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AND EU ACCESSION

AHEPA's position on a just solution to the Cyprus problem is based on a bizonal, bicommunal, federation with a single international personality and a single sovereignty as outlined by United National Security Council Resolutions, especially Resolution 1251 of June 29, 1999. Further, the position of AHEPA is for Cyprus to enter into the EU, upon meeting all established criteria, whether or not a settlement is reached. This is outlined by the EU in the Helsinki Agreement of December 1999. AHEPA would prefer to see a settlement prior to accession based upon the rule of law as it will benefit the people of Cyprus—Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots alike.

U.S. policy toward a Cyprus settlement must be to support the rule of law within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolutions and encourage the resumption of the U.N.-sponsored proximity talks. Currently, the proximity talks are at an "impasse right now because of the position taken by Mr. Denktash," stated U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell before a Senate Subcommittee hearing. He added, "We are supporting the U.N. efforts on this."

Undersecretary of Political Affairs Marc Grossman, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, "We have got to impress on

the Turkish Cypriots and the people in Ankara that they have got to get involved in this negotiation. And we've got to use leverage. But I use that term kind of in a positive way, in terms of what Cyprus is going to do to get into the European Union."

U.S. policy toward Cyprus' accession into the EU must be in compliance with the Helsinki decision, meaning a settlement is not a precondition for Cyprus' accession. Also, the U.S. must ensure a level playing field with respect to Cyprus' accession by supporting its entry, with or without a settlement, and discourage any thought by Turkey, a non-EU member, to stand in Cyprus' way.

Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke recently said to a conference of concerned Greek and Cypriot Americans, "President Clerides is making tremendous progress toward accession and no non-member will be able to veto its accession, especially not Turkey, and not Mr. Denktash, who is the most obstructionist person I have had to deal with, but he cannot derail the process."

Finally, the U.S. policy is made clear as State Department Richard Boucher said on May 4, 2001, "We've supported the EU's decision, the EU's method of dealing with this. We've supported the Helsinki conclusions, which laid out the EU's progress. And we've also supported very much the U.N.'s efforts, and that's where our focus remains right now."

POSITION ON TURKEY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

It is in everyone's best interest, the United States, Greece, Cyprus, and of course, Turkey, for Turkey's economy to stabilize and grow. This will lead to social and political stability in Turkey. AHEPA supports a movement toward stabilization in all of these areas. AHEPA welcomes Turkey's candidacy to join the EU, and would further welcome its entry into the EU based upon it meeting all the necessary criteria outlined by the European Union and the agreements reached in Helsinki.

As Americans of Hellenic descent, we want the southern flank of NATO to be strong and Turkey is an element of that flank. However AHEPA questions the role of the military as it pertains to the democratic government of Turkey. Its constant insistence on the procurement of weapons that can only be described as offensive at a time when Turkey's economy is in dire straits and in need of restructuring must be examined. For example, why does Turkey want to purchase 145 attack helicopters costing $7 billion when it needs to borrow hundreds of millions of dollars from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund? (Please refer to the enclosed strategic report written by Gregory Copley).

U.S. Policy must be to strongly encourage Turkey to improve its human rights record especially in light of the European Court of Human Rights' decision of May 10, 2001, (Cyprus v. Turkey). The court's ruling in favor for Cyprus, 16–1, found Turkey guilty of human rights abuses in Cyprus. It does not take into consideration the human rights abuses committed against other minorities, for example the Kurds. U.S. taxpayer dollars subsidizing these abuses by Turkey through the weaponry it procures must be examined.

Additionally the U.S., founded on the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, including freedom of religion, must take the lead to call on Turkey to reopen the Theological School of Halki (where the priests who serve the Greek American community are educated) and to allow the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the spiritual center for Orthodox Christians, including five million in the United States, to operate freely in carrying out its religious mission and without fear of persecution.

CONCLUSION

As American citizens, the AHEPA's position for the last 27 years of Turkey's illegal occupation of some 34% of Northern Cyprus has continually been based on the rule of law and countless U.N. resolutions. Although we pride ourselves on our Hellenic heritage, it is our American heritage and ideals on which we have based our position.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rossides follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE ROSSIDES, AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE, INC.

Chairman Gallegly, ranking member Hastings and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony to the Subcommittee on behalf of the membership organizations listed above on the hearing topic: "U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Managing the Greece, Turkey, Cyprus Triangle."

U.S. INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The U.S. has important interests in Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. To the north of Greece are the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Russia, to the East, the Middle East, the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, and to the south is North Africa. Significant communication links for commerce and energy sources pass through the region. The U.S. has an important stake in fostering good relations between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and in achieving a just and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem and Aegean issues.

In 2000 the political, security and economic landscape in Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean underwent significant changes. The emergence of a democratic government in Serbia transformed the prospects for progress in the Balkans. Further, at its December 8–10, 2000 Nice Council, the European Union (EU) took the necessary practical steps to underpin the process of enlargement. The active involvement of the EU has improved the prospects for enhanced regional cooperation and development. The U.S. stands to benefit from these developments.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE REGION

A key U.S. national security interest in the region is the security of and access to the Persian Gulf oil resources for which we fought a war under UN auspices in 1990–1991 (Desert Shield, Desert Storm). In contrast, access to Caspian Sea oil and gas resources is not an issue. The issues involved are primarily transportation pipelines and fairness in the process for American oil companies.

POLICY THEMES

The policy themes in the interests of the U.S. advocated by the American Hellenic Institute since its founding in 1974 and reiterated in successive Greek American Policy Statements regarding Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and their relation to U.S. interests and values are:

1. U.S. interests are best served by fostering American values and in particular the rule of law in international affairs. President Dwight D. Eisenhower condemned and reversed the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel in October 1956. In his October 31, 1956 television and radio report to the nation Eisenhower said: *"There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."*

President George H.W. Bush stated on January 16, 1991, the day the Persian Gulf air war began against Iraqi forces: *"We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations."*

In his State of the Union address to Congress and the nation on January 29, 1991, President Bush said: *"Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. . . . They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace based not on arms races and confrontation but on shared principles and the rule of law."*

On February 27, 1991, President Bush announced to the nation that "Kuwait is liberated" and stated: *"This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law and for what is right."*

2. Greece is a pivotal nation for U.S. interests in Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. should develop a "special relationship" with Greece. A principal requirement for the U.S. is to expand and deepen its relationship with Greece through a coordinated program in the political, military, commercial and cultural fields. Greece is a vigorous and stable democracy with a rapidly modernizing economy. Greece is a source of regional political leadership and democracy building, economic investment, and commercial expertise. Greece is the only regional state that is a member of the European Union, NATO and the European Monetary Union (EMU).

3. A fair and just settlement of the Cyprus problem based on UN resolutions and democratic norms and EU legal principles and common practices. A Cyprus settlement should not reward aggression. On July 7, 1988, then Vice President George Bush stated: *"We seek for Cyprus a constitutional democracy based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights."* On October 2, 1992, presidential candidate Governor Bill Clinton stated: *"A Cyprus settlement should be consistent with the fundamental principles of human rights and democratic norms and practices."* UN resolutions refer to a bizonal, bicommunal federation in a sovereign state.

4. A resolution of Aegean issues based on the rule of law—(1) the continental shelf and territorial waters and (2) Turkey's unilateral claims regarding Greek islets and islands and the maritime boundary between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean.

5. U.S. interests are best served by supporting the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.

6. The transformation of Turkey into a genuine democracy with the military under civilian rule. The U.S. should not apply double standards on the rule of law and human rights to Turkey. In the interest of regional stability and dispute resolution, the U.S. should promote Turkey's emergence as a fully democratic state able to complete the EU accession process and to participate fully in the economic opportunities presented by the improved regional climate. This process will require fundamental change in Turkey's governmental institutions, particularly a reduced role for its ubiquitous military, including putting it under civilian rule, a significant improvement in its human rights record, and meaningfully addressing its intransigence over Cyprus and the Aegean. Past U.S. policy has not had this effect and needs to be reviewed by the Bush administration and Congress.

A genuine democracy in Turkey is in the interests of the U.S., Turkey's neighbors and, above all, the Turkish people, including the 20 percent Kurdish minority. We should be giving full support to the democratic forces in Turkey who are contending with the self-perpetuating military junta.

In a perceptive article in the January 2001 issue of *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, editor Gregory R. Copley cites the Turkish General Staff as the main obstacle to governmental reforms needed for accession to the EU and states that *"it is time for Washington to support the real advocates of change in Turkey."* (p. 9)

HOW DOES THE U.S. ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION

How does the U.S. protect its national security interests and achieve its political objectives in the area?

Regarding our national security interests, following the Persian Gulf War we have (1) maintained a military presence in the Persian Gulf area; (2) we have the use of the Souda Bay, Crete naval base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet; and (3) the British have an airbase in Cyprus. There is no present risk to the world's access to Persian Gulf oil.

Regarding our political interests in the Cyprus and Aegean issues and Greek-Turkish rapprochement, some have suggested that the main effort to achieve progress and success is for the U.S. to encourage dialogue and communication between Greece and Turkey at all levels, political, military, business, cultural, etc., and confidence building measures (CBM), and for the U.S. to continue its dialogue and communication with the Turkish political and military leaders.

This procedure has not worked during the past decades and I do not believe it can or will work today because of the realities of the situation, although dialogue and communication should continue. By realities I do not mean the history of the last 500 years. The realities I speak of are this century's realities, particularly the current realities. Unless the U.S. faces these realities head-on, and is willing to exert diplomatic, economic and political pressure on Turkey, Greek-Turkish rapprochement will not develop as we wish it to, nor will there be any significant progress on Cyprus or the Aegean at this time.

THE REALITIES

1. The Turkish military controls foreign and domestic policy under the Turkish constitution. The Turkish military's political control is augmented and supported by (1) its ownership of substantial financial assets, and (2) its control of its own budget—amounting to one-third of state revenues. The Turkish military is the main cause of Turkey's economic, financial and political problems.

Former French Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Eric Rouleau, in an exceptional article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Turkey's Dream of Democracy" (November/December, 2000, pages 100–114), which should be required reading for anyone dealing with U.S. relations with Turkey, describes the Turkish military's control over the Turkish state. He writes:

> *A rigid, nationalist ideology and a powerful, activist officer corps: this is what the EU is up against in trying to persuade Turkey to totally revamp a constitution that institutionalizes the army's dominant power and blocks any move toward democratization (p. 105). Even EU membership, the ultimate incentive, may not be enough to convince the Turkish military to relinquish its hold on the jugular of the modern Turkish State.* (p. 102)

Ambassador Rouleau's article is attached as Exhibit 1.

Turkey is, and has been, under the control of a self-perpetuating military junta composed of the six military members of Turkey's National Security Council (NSC) and headed by the Chief of Staff, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu. The chief of staff *"decides on nominations and promotions within the armed forces"* and names his own successor (Rouleau, p. 106).

2. The Executive Branch of our government tries to create the perception of being a disinterested broker/mediator between Greece and Turkey. The reality is otherwise. Laurence Stern, former diplomatic correspondent and foreign news editor for the *Washington Post*, wrote in his book *The Wrong Horse* (New York Times Books, 1977), at page 7: *"One of the most important keys to an understanding of the Cyprus muddle is the realization that the United States, far from being a disinterested broker to the disputes of the past, was a deeply involved participant"* on Turkey's behalf.

3. The Cyprus issue is not a normal dispute between nations with merits on both sides. The Cyprus issue is one of aggression by Turkey and illegal occupation of 37.3 percent of Cyprus' territory. Turkey is the aggressor and Cyprus is the victim. Turkey in its aggression against Cyprus violated U.S. laws and agreements under those laws not to use U.S. arms and equipment for aggression. Turkey in its aggression against Cyprus violated the UN Charter (article 2(4)), the NATO Treaty (preamble and article 1) and customary international law.

There is no legal difference between Turkey's aggression against Cyprus and Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

4. The maritime boundary between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea is clear and has been long-established by international treaties, yet the Executive Branch refuses to so state even though it is a signatory to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and obligated to uphold its provisions.

5. U.S. support of Turkey in 1974 and since has prevented any meaningful negotiations with Turkey. Why should Turkey make any effort to solve the Cyprus problem when there is no pressure from the U.S.? Why should Turkey do anything when the U.S. was and is pushing for Turkey's admission as a candidate for EU accession without conditions?

Without adequate U.S. diplomatic, economic and political pressure on Turkey, there will be no progress on the Cyprus and Aegean issues or Greece-Turkey rapprochement. The U.S. appeasement of Turkey and the application of a double standard on the rule of law to Turkey since 1974 to date are the main causes for no progress.

6. Turkey is the cause of the tensions in the region, not the solution:

- aggression in Cyprus
- threats against Greece in the Aegean
- economic blockade of Armenia

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ITEMS

Ambassador Monteagle Stearns

Former U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, titled his remarks at the American Hellenic Institute Foundation's conference on The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece, "The U.S.-Greek Strategic Relationship During the Cold War and Beyond." He pointed out that during the Cold War the U.S. did not develop a Greek policy or a Turkish policy, but rather attempted to fit Greece and Turkey into the West's Soviet policy. He stated:

> *We in the U.S. and in Western Europe discounted the importance of regional problems. After the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. did not really develop a Greek policy or a Turkish policy. We simply tried to fit Greece and Turkey into our Soviet policy and the fit was never a comfortable one. But, this had another effect that was even more uncomfortable. It meant that we discounted the importance of regional problems—the problem of Cyprus, the problem of the Aegean, and the problem of Greek-Turkish relations generally—because we believed, incorrectly, that when Greece and Turkey were admitted into NATO in 1952, their ultimate security aspirations had been achieved. Everything else was of lesser concern. And this was, of course, far from the truth. Particularly as the Cold War turned into a frozen war, Greek preoccupations, and to some extent Turkish preoccupations, with regional issues became much more important in the two capitals.*
>
> *Not so in Washington. The mistake that the United States government made in this period, the post-Truman Doctrine period, was a peculiar American mistake. It was to regard Greece and Turkey as components of a strategic equation,*

rather than as products of their own historical experience. With the Cold War behind us, we must dismiss from our minds blocs and strategic equations and begin to approach regional problems on their merits.

Ambassador Stearns' remarks are a devastating indictment of U.S. foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey during and after the Cold War. That policy was driven in large part by career officials in the State and Defense Departments and on the staff of the National Security Council.

This tragic mistake of U.S. foreign policy was compounded by executive branch officials during this period when they failed to deal even-handedly with Greece and Turkey and opted instead to favor Turkey over Greece to the severe detriment of U.S. national interests.

There are a number of examples, from the 1950s to date, of the appeasement of Turkey and the failure to apply the rule of law to Turkey by the executive branch of our government, to the detriment of U.S. interests and Greece. The two most striking examples are the Cyprus problem and the Aegean Sea issue.

Cyprus

The most glaring and obvious example is the failure of the State Department, on July 20, 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, to halt immediately all military arms and equipment to Turkey as required by U.S. law, which prohibits the use of U.S. military aid for aggression. Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State at that time and bears the primary responsibility for this violation of American law. He is also responsible for encouraging the criminal coup against President Makarios of Cyprus on July 15, 1974, and for encouraging the illegal Turkish invasion five days later on July 20, 1974.

It is important to bear in mind that he had the support of key career officials, including Under Secretary Joseph Cisco, Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman and others except for one lone voice, that of the Cyprus Desk officer, Tom Boyatt. Kissinger transferred Boyatt to Chile in September 1974 and replaced him with Nelson Ledsky, who worked to subvert the application of the rule of law to Turkey. Since then the career officials in State and Defense have covered up the U.S. involvement on Turkey's side by creating the impression that the U.S. is acting as an "honest broker." Nelson Ledsky was later appointed as U.S. Cyprus coordinator. That is like putting the fox in the chicken coop.

The Aegean

The Aegean Sea issue is another example of the executive branch's policy of "tilt towards Turkey." During the islet of Imia crisis in the Aegean on January 28–31, 1996, the U.S. played a helpful role in preventing an armed clash between Greece and Turkey. However, the failure of the Clinton administration, with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in the lead, to recognize and state that under the treaties involved, including the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the islet of Imia is sovereign Greek territory, is a stark example of the appeasement of Turkey, the tilt towards Turkey, and the reckless disregard of the rule of law in international affairs.

The appeasement of and double standard on applying the rule of law to Turkey in the Aegean by the executive branch is the cause of Turkey's continuing claims on Greek islands in the Aegean, indeed for Turkey's claim to one-half of the Aegean.

The disgrace of U.S. policy in its pro-Turkish tilt on issues concerning Greek-Turkish relations is further compounded when one considers that:

1. Greece has been and is more important strategically to U.S. interests than Turkey, as demonstrated by World Wars I and II and most recently in the Persian Gulf War; and
2. Turkey has been an unreliable ally that actively aided the Soviet Union militarily during the Cold War, going back to at least the 1973 Middle East War.

Turkey's Financial Crisis

Turkey has had seventeen financial crises since 1961, yet the rescue efforts of the U.S. and the IMF and World Bank have failed to stabilize the Turkish economy. The reason that efforts have been unsuccessful is the failure to identify and address the key factor in Turkey's financial crises: the Turkish military, which controls foreign and domestic policy under the Turkish constitution. The Turkish military's political control is augmented and supported by (1) its ownership of substantial financial assets, and (2) its control of its own budget—amounting to one-third of state revenues. A copy of my March 12, 2001 letter to President George W. Bush on Turkey's December 2000 financial crisis is attached as Exhibit 2.

Turkey had a further financial crisis in March/April 2001, three months after the December 2000 crisis, and requested $25 billion from the international community. The IMF and World Bank, with the U.S. playing a major role, decided on a $10–11 billion package. Turkey's financial crisis gives the U.S. and the West an opportunity to make progress on Cyprus and the Aegean. My letter of May 9, 2001 to President Bush is attached as Exhibit 3.

Mr. Brett D. Schaefer, fellow at the Heritage Foundation, states in a February 28, 2001 article on the Turkish economic crisis that: *"The Administration must not . . . perpetuate the Clinton Administration's disastrous policy of insuring developing countries and international investors against their own imprudent actions."*

The Turkish Junta's Crimes Against Its Kurdish Minority Compared to Milosevic's Crimes Against Yugoslavia's Albanian Minority

Is there any difference (legal or otherwise) between Slobodan Milosevic's actions of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against its Albanian citizens in Kosovo and the Turkish military junta's actions (ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide) against its Kurdish citizens (a 20 percent minority) in the Kurdistan area of Turkey?

There are differences, but not legal or philosophical. Turkey's actions against the Kurds are genocidal in nature. The Turkish military's crimes against its Kurdish minority make Milosevic's actions pale in comparison. Ambassador Rouleau cites the following shocking figures:

> *Over the years, individuals who advocate conciliation, including parliamentarians of Kurdish origin, have been imprisoned by the hundreds. Parties formed by moderate Kurds have been outlawed one after another. Torture has become widespread, and disappearances and assassinations of lawyers, journalists, politicians, and business executives suspected of sympathizing with the rebels have multiplied. According to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in addition to the 35,000 people killed in military campaigns, 17,500 were assassinated between 1984, when the conflict began, and 1998. An additional 1,000 people were reportedly assassinated in the first nine months of 1999. According to the Turkish press, the authors of these crimes, none of whom have been arrested, belong to groups of mercenaries working either directly or indirectly for the security agencies.* (pp. 111–112)

In addition, the Turkish military burned over 2,500 Kurdish villages in its scorched-earth campaign resulting in over 2,500,000 Kurdish refugees.

Where are the foreign policy "experts" calling for a war crimes tribunal against Turkey's military and political leaders similar to the one for Yugoslavia? There are none at present. Is it because Turkey is a NATO ally and Yugoslavia is not?

The Turkish Military Junta's and then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's Crimes Against Humanity for Their Aggression Against Cyprus in 1974.

Turkey's invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, in which it seized about four percent of Cyprus' territory, and its renewed aggression on August 14–16, 1974, in which it occupied an additional 33 percent of Cyprus are war crimes. It should be noted that the renewed aggression in August 1974 occurred after the legitimate government of Cyprus had been restored on July 23, 1974. Milosevic was indicted as a war criminal. Why shouldn't the then Turkish military junta and the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit be indicted as war criminals?

Turkish Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash's War Crimes for His Part in the Killing in 1974 of Five American Civilians

The Turkish Cypriot leader Raff Denktash has admitted that the five American civilians of Greek Cypriot descent who were in the custody of the Turkish Cypriot Militia were killed by the Turkish Cypriot Militia during Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Mr. Denktash was in command of the Turkish Cypriot Militia. Why shouldn't he be indicted as a war criminal?

Turkey's Strategic Importance to the U.S.: Myth and Reality

A myth propagated by Turkey and its several United States "agents of influence," registered as foreign agents with the Justice Department, portrays Turkey as a strategic and loyal ally, vital to the national security interests of the United States. The reality is otherwise. First of all, the assertion that Turkey is "vital" to the national security interests of the United States is false on its face.

Turkey was of minimal national security value to the United States during the Cold War where the action was on the central front of Europe. U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey were for many years, unnecessary and duplicative of other superior listening posts and satellites. It was a waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars to keep

any listening facilities open in Turkey and American troops stationed there. (See Rossides "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," 17 *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, 21, Spring 1991, at page 79, footnote 187.)

We do not need the airfields in Turkey to conduct Operation Provide Comfort for the protection of the Iraqi Kurds. There are a number of other airbases in the area that can be used, including the British airbase on Cyprus and airbases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. What we do need is an Operation Provide Comfort for the protection of the Kurds in Turkey.

With the end of the Cold War in 1989–1990, Turkey's strategic value was diminished.

The Turkish military are supporters of Saddam Hussein. Turkey is pressing for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq and has allowed large-scale smuggling of oil and other goods from Iraq and the smuggling of goods into Iraq.

Arguments that Turkey can be helpful to the U.S. regarding the Central Asian countries is window dressing. We certainly do not need Turkey as an intermediary for us with those countries.

Mr. Ian Lesser, Rand Corporation senior analyst who testified regarding Turkey, has been a long-time apologist for Turkey. The remarks of Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, given at a conference sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on June 18, 2001, are more relevant and objective than the testimony of Mr. Lesser. The remarks of Dr. Carpenter are attached as Exhibit 4.

Turkey's Acts of Disloyalty to the U.S. and NATO and Unreliability as an Ally—Several Actions in Support of the Soviet Military

(1) During the 1973 Mid-East War, predating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by one year, Turkey refused the United States military overflight rights to resupply Israel and granted the USSR overland military convoy rights to resupply Syria and Iraq, and military overflight permission to resupply Egypt. See E. Luttwak, *The Politics of Sea Power*, 60–61, (1974). A member of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara wrote:

> *During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Moscow's overflights of Turkish airspace were tolerated. On the other hand, during the same Middle East conflict, Turkey refused to allow the United States refueling and reconnaissance facilities during the American airlift to Israel. Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Security and the Middle East," 52 Foreign Affairs, 157, 163 (Fall 1983).*

(2) In the 1977–1978 conflict in Ethiopia, Turkey granted the Soviets military overflight rights to supply the pro-Soviet Ethiopian communists under Col. Mengistu, who eventually prevailed. C. Meyer, *Facing Reality—From World Federalism to the CIA*, 276–80 (1980).

(3) Over NATO objections, Turkey allowed three Soviet aircraft carriers, the Kiev on July 18, 1976, the Minsk on February 25, 1979, and the Novorosiisk on May 16, 1976, passage rights through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits into the Mediterranean in violation of the Montreaux Convention of 1936. See generally *Washington Post*, July 19, 1976, at A26, col. 1; *New York Times*, February 26, 1979, at A13, col. 1. The Soviet ships posed a formidable threat to the United States Sixth Fleet.

(4) In 1979 Turkey refused to allow the United States to send 69 marines and six helicopters to American military facilities at Incirlik in Turkey for possible use in evacuating Americans from Iran. *New York Times*, February 13, 1979, at A8, col. 3.

(5) Again, in 1979 Turkey refused the United States request to allow U–2 intelligence flights (for Salt II verification) over Turkish airspace "unless Moscow agreed." *New York Times*, May 15, 1979, at A1, col. 3. This position was voiced over a period of months by Turkish officials, the opposition party and the military Chief of Staff, Gen. Kenan Evren.

(6) In May 1989, Turkey rejected an American request to inspect an advanced MIG–29 Soviet fighter plane, flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey. *New York Times*, May 28, 1989, at A12, col. 1.

(7) The Turkish government refused repeated American requests for the installation of antennas in Turkey concerning 11 transmitters whose broadcasts would have been directed primarily to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. The initiative by the United States Department of State sought to improve reception of programs broadcast by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America.

(8) Turkey further damaged NATO by vetoing NATO's effort to put military bases on various Greek islands for defensive purposes against the Soviet navy.

Turkey's unreliability as an ally, as evidenced by the above examples, should come as no surprise to those familiar with Turkey's history in the twentieth century. Turkey fought against the Allies in World War I. In World War II Turkey violated a treaty with France and Britain which required Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Instead, Turkey declared neutrality and openly aided Hitler by supplying Nazi Germany with vital chromium ore and as a transit country for other war materiel which prolonged World War II by seven months.

The Persian Gulf War

The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that Greece, not Turkey, is the strategic key to the projection of U.S. power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The NATO naval base in Souda Bay, Crete, is the key base for the projection of United States power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf through the Sixth Fleet and is far more important to U.S. strategic interests than all the listening posts and bases in Turkey. President Bush recognized the importance of Souda Bay by his historic visit to the Souda Bay base in July 1991.

Turkey sat on the sidelines throughout Desert Shield, refusing to send any forces to the U.S.-led Coalition, refusing to authorize a second land front from Turkey (see *Washington Post*, January 16, 1991, at A6, col. 5), and refusing to allow the use of the NATO air base at Incirlik, Turkey.

Desert Storm began on January 16, 1991. It was not until over 48 hours *after* the air war had begun on January 16, 1991, and only after the Iraqi air force and air defenses had been neutralized and the U.S. had achieved air superiority, that Turkey allowed a limited number of sorties out of the Incirlik NATO air base. Only one out of twenty coalition sorties originated in Turkey, and these were clearly unnecessary. The Turkish military and Turkish public opinion opposed the use of Incirlik NATO air base.

Regarding the two oil pipelines from Iraq through Turkey to the Mediterranean coast, Iraq, not Turkey, closed the first oil pipeline and reduced the flow of oil through the second by 75 percent for lack of customers. Turkey refused to act to shut off the second pipeline until after the UN Security Council passed resolution 661 on August 6, 1990 (*Washington Post*, August 8, 1990, at A12, col. 4). Other countries acted right away.

Further, we did not need Turkey to halt the remaining 25 percent of the second pipeline since the naval blockage would have prevented any movement of Iraqi oil from Turkey's Mediterranean port if there had been any customers. Turkey's President Ozal admitted this in a news conference on June 7, 1991 in Istanbul when he stated: "*If Turkey had not imposed an embargo and shut the pipeline it would have led to a blockade*" (Associated Press, June 7, 1991).

Turkey had no choice but to close the remaining pipeline once the Security Council acted. Otherwise, she would have been in violation of Security Council Resolution 661 and Article 25 of the UN Charter, which requires member states to comply with Security Council resolutions. By failing to implement S.C.Res.661, Turkey would have jeopardized her relations with the rest of the nations who supported S.C.Res.661, including the U.S., and the significant economic relations and aid from the U.S., other countries and international organizations.

Turkey's proponents stress that Turkey closed its 206-mile border with Iraq. In reality, the border was never fully closed. There was large-scale, openly organized smuggling along the Turkey-Iraq border. (See *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Turkish newspapers *Sabah*, Sept. 3, 1990, and *Cumhuriyet*, Sept. 22, 1990; and the Turkish weekly magazine *Yuzil*, Sept. 9, 1990.)

Turkey's proponents also assert that Turkish troops "tied down" 100,000 Iraqi forces. Again, the reality is otherwise, The Iraqi troops were stationed along the Syrian and Turkish borders in northern Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait and Iraq had no plans to move them south. Those troops had to be kept there in order to control the Kurds and check the Syrians.

While Turkey delayed support for the U.S.-initiated freeze on commercial dealings with Iraq and negotiated for compensation, and sat on the sidelines throughout Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Greece:

(1) immediately condemned Iraq's aggression;

(2) authorized from the first day of the crisis the use of the Souda Bay naval base to provide operational, logistical and command support for the U.S. Sixth Fleet 24 hours a day;

(3) authorized the use of the U.S. air base at Souda Bay to provide similar support to the U.S. Air Force in the build up of U.S. air power in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries;

(4) authorized military overflights and base access generally (the extraordinary number of over 32,000 military overflights of Greece occurred during Desert Shield/Desert Storm);

(5) joined the coalition forces and sent two naval frigates to the Persian Gulf; and offered air combat patrols and medical facilities.

The Greek merchant marine played a substantial role in the movement of cargo to the Persian Gulf for the U.S. and allied forces. The Greek merchant marine is an important asset for U.S. and NATO interests that is often overlooked in considering the relative strategic and military values of Greece and Turkey.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated that Turkey is fundamentally irrelevant for protecting the oil resources in the Persian Gulf and of limited value for U.S. national security interests in the present post-Cold War, post-Persian Gulf War eras.

The war proved that what is necessary for the protection of oil resources in the Persian Gulf is:

(1) the cooperation of the Gulf states with the U.S. by authorizing U.S. air and land bases in those countries, not in Turkey;

(2) the use of the naval base at Souda Bay, Crete;

(3) the use of the British bases in Cyprus; and

(4) the use of the U.S. naval base and facilities in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

David C. Morrison, in a comprehensive article, discussed in detail the U.S. base facilities in the Persian Gulf countries. (See *National Journal*, March 23, 1991, at 675.)

NATO and Turkey: A Stain on NATO's Honor

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a regional alliance created under article 52 of the United Nations Charter for collective defense against aggression under article 51 of the Charter. The fundamental principles, objectives and purposes of NATO are to deter aggression and to support democratic government. The preamble and article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty state:

> *The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.*
>
> *They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.*
>
> *They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.*
>
> *They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.*
>
> *They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:*
>
> *ARTICLE 1*
>
> *The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.*

Turkey violated article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty by failing "to settle" the Cyprus problem *"by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered"* and also by her *"use of force . . . inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."* Turkey also violated the policy set forth in the NATO preamble.

Turkey's invasion of Cyprus violated the United Nations Charter (article 1, paragraph 1; article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4; and the preamble). As a result, Turkey also violated article 1 and the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Turkey contravened the fundamental policies against aggression and in support of *"democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"* set forth in the preamble and underlying the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey breached both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. Although some argue that the North Atlantic Treaty applies to aggression against a member country only and not to aggression by a NATO member against a third party non-member, this interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 1 prohibits the use of force in *"any international dispute."*

At a minimum, NATO should have suspended Turkey until its aggression in Cyprus had been "purged." Purge is the word used by George Ball and Cy Vance in

their testimony before the House International Relations Committee on July 10, 1975. Instead, NATO assisted in supplying arms to Turkey after the Congress enacted an embargo in 1974. Furthermore, NATO's Secretary General Joseph Luns joined the Administration's lobbying effort to persuade the Congress to lift the embargo against Turkey.

Although Turkey continues to violate the North Atlantic Treaty by its presence in Cyprus, NATO has ignored the transgression. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is a stain on NATO's history and will remain until Turkey ends its illegal occupation of Cyprus.

Turkey could not qualify today for NATO membership. Its aggression in Cyprus could be used by NATO to suspend Turkey, or at a minimum not grant Turkey a veto over NATO actions until Turkey meets NATO standards. NATO should consider adopting the EU's conditions for Turkey.

NATO is not prevented from deciding that Turkey has no veto over NATO actions in view of Turkey's aggression against Cyprus which violates the UN Charter and the NATO Treaty.

Turkey and Human Rights

Turkey's human rights record is acknowledged as one of the worst in the twentieth century. The State Department's 2000 Human Rights Country Report section on Turkey covers 52 pages. The European Court of Human Rights on May 10, 2001 issued a devastating opinion on Turkey's human rights violations in Cyprus.

The Proposed Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

The Bush administration should put a halt to the previous administration's efforts to promote the proposed commercially uneconomic Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to bring oil from the Caspian Sea Basin to the West. It would require substantial unrecoupable subsidies from the U.S. CATO Institute research fellow Stanley Kober, in foreign policy briefing paper No. 63, "Washington's Misguided Support for the Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline" (October 31, 2000), discusses the economic problems and also sets forth the political problem: *"U.S.-Russia tensions . . . are being exacerbated over the pipeline issue . . . Thus, the pipeline, far from promoting U.S. interests in the region, undermines them. The U.S. government should heed its own rhetoric and let the market determine the pipeline route."*

Israel-Turkey Military Cooperation

Israel's military cooperation with Turkey makes Israel an accomplice to Turkey's horrendous human rights violations against the Kurds and the general population, including women. Israel's support of Turkey is a stain on the Holocaust. Israel obviously does not need Turkey to defend itself. Israeli defense contractors' relations with the Turkish military are also a stain on the Holocaust. I understand that it was a U.S. initiative that started the Israel-Turkey military cooperation.

U.S. Arms to Turkey Have Made the U.S. an Accomplice to the Turkish Military's Horrendous Human Rights Violations Against its Kurdish Citizens

The Clinton administration from 1993–2001 provided some $6 billion in military aid, via grants and loans, to Turkey. While some groups protested the arms transfers, which made the U.S. an accomplice to the Turkish military's ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide against the Kurds, where were the voices of the foreign policy establishment?

Demilitarization

Senator Bob Dole proposed demilitarization of Cyprus during the Senate debate on July 25, 1978, on the Carter administration's amendment, which passed, to remove the remaining arms embargo on Turkey. Dole voted against lifting the embargo and noted that *"[n]egotiations between the two communities have remained stalemated over the presence of the Turkish occupation force."* He stated:

> *The great need for demilitarization of Cyprus, involving withdrawal of both Greek and Turkish forces, must be stressed. . . . Once demilitarization of Cyprus is achieved, then the intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities over the territorial and political settlement will proceed much more smoothly. This must be the goal of all parties: to achieve demilitarization of Cyprus as soon as possible. . . . The President should also encourage the strengthening of the UN security force on the island to assist the demilitarization and provide the protection necessary throughout this process. . . . We do not seek to dilute the role of the United Nations in bringing peace to Cyprus—we seek to strengthen it. That role would be much more difficult . . . if we were to resume arms sales and shipments to Turkey before her tens of thousands of*

forces are removed from the island. By upholding the rule of law, we encourage its application and effectiveness in the future. 124 Cong. Rec. 22533–5 (1978)

Religious Freedom—The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Halki Patriarchal School of Theology

Religious freedom is a basic human right. This right is not enjoyed by Orthodox Christians in Turkey as evidenced by the chronic persecution of Orthodox Christians in Turkey, the harassment of the Ecumenical Patriarch and attacks on the Patriarchate in Istanbul. Further, we call on Turkey to stop the desecration of Orthodox Christian cemeteries in Istanbul, lift the restrictions imposed on the Saint Nicholas festival, a saint worshipped by Christians throughout the world, and permit persons to work at the Patriarchate who are not Turkish citizens.

We condemn the illegal closing by the Turkish Government in 1971 of the Halki Patriarchal School of Theology in violation of Turkey's obligations under the UN Charter and other international agreements, and call for its reopening.

Section 2804 of the 1999 Appropriations Bill, passed on October 22, 1998, states that:

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should use its influence with the Government of Turkey to suggest that the Government of Turkey—

(1) recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its nonpolitical, religious mission;

(2) ensure the continued maintenance of the institution's physical security needs, as provided for under Turkish and international law, including the Treaty of Lausanne, the 1968 Protocol, the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris;

(3) provide for the proper protection and safety of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Patriarchate personnel; and

(4) reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki Patriarchal School of Theology.

U.S. policy should be to support this legislation and to ensure that the actions called for in the law are implemented. In light of Greek-Turkish rapprochement efforts and Turkey becoming an EU accession candidate, the reopening of the Halki Patriarchal School of Theology would seem to be a next logical step for Turkey to take.

The Development of a Special Relationship Between the United States and Greece

The United States should heed Ambassador Stearn's remarks and develop a Greek policy and a Turkish policy. The U.S. should develop a special relationship with Greece because of that country's key strategic value for U.S. interests in the region, Greece's history, its reliability and because the U.S. is able to achieve its objectives with such a relationship based on mutual interests and benefits.

Greece today is still the key for U.S. interests in the region in protecting the sealanes in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas for the transportation of oil, natural gas and trade goods generally, and in promoting democracy, economic progress and stability in the Balkans. The U.S. has an important opportunity today to further American interests in the region by developing a special relationship with Greece, with mutual benefits to both countries. We should do everything possible to seize the opportunity.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member Hastings and members of the Subcommittee.

EXHIBIT 1

"Turkey's Dream of Democracy"

by Eric Rouleau
Former French Ambassador to Turkey

in
Foreign Affairs
November/December 2000

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Turkey's Dream of Democracy

Eric Rouleau

THE RULES OF THE GAME

TURKEY TODAY stands at a crossroads. Few other moments in the 77-year history of the Turkish republic have been so decisive. In the coming weeks, its parliament will begin to consider the "accession partnership document" recently presented to it by the European Union. The document is a road map for the far-reaching economic and political reforms Turkey must enact if it is to join the EU. Actual membership negotiations between Ankara and Brussels cannot begin until these reforms are implemented, which both parties hope will happen before 2004. But if Turkey expects to meet that deadline, it will need to start acting fast.

Less than a year ago in Helsinki, Finland, the EU finally decided to accept Turkey's candidacy for membership. The Turks were overjoyed. Since 1987, all of their previous applications to join the EU had been rejected. For 12 years, Turkey had complained that as a Muslim nation, it was being discriminated against by an exclusively Christian club. The Europeans had countered that democratic and economic deficiencies in Turkey's institutions and practices disqualified it from membership. If Ankara really wanted to join, Brussels instructed, it should start taking steps to meet the union's many requirements.

Then, at the December 1999 Helsinki meeting, the EU softened its stance and dropped its preconditions. The reasons for this about-face were several. Thanks to a thaw in bilateral relations, Greece had finally

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lifted its veto. And Turkey was too important a player on the international chessboard to be ignored. Bordering the oil fields of the Middle East, at the edge of the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (some of which are also rich in oil), and linked through its Ottoman past to the Balkans, Turkey has huge potential to play a stabilizing role in a turbulent region. Moreover, in the economic domain, Turkey had intensified its lucrative commercial and financial ties with Europe and had come to be considered one of the world's ten most promising emerging markets by the U.S. government.

The Helsinki decision called on Turkey, like all other EU membership candidates, to comply with the so-called Copenhagen rules. These guidelines, established in 1993, require EU hopefuls to build Western-style democratic institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, individual rights, and the protection of minorities. Indeed, the EU's eastern and central European candidates adopted most of the Copenhagen norms on their own, before even knocking at the doors of the union.

In contrast, in the ten months since the historic Helsinki decision, Ankara has made no moves to reform its institutions. It is true that, after abstaining for 34 years, Turkey recently signed (but has not ratified) two U.N. conventions on political rights. And some observers were encouraged by parliament's election in May of Ahmed Necdet Sezer, the country's highest-ranking judge and a known liberal, as president of the republic—although Sezer was seen as a nonpolitical compromise candidate and has limited power. Overall, however, the authoritarian nature of the regime appears to have hardened.

This August—to cite but one example—Ankara, acting at the instigation of the army high command, took advantage of a parliamentary recess to issue a decree authorizing it to dismiss, without charges or legal judgments, civil servants suspected of Islamist or pro-Kurdish sympathies. This decree, which could possibly affect tens of thousands of individuals, was denounced as unconstitutional and arbitrary by almost all of Turkey's unions and professional associations and by numerous politicians, jurists, and columnists. In an event unparalleled in the history of the republic, President Sezer vetoed the decree on the grounds that only parliament could pass such a measure. If parliament rejects the draft law when it reconvenes

this fall, the military may well interpret the vote as an intolerable challenge to its authority. A major national crisis could result.

This incident gives some idea of the enormous difficulties Ankara will face in adopting the Copenhagen rules. These measures represent more than simple reforms; they mean the virtual dismantling of Turkey's entire state system. This system, which places the armed forces at the very heart of political life, is deeply rooted in a centuries-old culture and in practices that have been ingrained for decades. Whether Turkey will choose to change them—and whether the army will let it—remains uncertain. Even EU membership, the ultimate

CORBIS-BETTMANN

Outranked: Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Ankara, August 1, 2000

term has become ubiquitous in the successive constitutions that the military has sponsored after overthrowing various civilian governments since 1960. Kemalism is likewise invoked in most of the laws based on those constitutions, as well as in the oaths of allegiance sworn on taking office by Turkey's presidents, parliamentarians, and high officials. To succeed or survive in modern Turkey, all opinions, initiatives, and behavior must conform to the ideas or intentions—real or imagined—of Kemal Atatürk.

Modern Kemalism is a faith simple in formulation and broadly positive in content. It has two major elements: the indivisibility of the nation and its territory and the secularism of the republic. The rigid conformity with which these basic principles are upheld is paradoxical,

however, and ill conforms to the true spirit of Mustafa Kemal. For although Kemalism has been transformed into a strict ideology since his death, Atatürk himself was no ideologue. He pragmatically borrowed from sources as varied as the French Revolution and the totalitarian regimes of his time in order to forge a nation-state bent on modernization and economic development. Just as paradoxical is the fact that the same people who have championed so-called Kemalist orthodoxy have never hesitated to go against its very essence whenever Atatürk's policies got in the way or were found anachronistic. Atatürk's single party has been replaced with a multiparty system and his statist economy has been gradually abandoned in favor of a market-driven one. Whereas Atatürk laid down the strict principle that under no circumstances should Turkey involve itself in the internal affairs of foreign countries, his successors in the military have defended not only Turkish-speaking minorities in other countries (Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and elsewhere) but also—surprisingly for a militantly secularist state—Muslim minorities in foreign lands (such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya).

Perhaps the most poignant irony of Kemalism today is the fact that the "Father of the Turks" unalterably opposed any intervention by the armed forces in the affairs of state—a principle that his admirers have consistently violated for the last 40 years. Such departures from the founder's principles have not prevented the military from virtually deifying Atatürk, however, or elevating Kemalism to the rank of sacrosanct dogma, while arrogating to its officers a monopoly on interpretation and the right to punish suspected dissidents.

The military's principal tool in this pursuit has been the officer corps, an elite caste par excellence. As described by veteran journalist Mehmet Ali Birand in his investigative work, *Shirts of Steel*, the officer system has been remarkably effective at reproducing itself generation after generation. Candidates for military careers, selected according to strict social, political, intellectual, and physical criteria, are taken completely in hand by the state from the age of 13 or 14. Cadets undergo intensive training in special schools that are beyond the jurisdiction of the ministry of national education. In addition to military training, they follow university-level courses in history, sociology, political science, and economics. The officer is meant to become a top civilian official in uniform; as the chief of staff noted in January 1998,

"A general should be able to act as a diplomat, whereas a diplomat should be familiar with military questions; both should be well versed in economics."

Nonetheless, officers enjoy greater privileges than civil servants at the same level: their pay is sometimes twice as high, they shop in subsidized military stores, they obtain low-interest housing loans, and they have access to exclusive holiday resorts, hotels, and clubs. Endowed with a sacred mission, they naturally occupy the pinnacle of the state, and their prestige is unequaled in Turkish society.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUMS

A RIGID, NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY and a powerful, activist officer corps: this is what the EU is up against in trying to persuade Turkey to totally revamp a constitution that institutionalizes the army's dominant power and blocks any move toward democratization. Unveiled in 1982 by the generals who had seized power two years before, Turkey's current constitution is the source of laws and practices that frequently undermine basic freedoms and human rights. This summer, in an unprecedentedly frank statement for someone of his rank, Sami Selçuk, the chief justice of Turkey's highest court of appeal, declared that 90 articles of the constitution should be canceled or amended in order to comply with EU rules and promote democratization—so many that it might be better to "rewrite it completely from scratch." This, in blunt terms, is what the EU has been implicitly suggesting in a series of reports and notes it has sent to Ankara for more than a decade.

One of Brussels' main targets has been Article 118, which establishes the National Security Council (NSC), a kind of shadow government through which the pashas can impose their will on parliament and the government. The NSC is made up of six high-ranking military officers and five civilians. Once a month, decked out in full dress uniform, the chief of staff and the heads of the army, navy, air force, and national police, along with a sixth general acting as the council's general secretary, meet with Turkey's president, prime minister, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior. The council is empowered to examine all the affairs of state, whether relating to domestic or to foreign policy. Its deliberations are never made public,

and even when decisions are announced, they are presented as "recommendations" to the government.

Civilians ignore these recommendations at their peril. Although the NSC acquiesced when its recent order to purge suspect civil servants was vetoed by President Sezer and sent to parliament for approval, the council was far less indulgent in the case of Prime Minister Erbakan. When Erbakan had the temerity to send the NSC's 20 "recommendations" aimed at "eradicating Islamist reaction" to parliament in February 1997, the military had him ousted. Erbakan signed his government's death warrant by pretending not to understand that the recommendations constituted an ultimatum.

Any public criticism of the military deemed insulting can result in a prison sentence.

The EU has not suggested that the NSC be abolished, but only that it be transformed into an informal and extraconstitutional consultative body with a civilian majority. Unsurprisingly, this idea was well received in Turkey's liberal circles. But the chief of staff hastened to dispel any illusions about the reform. Reminding Turks that the NSC's decisions are taken not by majority vote but by consensus, he declared that the council could include "even one hundred civilians, if that's what they want." As the editor in chief of the *Turkish Daily News,* Ilnur Çevik, explained, the chief of staff's apparent equanimity stemmed from the fact that the military's "qualitative superiority" on the council assured that the "consensus" it favored would be maintained—whoever joined the body. As Çevik wrote, "The military present their views and want them to be taken into consideration; no government dares challenge their views and 'advice.'" To ensure compliance, special offices set up within the general staff monitor the activities of most ministries.

The military's "qualitative superiority," as Çevik called it, is guaranteed by a number of articles of the constitution. For example, the constitution gives the chief of staff more power than the defense minister and all other members of government. Although the chief of staff comes after the prime minister in the order of protocol, in fact he has more authority in the most sensitive areas of the state. The head of the military is, in effect, responsible for the country's internal and external security, including the intelligence agencies. It is he who decides on nominations and promotions within the armed forces and who formulates defense policy.

The armed forces enjoy a similar autonomy in the judicial domain, having their own laws, courts, and judges to deal with matters concern-

ing military personnel—including cases where civilians are involved. Any public criticism of the military (in the press, for example) found to

152 legal texts—not counting the articles of the constitution. Article 312 of the penal code, for example, the abrogation of which the EU has repeatedly sought, penalizes views judged contrary to ethnic and religious harmony. This was the article used in 1998 to strip the 75-year-old Erbakan, a veteran of the political scene for more than three decades, of his civic rights for five years. The same article was applied again this year to sentence him to one year in prison for a campaign speech he gave in 1995, a year before he was appointed prime minister. Similarly, an arrest warrant was issued in August against Fethullah Gülen, a distinguished Muslim cleric who preaches tolerance and human rights. Though the warrant was subsequently dismissed, another prosecutor indicted him again for "planning to establish a theocratic dictatorship." Gülen, who is living in the United States while undergoing medical treatment, is the spiritual leader of an Islamic brotherhood that operates a network of hundreds of schools in Turkey and abroad that have won praise even from the ardently secularist Bülent Ecevit, Turkey's current prime minister. As Çevik editorialized in the *Turkish Daily News,* "Gülen and his people have done nothing but serve this country, yet we still want to harm them by sending Gülen to prison. Isn't this odd?"

Not if one shares the view of the pashas, who tend to be suspicious of any Muslim activist who is not under state control. As General Hilmi Özkök, speaking in August at his inauguration as chief of the army, declared, any "concession to radical Islamic factions will bring this country back to the darkness of the Middle Ages."

Finally, in addition to the constitution and penal code, the EU has also objected to a number of other laws. These restrict basic rights in various ways: by restricting and outlawing the formation of political parties, professional associations, and unions; by constraining the status of civil servants; by mandating dress codes; and so on.

MERCANTILE MILITARISM

APART FROM its constitutional guarantees, the political power of the pashas would be easier to curtail if it did not rest so firmly on considerable economic and financial means as well. In Turkey, it is the chief of staff, not the prime minister, cabinet, or parliament,

who oversees arms production and procurement (which do not figure in the state budget). It is also the general staff that draws up the annual budget of the armed forces (even though it absorbs more than a third of state revenues). Given the amounts involved—for example, the modernization of the armed forces will cost some $70 billion over the next 15 years—such budgetary control affords the military huge power. Time-honored tradition has it that parliament approves the military budget as is, without debate and by acclamation, before presenting it to the chief of staff along with its congratulations and good wishes. Again, civilian resistance is dangerous; among the "crimes" perpetrated by Erbakan that led to his downfall was his refusal to release funds requested by the chief of staff beyond the budget already approved by parliament.

Then there are the military-controlled industries. In a recent study, Taha Parla, a professor at Bosphorus University, throws light on the army's most important holdings. The main one, OYAK, is a vast conglomerate comprising some 30 enterprises in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing, cement works, food processing, pesticides, petroleum, tourism, insurance, banking, real estate, supermarkets, and high technology. These enterprises employ more than 30,000 people. One of the most important companies of the group is OYAK-Renault, which has an annual production capacity of 160,000 French-designed vehicles.

OYAK, among the three or four largest holding companies in Turkey, is unquestionably one of the most profitable. And with good reason: the group is exempt from duties and taxes. Big business puts up with what could be considered unfair competition because OYAK, shrewdly, has integrated the business community into its activities: OYAK's partners include the powerful holding companies of the Koç and Sabanci families—the "emperors" of Turkey's industry and trade—as well the private banking baron Kazim Taşkent. For their part, big Turkish corporations co-opt retired senior officers to serve on their boards, not only as compensation for services rendered but to maintain links with the current army brass.

OYAK's sister firm, TSKGV (Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces), is devoted exclusively to arms production. Benefiting from the same privileges as OYAK, TSKGV comprises some

30 companies and generates tens of thousands of jobs. More than 80 percent of its revenues go into a reserve fund estimated to reach tens of billions of dollars.

ENEMIES WITHIN

THE MILITARY'S economic base, its unique constitutional status, [illegible]

of power between the military and the civilian authority. Other factors can play a role as well. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, a combination of favorable circumstances and good statecraft on the part of then President Turgut Özal allowed him to temporarily curtail the pashas' ability to intervene in the government. Thus when Özal decided to support the allied forces during the Gulf war in 1991, the chief of staff, General Torumtay, could only resign in protest. Nor did the pashas move when Özal, acting against their well-known convictions, began to prepare the way for a political solution to the Kurdish problem and for integrating Turkey's Islamic sectors into the mainstream political system.

Özal's successors have had neither his stature nor the kind of circumstances that would enable them to follow his example, however. After

the other political—were launched against the two movements, Kurdish and Islamic. Drastic action was justified on the grounds that the PKK and the Islamist party were both determined to destroy Kemalist Turkey, the first by dismembering it, the second by infecting it with the virus of fundamentalism. The generals insisted that the movements were puppets in the hands of foreign powers, which supplied them generously with funds, arms, and logistical support. According to military statements made at the time, almost all of Turkey's neighbors—Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, Sudan, Libya, and Russia—were involved, not to mention Germany, the EU, and sometimes even the United States. These Western states were accused of being too indulgent toward the Islamists, the Kurds, or both.

The army pursued its war against the Kurds relentlessly. When in 1993 the PKK renounced its senseless separatist ambitions, proposing to end the armed conflict in order to negotiate autonomy or even decentralization for the Kurdish provinces of the southeast, the general staff ignored the offers or rejected them as "tricks." The PKK's leaders—by way of their various contradictions, political errors, and outright crimes—only made things easier for the generals. With their fuzzy Marxism-Leninism followed by attempts to ally themselves with the Islamists, their preference for armed struggle over political combat, and the atrocities they committed against civilians—Turkish and Kurdish alike—the Kurdish warlords served the interests of the hard-liners in Ankara.

The EU, like the United States, has always condemned separatism and terrorism. But it deems unacceptable the notion that these ills justify authoritarian rule, state repression, and the violation of human rights. The Turkish military's attitude, on the other hand, can be summed up in a 1995 statement by Deputy Chief of Staff Ahmet Görekçi, when he announced that the army would "not allow itself to be bound hand and foot by democracy and human rights."

Nor has it, judging from the human rights reports published annually by the U.S. State Department and by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Over the years, individuals who advocate conciliation, including parliamentarians of Kurdish origin, have been imprisoned by the hundreds. Parties formed by moderate Kurds have been outlawed one after another. Torture has become widespread, and disappearances and assassinations of lawyers, journalists, politicians,

and business executives suspected of sympathizing with the rebels have multiplied. According to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in addition to the 35,000 people killed in military campaigns, 17,500 were assassinated between 1984, when the conflict began, and 1998. An additional 1,000 people were reportedly assassinated in the first nine months of 1999. According to the Turkish press, the authors of these crimes, none of whom have been arrested, belong to groups of mercenaries working either directly or indirectly for the security agencies.

By 1999, the PKK had been totally defeated. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was imprisoned and condemned to death. The group's other leaders have since renounced violence and called on their followers to disband and to defend their cause "within the framework of peace and democracy." Rather than responding to these overtures, the army, unperturbed, continues to carry out "mopping up" operations in Turkey and northern Iraq, where former fighters have taken refuge. Emergency laws and the special courts are still in force in the nine Kurdish provinces. Capital punishment has not been abolished, despite Turkey's commitment to do so in keeping with EU demands. Nor is there any prospect of recognizing the Kurds' rights, since in the eyes of the military and civilian authorities the Kurds do not exist as a community. This extends even to cultural matters, such as teaching or broadcasting radio and television programs in Kurdish. Given this situation, it is not surprising that the Kurds are enthusiastic supporters of Turkey's EU membership. At least Brussels demands that their elementary rights be respected.

Meanwhile, the struggle—this one political—against the Islamists continues with the same tenacity. After outlawing the Rifah (Prosperity) Party two years ago, the legal procedure to ban its successor, the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, is already under way. The government's wrath against the Islamists seemed undiminished by Fazilet's setbacks in the last elections, when it fell from first to third place in the parliament. Nor is Ankara mollified by the fact that Fazilet's program and goals have been so moderated that certain media no longer consider it a "fundamentalist" party, while others describe its leaders as "Muslim Democrats." Indeed, the comparison to Europe's moderate Christian Democrats is apt. What exasperates the supporters of the status quo is that Fazilet, like Rifah before it, has made itself the

champion of democratization and human rights, thereby implicitly challenging the political power of the army.

DOUBLE VISION

TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY has crystallized the way in which two very different visions of the country are now facing off in a contest the outcome of which is difficult to predict. On the one side stands the Turkey of what can be called the "Kemalist republicans," those who see the military as the infallible interpreter of Atatürk's legacy and the sole guardian of the nation and the state. This side has formidable power; the military enjoys not only enormous constitutional and legislative advantages but also unrivaled prestige among large sectors of the population. As a university professor in Istanbul remarked this summer, "If the Turkish people had to choose between the European Union and our army, they would choose the army!"

On the other side stand—rather cautiously—what could be called the "Kemalist democrats." They are proud of the revolution carried out by the founder of the republic eight decades ago, but at the same time they believe that the regime should adapt to modernity and Western norms. This group includes intellectuals who maintain that Turkey needs democratization regardless of EU requirements, business circles in favor of the globalization of the economy, and (perhaps ironically) Kurds and Islamists hopeful that Brussels will ensure that their legitimate rights are recognized and guaranteed.

In a recent attempt to tip the scales in favor of his own brand of Kemalism, Chief of Staff Hüsayn Kivrikoglu made an ominous declaration on August 30. Warning the government and political parties to make sure that the bill to purge suspect civil servants is adopted as soon as parliament reconvenes, Kivrikoglu added that the army would closely monitor the process to determine how "sincere" the politicians are in "removing the rotten apples" or "reactionaries" who "have infiltrated the state by the thousands in the aim of destroying it." The chief of staff went on to note that even the judiciary has been infected by the Islamic virus, citing as an example the cancellation (subsequently reversed) of Gülen's arrest warrant.

Though the general's remarks sounded like an ultimatum, Hikmet Sami Türk, the minister of justice and himself a staunch secularist, had the courage to respond (albeit indirectly) that Turkey should avoid witch hunts and McCarthyism. And so tensions mount. With the civil service purge in the works and Brussels' "accession partnership document" soon to be considered, a confrontation between the army and civil society seems inevitable. Despite the unprecedentedly large numbers of people now willing to challenge the military's hold on Turkey's affairs, not everyone is optimistic about the outcome. In a remarkable forthcoming book, Ümit Cizre, a professor at Bilkent University in Ankara, laments that

> civil society has increasing latitude but no real strength; parliament contains opposition forces but has no real teeth; the judiciary operates with some independence at times but is by and large controlled politically; media can uncover the dark connections of organized crime, but is itself oligopolistically owned and is prone to nationalist and populist influences.

Will Turkey miss the boat for the European Union? Some of the pashas, jealous of their power, hope that it will. Others are betting that, owing to Turkey's strategic and economic importance and out of "respect for Turkey's national specificities" (to use Prime Minister Ecevit's delicate phrase), the EU will let Turkey into the union after only cosmetic reforms. This seems unlikely. But all that is certain today—as Turkey stands facing two very different paths forward—is that the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels will be difficult, painful, and will most likely last for many years to come.

EXHIBIT 2

AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE (AHI),
Washington, DC, March 12, 2001.

Hon. GEORGE W. BUSH, *President,*
The White House,
Washington, DC.

Re: Turkey's Financial Crisis

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I write regarding the present financial crisis in Turkey with suggestions as to the U.S. and IMF responses to the situation and factors that should be taken into account in determining what is in the best interests of the U.S.

The Turkish financial crisis has implications for overall U.S. relations with Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. In order to best serve U.S. interests in the region we must carefully analyze the reasons behind Turkey's endemic financial instability.

Turkey has had several financial crises over the past decades, yet the rescue efforts of the U.S. and the IMF have failed to stabilize the Turkish economy. The reason that efforts have been unsuccessful is the failure to identify and address the key factor in Turkey's financial crises: the Turkish military, which controls foreign and domestic policy under the Turkish constitution. The Turkish military's political control is augmented and supported by (1) its ownership of substantial financial assets, and (2) its control of its own budget—amounting to one-third of state revenues.

The military's constitutional control of domestic and foreign policy and its substantial economic base make it the prime beneficiary of any assistance from the IMF, the U.S. and other organizations. Yet it is the military which is the main cause of Turkey's economic, financial and political problems.

Former French Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Rouleau, in an exceptional article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled *Turkey's Dream of Democracy*, (November/December 2000, pages 100–114, copy enclosed), which should be required reading for anyone dealing with U.S. relations with Turkey, describes the Turkish military's control over the Turkish state. He writes:

> "A rigid, nationalist ideology and a powerful, activist officer corps: this is what the EU is up against in trying to persuade Turkey to totally revamp a constitution that institutionalizes the army's dominant power and blocks any move toward democratization." (p. 105)
>
> "Even EU membership, the ultimate incentive, may not be enough to convince the Turkish military to relinquish its hold on the jugular of the modern Turkish State." (p. 102)

Mr. Rouleau describes Turkey's National Security Council (NSC), established by Article 118 of the constitution, as:

> "a kind of shadow government through which the pashas [generals] can impose their will on parliament and the government. The NSC is made up of six high-ranking military officers and five civilians. Once a month, decked out in full dress uniform, the chief of staff and the heads of the army, navy, air force, and national police, along with a sixth general acting as the council's general secretary, meet with Turkey's president, prime minister, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior. The council is empowered to examine all the affairs of state, whether relating to domestic or to foreign policy. Its deliberations are never made public, and even when decisions are announced, they are presented as 'recommendations' to the government." (pp. 105–106)

Mr. Rouleau points out that:

> "the constitution gives the chief of staff more power than the defense minister and all other members of government. Although the chief of staff comes after the prime minister in the order of protocol, in fact he has more authority in the most sensitive areas of the state. The head of the military is, in effect, responsible for the country's internal and external security, including the intelligence agencies. It is he who decides on nominations and promotions within the armed forces and who formulates defense policy." (p. 106)

Mr. Rouleau describes "Mercantile Militarism" under which the general's political power rests "firmly on considerable economic and financial means." He writes:

> "In Turkey, it is the chief of staff, not the prime minister, cabinet, or parliament, who oversees arms production and procurement (which do not figure in the state budget). It is also the general staff that draws up the annual budg-

et of the armed forces (even though it absorbs more than a third of state revenues). Given the amounts involved—for example, the modernization of the armed forces will cost some $70 billion over the next 15 years—such budgetary control affords the military huge power. Time-honored tradition has it that parliament approves the military budget as is, without debate and by acclamation, before presenting it to the chief of staff along with its congratulations and good wishes." (pp. 108–109)

"Then there are the military-controlled industries. In a recent study, Taha Parla, a professor at Bosphorus University, throws light on the army's most important holdings. The main one, OYAK, is a vast conglomerate comprising some 30 enterprises in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing, cement works, food processing, pesticides, petroleum, tourism, insurance, banking, real estate, supermarkets, and high technology. These enterprises employ more than 30,000 people. One of the most important companies of the group is OYAK-Renault, which has an annual production capacity of 160,000 French-designed vehicles.

OYAK, among the three or four largest holding companies in Turkey, is unquestionably one of the most profitable. And with good reason: the group is exempt from duties and taxes. Big business puts up with what could be considered unfair competition because OYAK, shrewdly, has integrated the business community into its activities: OYAK's partners include the powerful holding companies of the Koc and Sabanci families—the "emperors" of Turkey's industry and trade—as well the private banking baron Kazim Taskent. For their part, big Turkish corporations co-opt retired senior officers to serve on their boards, not only as compensation for services rendered but to maintain links with the current army brass.

OYAK's sister firm, TSKGV (Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces), is devoted exclusively to arms production. Benefiting from the same privileges as OYAK, TSKGV comprises some 30 companies and generates tens of thousands of jobs. More than 80 percent of its revenues go into a reserve fund estimated to reach tens of billions of dollars." (pp. 109–110)

These military-owned companies are highly profitable because they are exempt from duties and taxes, a unique form of official corruption. Corruption is endemic, including the smuggling of oil from Iraq with substantial revenue for military commanders, and complicity in drug trafficking. The recent dispute between Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer stemmed from Prime Minster Ecevit's foot-dragging on corruption investigations.

Shoring up the Turkish economy without reforming the military's "hold on the jugular of the modern Turkish state" is self-defeating and only ensures that American interests will not be served. The IMF, U.S. and other outside assistance to Turkey should be conditioned on reform of the military's control of the Turkish state and its military-industrial complex. Examples of conditions which have an economic factor and which the IMF should require for any continued aid under its December decision, include:

- putting the military budget "which absorbs more than a third of state revenues" under civilian control;
- a halt in the ruinous and unnecessary arms buildup, an estimated $70 billion over the next 15 years. Turkey's arms buildup forces Greece into an arms race which is harmful to both nations;
- a halt in the negotiations to purchase 145 Cobra attack helicopters from Bell Textron for $4.1 billion;
- the removal of the military from control/ownership of (1) arms production and procurement companies through TSKGV (Foundation for the strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces), and (2) OYAK, "a vast conglomerate, comprising some 30 enterprises" and any other companies operating in the private sector. These companies should be sold and the proceeds used to reduce Turkey's external debt, including the billions of dollars owed to the U.S;
- the use in the current financial crisis of the "*tens of billions of dollars*" in the TSKGV "*reserve fund*;" and
- A halt of the previous administration's efforts to promote the proposed commercially uneconomic Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to bring oil from the Caspian Sea Basin to the West. It would require substantial unrecoupable subsidies from the U.S. CATO research fellow Stanley Kober, in foreign policy briefing paper No.63, *"Washington's Misguided Support for the Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline"* (October 31, 2000), discusses the economic problems and also sets forth the political problem: "U.S.-Russia tensions . . . are being exacerbated over the

pipeline issue . . . Thus, the pipeline, far from promoting U.S. interests in the region, undermines them. The U.S. government should heed its own rhetoric and let the market determine the pipeline route."

Fundamental to any lasting reform is the revision of the Turkish constitution to place the military under civilian control. There is no bar to the IMF making an economic judgment that financial assistance to Turkey, without political reforms, is self-defeating—that it would primarily help the generals and would not go to the root of the problem.

The present financial crisis gives the U.S., the IMF, the EU and NATO an important opportunity to require Turkey to put the military in the barracks and to establish civilian control over the elitist and racist Turkish military.

Turkey is, and has been, under the control of a self-perpetuating military junta composed of the 6 military members of Turkey's NSC and headed by the Chief of Staff, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu. The chief of staff "decides on nominations and promotions within the armed forces" and names his own successor.

A genuine democracy in Turkey is in the interests of the U.S., Turkey's neighbors and, above all, the Turkish people, including the 20% Kurdish minority. We should be giving full support to the democratic forces in Turkey who are contending with the self-perpetuating military junta.

In a perceptive article in the January 2001 issue of "Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy," editor Gregory R. Copley cites the Turkish General Staff as the main obstacle to governmental reforms needed for accession to the EU and states that "it is time for Washington to support the real advocates of change in Turkey." (p.9)

Mr. Brett D. Schaefer, fellow at the Heritage Foundation, states in a February 28, 2001 article on the Turkish economic crisis that: "The Administration must not . . . perpetuate the Clinton Administration's disastrous policy of insuring developing countries and international investors against their own imprudent actions."

The IMF, with the full and open support of the U.S., should make its conditions known to the Turkish government and military leaders and then sit tight. No further aid under the IMF December decision should be made until real and identifiable reforms are institutionalized. The financial crisis presents an exceptional and unique opportunity to get fundamental change in Turkey to everyone's benefit except the Turkish generals and admirals growing rich on the backs of the Turkish people. Let's not squander this opportunity.

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is the main political puppet of the military. In 1974 it was then Prime Minister Ecevit who announced the invasion of Cyprus ordered by the Turkish military. Today Ecevit continues to do the bidding of the military. We have the spectacle of Ecevit asking for an additional $25 billion in loans, a Turkish negotiating technique, which is also designed to divert attention from the real issue, the Turkish military and needed government reforms to bring genuine democracy to Turkey. The IMF should demand that Ecevit and the military use the "tens of billions of dollars" from the military's "reserve fund" to assist in the current financial crisis.

The halt in U.S. and other nations' arms sales to Turkey is particularly important for the economy of Turkey and it would send an important message to Turkey. Money Turkey spends on arms should go to a host of domestic needs. There is no real threat to Turkey in the region and those who contend otherwise have other motives. Turkey is the cause of tensions in the region, not the solution.

There is also an overriding moral issue involved in arms sales to Turkey. The arms Turkey buys have been used by the Turkish military in its "war of terror" against its Kurdish minority. From 1984 to 1998 the Turkish military has killed some 35,000 innocent Kurdish civilians in military campaigns, burned over 2,500 villages in its scorched-earth campaign resulting in over 2,500,000 Kurdish refugees, and has had over 17,500 Kurds assassinated in extrajudicial killings.

Ambassador Rouleau details the war of terror by the Turkish military against its Kurdish minority as follows:

"Over the years, individuals who advocate conciliation, including parliamentarians of Kurdish origin, have been imprisoned by the hundreds. Parties formed by moderate Kurds have been outlawed one after another. Torture has become widespread, and disappearances and assassinations of lawyers, journalists, politicians, and business executives suspected of sympathizing with the rebels have multiplied. According to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in addition to the 35,000 people killed in military campaigns, 17,500 were assassinated between 1984, when the conflict began, and 1998. An additional 1,000 people were reportedly assassinated in the first nine months of 1999. According to the Turkish press, the authors of these crimes, none of whom have been arrested, belong

to groups of mercenaries working either directly or indirectly for the security agencies." (pp. 111–112)

The State Department Human Rights Country Report for 2000 devotes 52 pages to Turkey's human rights abuses.

The sale of arms by the Clinton administration—$6 billion between 1993–2000—has made the U.S. a direct accessory to Turkey's crimes against the Kurds. Israel's military cooperation with Turkey and Israel's defense contractors' deals with the Turkish military, at the U.S. initiative and encouragement, also makes Israel an accessory to Turkey's crimes.

Mr. President, in response to a question on Iraq in your press conference on February 22, you stated "We're reviewing all policy in all regions of the world." I assume that includes the Clinton adminstration's policy towards Turkey, which is in urgent need of a critical review. In addition to the present economic and financial review caused by the current crisis, an overall review should include political reform as discussed above and should consider the following questions:

- an assessment to determine whether the Clinton policy impeded Turkey's democratization;
- an assessment of the thesis of the Clinton administration that Turkey's strategic value to the U.S. is such that the U.S. should forego its principles and values and the rule of law regarding Turkey actions;
- an assessment of Turkey's reliability as an ally;
- an assessment of Turkey's strategic value;
- a reassessment of the Clinton policy of appeasing Turkey regarding the Cyprus and Aegean issues; and
- an assessment of the impact on U.S.-Russia relations of the Clinton administration's Turkish policy.

As Turkey's closest ally, the U.S. must be prepared to tell Ankara that the military must return to the barracks and allow meaningful reform to proceed. During the December bank scandal in Turkey, the IMF balked at the idea of bailing out a nation whose record of corruption and default was so notorious. After pressure from the Clinton administration, the IMF grudgingly agreed to the bailout—the prime beneficiary of which is the military. A mere two months later, Turkey has again erupted in financial crisis.

The EU put conditions on Turkey as a candidate for accession, which requires Ankara to make genuine democratic reforms. The U.S. and the IMF should do the same.

I am sending copies of this letter to Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, your Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice and the Congress.

Respectfully,

EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, *General Counsel*
Senior Counsel, Rogers & Wells.

Enclosure

EXHIBIT 3

AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE (AHI),
Washington, DC, March 12, 2001.

Hon. GEORGE W. BUSH, *President,*
The White House,
Washington, DC.

Re: International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Loans to Turkey

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I write regarding the IMF's and World Bank's current decision to loan Turkey an additional $10 billion, and as a follow-up to my letter to you of March 12, 2001 on Turkey's financial crisis.

We applaud the following positions of Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill regarding the IMF and World Bank loans to Turkey (*New York Times*, April 27, 2001, at A8, col. 3):

- that the U.S. will not give a bilateral loan to Turkey in addition to the IMF and World Bank loans;

- that Turkey must adhere strictly to the conditions imposed by the IMF and World Bank for the loans;
- that Turkey will not receive any more international assistance if their latest economic overhaul plan fails;
- that the Turkish economic minister should design the economic program with care because the international safety net will be withdrawn after this round of aid; and
- that the emphasis be placed on prior actions, meaning that aid money will not be distributed until promised changes are implemented by government officials and parliament.

"'The U.S. has made it clear that it's three strikes and you're out,' said one person involved in the negotiations. The latest aid package would be Turkey's third from international lending agencies in recent months." (*New York Times*, Id.)

However, we are most disappointed that the potential list of conditions does not appear to include the following conditions which have an economic impact, namely:

- a requirement that the Turkish generals divest the military of its ownership of private sector companies (please see my letter to you of March 12, 2001);
- a requirement that the billions of dollars in the military reserve fund be used first (Id.);
- removal of the Turkish military from control of its own budget (Id.); and
- a requirement that Turkey remove from Cyprus its 35,000 illegal occupation troops and 80,000 illegal settlers from Turkey. The Turkish occupation of Cyprus costs Turkey an estimated $1 billion annually ($350 million subsidy to the illegal Denktash regime and an estimated $650 million for the troops and settlers). The UN peacekeeping force, as is or enhanced, can handle any alleged security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, many of the Turkish Cypriots are more concerned about their security from the 80,000 Turkish settlers and the 35,000 Turkish troops.

American values spearheaded by the rule of law should be the keystone for U.S. foreign policy. Through its unlawful 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turkey violated the UN Charter, the NATO Treaty, U.S. laws and bilateral agreements, as well as international law. The U.S. was involved in Turkey's 1974 invasion through the actions of then Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and the U.S. has a moral obligation to right this wrong.

I am enclosing a copy of my March 12, 2001 letter to you for your convenience.

Respectfully,

EUGENE T. ROSSIDES

Enclosure

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of the Treasury Paul H. O'Neill
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
IMF Managing Director Horst Kohler
IMF Alternate U.S. Executive Director Meg Lundsager
President James D. Wolfensohn, The World Bank Group
Executive Director Jan Piercy representing U.S., The World Bank Group
The Congress

EXHIBIT 4

THE EUROPEAN UNION ASCENDANT: DEALING WITH SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

By Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute

One of the thorniest problems for the United States and NATO throughout the Cold War era was the hostile relationship between Greece and Turkey. From the moment both countries joined the Alliance in the early 1950s, their constant spats were arguably the principal source of tension within NATO—eclipsing even the disruption caused by French president Charles De Gaulle's decision to pull France out of the Alliance's military structure. Monteagle Stearns, former ambassador to

Greece, points out that the United States and its NATO partners had to restrain Ankara and Athens from going to war on no fewer than three occasions during the Cold War.[1]

Matters did not improve appreciably during the initial post-Cold War decade. In January 1996, the two countries nearly came to blows over a territorial dispute involving an uninhabited islet off the Turkish coast known as Imia to the Greeks and Kardak to the Turks. Both countries deployed warships to the area, and the United States once again launched a concerted diplomatic effort to forestall an armed conflict.

Tensions flared alarmingly once again in 1997 and 1998 when Cyprus (apparently with the acquiescence of Athens) announced plans to purchase and deploy Russian-made S–300 anti-aircraft missiles. Turkey threatened to use force to prevent any deployment, and the crisis did not abate until Cyprus and Greece backed away from the abyss by putting the missiles on the Greek island of Crete (more distant from Turkish territory) rather than on Cyprus. Yet another crisis erupted in early 1999 when evidence emerged that hardline elements in Greece had smuggled in Abdullah Ocalan, the fugitive leader of the principal armed separatist force in Turkey, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

Relations have improved modestly in the past two years, fueled primarily by a series of conciliatory gestures by Athens. The government of Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis appears to be genuinely committed to a better relationship with Turkey. Among other actions, the Greek government has removed itself from being the principal roadblock to Turkey's declared ambition to become a member of the European Union.

Thus far, though, there have been few reciprocal concessions from Ankara. The one exception is the April 2001 agreement by both countries to reduce arms spending.[2] That is a modestly encouraging development, but it remains to be seen whether the Turkish military hierarchy will actually carry out the commitment. Moreover, the substantive disputes between Greece and Turkey are not materially closer to resolution than they were before. In addition to the festering problem of Cyprus, there are other sources of potential trouble. Those include quarrels over the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the Aegean shelf, territorial disputes involving a number of islands in the Aegean, and provocative deployments and maneuvers by Greek and Turkish air and naval forces—especially the Turkish air force's tendency to violate Greek air space.

There are three outside parties—NATO, the EU, and the United States—that are especially interested in future relations between Greece and Turkey and the overall security situation in the eastern Mediterranean. Of those three parties, NATO has the least significant and constructive role to play.

Proponents of a NATO-centric policy like to argue that membership in the Alliance, and the patterns of communication and cooperation that were fostered by that membership, is an important reason why Greece and Turkey have never actually come to blows. There is some truth to that assertion, but the argument should not be carried too far. Throughout the Cold War, both countries faced a very serious mutual security threat: the Soviet Union. Leaders in Athens and Ankara understood that carrying Greco-Turkish disputes to the point of armed conflict would threaten to rupture NATO and leave them to Moscow's tender mercies. No rational official in either country wanted to incur that risk. It is far from certain whether NATO membership and the sense of alliance solidarity will exert a sufficient continuing constraint now that there is no longer a looming external mutual security threat. NATO, in short, is likely to be an increasingly marginal player in the Greco-Turkish relationship.

The United States has a more significant role to play, but it is a relatively narrow one. Washington's principal contribution to peace in the region should be to stop being Ankara's enabler for irresponsible behavior. Because they consider Turkey such an indispensable ally, U.S. officials have too often applied a double standard when it comes to that country's actions.[3] Washington's criticism of Ankara for its

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[1] Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).response to a pro-unification coup orchestrated by the military junta in Greece. Turkey followed up its initial intervention with a military offensive that culminated in the occupation of 37 percent of the island and the expulsion of nearly 180,000 Greek Cypriots. For weeks afterward, NATO teetered on the brink of an intra-alliance war. But there had been earlier "near collisions" as well. In both 1964 and 1967, Washington and other NATO capitals had to pressure Greece and Turkey to dampen their confrontational inclinations.

[2] Andrew Borowiec, "Greece, Turkey Agree to Arms Cuts," *Washington Times*, April 25, 2001, p. A14.

[3] Ted Galen Carpenter, "Wearing Blinders on Turkey?" *Washington Times*, November 18, 1999, p. A17.

continuing occupation of northern Cyprus has been tepid, at best. Indeed, the United States has repeatedly sought to play the role of mediator, as though there is a moral equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

The double standard surfaces in other ways. During the first stage of NATO's enlargement, the United States was most insistent that all new members must have solid democratic credentials and that their militaries must be clearly under civilian control. Yet even as the debate about the admission of new members went forward, Turkey's military gave the country's elected prime minister an ultimatum to either resign or be forced from office. Again, Washington's criticism of such flagrantly undemocratic behavior was barely audible.

Turkey's bullying behavior against other countries has drawn little, if any criticism, from the United States. Ankara's exceedingly dubious claims to Greek islands in the Aegean provoke little more than U.S. calls for restraint on both sides. Turkey's threat to use force against Syria unless that country not only severed all ties with Ocalan but also gave up all claims to a disputed border province did not even result in that reaction by Washington. Likewise, U.S. officials have failed to condemn Turkey's economic embargo against Armenia, much less pressure Ankara to end it.

A more subtle, but equally troubling, development has been Washington's tendency to act as Turkey's chief lobbyist in that country's relations with the EU. When the EU states continued to show reluctance during the mid and late 1990s about considering Turkey as a candidate for membership, U.S. officials openly criticized their position and implied publically that ethnic and religious prejudice was to blame. Although it would be naive to assume that such prejudice was entirely absent, Washington largely ignored the reality that Turkey's chaotic economy, its inadequate democratic credentials (especially the dominant role played by the military), and its abysmal human-rights record were far more important reasons for the EU's caution.

Now that the EU has decided to consider Turkey's candidacy, it is especially important that Washington's meddlesome interference cease. It was bad enough for the United States to pressure the EU to consider Turkey as a candidate for membership, given that country's glaring deficiencies. It would be far worse to pressure the EU to dilute its membership standards to admit Turkey at an early date. Turkey is not even close to being ready for admission. Significant changes in Ankara's external behavior, as well as massive internal political and economic reforms, are needed before it can ever become a credible candidate.

That underscores a more fundamental point. The United States should make it clear that it regards the European Union as the lead institution in dealing with the problems of the eastern Mediterranean. The EU is likely to assume that role in any case—assuming that the decision of Ireland's voters rejecting the Nice Treaty is eventually reversed and the enlargement of the Union goes forward. Indeed, it is the prospect of EU enlargement that offers the best hope for resolving some of the heretofore intractable security problems of the region.

The probable admission of Cyprus in 2003 creates an entirely new dynamic regarding that dispute. Even as Cyprus became a candidate for membership, Turkey clung to the hope that EU members would ultimately balk at admitting a state with such a huge, unresolved political and territorial problem. Turkish officials seemed to entertain two somewhat contradictory expectations. On the one hand, they hoped that the EU would recognize Ankara's puppet state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and approve its accession at the same time the Republic of Cyprus was taken into the ranks of new members. Failing that, Ankara believed that one or more EU members would indefinitely block the admission of any Cyprus entity—perhaps until Turkey itself was ready for membership. In short, by issuing vague (and sometimes not-so-vague) threats, Turkish officials believed they could intimidate the EU into agreeing to a settlement of the Cyprus issue on Ankara's terms.

As the date for the admission of the first round of new members draws closer and Cyprus stays in the front rank, either expectation looks increasingly unfounded. Turkey will soon face a difficult but absolutely crucial decision. If the Republic of Cyprus becomes a member of the EU even though the division of the island remains unresolved, Ankara will then have a troublesome dispute, not just with the Cypriot government, but with the entire EU. The TRNC will be out in the cold, unable to enjoy the economic benefits of EU membership that their Greek Cypriot compatriots

will enjoy fully. The prospect of that outcome is already causing tensions between Turkish Cypriots in the TRNC and the authorities in Ankara.[4]

Cyprus as a member of the EU also has important implications for Turkey's own membership aspirations. Membership in the EU would give Nicosia the right to block Ankara's accession. And it is difficult to imagine any Cypriot government approving EU membership for Turkey while Turkish troops still occupy 37 percent of Cyprus.

Consequently, if Turkey is serious about wanting to join the EU, it will have to make major concessions on the Cyprus issue—and do so soon. The key question is how serious Turkey is about becoming a part of the EU. Certainly, there are some influential Turks who believe that their country's destiny resides with the democratic West and want to make whatever reasonable domestic and international concessions are necessary to achieve that result. Much of the Turkish business community and a sizable contingent of pro-Western intellectuals are members of that camp. They are, however, opposed by very powerful domestic forces.

There is a tendency among some analysts to divide Turkish political opinion into two stark camps: pro-Western secular forces and anti-Western radical Islamic forces. The reality is much more complex. There are at least five major factions. The genuine pro-Western democrats have already been mentioned. The radical Islamists constitute another faction, and they generally oppose Turkey's involvement in Western institutions. There is also a radical secular nationalist faction, whose members embrace a nationalism bordering on chauvinism and want to be part of the West only on Turkey's terms, if at all. The growing strength of the Nationalist Action Party is a worrisome indicator of that faction's prominence. The traditional secular parties (Motherland and True Path) constitute a fourth faction. They are largely dedicated to preserving their political and economic prerogatives (including the fruits of corruption) and are willing to join the EU only if those are not diminished unduly. Finally, and most important, there is the military. Elements of all four other factions can be found in that institution. As in the case of the secular parties, most of the military leadership is interested in Turkey's EU membership only if it can maintain its influential position in the country's constitutional system.

Turkey faces a major domestic struggle on the question of EU membership, and its outcome is anything but certain. Ankara's negotiations with the EU regarding the Rapid Reaction Force offer reasons for both optimism and pessimism. For months, Turkey was the principal obstacle to an agreement that would allow the new RRF to use NATO assets for peacekeeping or other operations. Ankara made two especially important demands. One was that Turkey would have a full role in the EU's decisionmaking process when it came to the use of force. In essence, Turkey was insisting on being treated as a de facto EU member on such decisions. The other demand was that the Aegean and Cyprus would be off limits to any operations by the RRF.

Turkey stubbornly adhered to its position until EU officials began to emphasize that such obstructionism was jeopardizing Turkey's relations with the Union, and (by implication, at least) Turkey's long-term prospects for admission. Finally, according to press reports, a compromise was reached whereby Turkey received much, but by no means all, of what it was demanding. Under the agreement in principle, Turkey would be consulted and have input into any decision to use the RRF but would not be given a vote, much less a veto. Instead of a written assurance that the RRF would not be used in the Aegean or Cyprus, Turkey received "informal assurances" to that effect.[5]

There is little question that the lure of the benefits of membership in the EU is powerful. Without it, Ankara might well have remained recalcitrant on the RRF issue. Another indication of how much the country is being tempted is that, despite opposition, a parliamentary commission is recommending some 51 changes in Turkey's constitution to harmonize it with EU requirements.[6]

The prospect of Turkey's membership in the EU offers the best hope for both a more democratic Turkey and one that is more willing to live in peace with its neighbors. The road to accession would require a multitude of domestic changes, including greater protections for freedom of expression, reform of the criminal justice system, more rational economic policies, and an end to the dominant position of the

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[4] Gokhna Tezgor, "Turkish Cypriots Ponder the 'Motherland,'" Reuters, February 11, 2001; and Andrew Borowiec, "Lira's Plunge Emblematic of Turkish Cyprus' Woes," *Washington Times*, March 14, 2001, p. A13.

[5] Judy Dempsey, "Turkey Accord with NATO Opens Way to EU Force," *Financial Times*, May 30, 2001, p. 1; "Turkey Says Has 'Deal' on EU Using NATO Assets," Reuters, May 29, 2001; and Jeffrey Ulbrich, "EU Mulls a New Deal With Turkey," Associated Press, June 7, 2001.

[6] "Turkey Drafts EU Constitutional Reforms," Reuters, May 24, 2001.

military. Equally important, it would require dramatic changes in Turkey's behavior toward neighboring countries. The occupation of northern Cyprus would almost certainly have to end, and Ankara would likely have to terminate its claims to Greek islands in the Aegean.

Both NATO and the United States can facilitate such benign developments. NATO can do so by accepting a serious security role for the EU generally and by explicitly recognizing that it will be the lead institution in dealing with eastern Mediterranean matters. The United States can do so by pointedly declining to encourage Ankara's hopes that Washington will pressure the EU to dilute its demands on Turkey. Instead, U.S. leaders should make it clear to their Turkish counterparts that America stands firmly behind the EU's policies and that Turkey should accommodate Brussels. That would not only signal U.S. recognition of the new realities, but it would facilitate constructive change.

Mr. GALLEGLY. And our first witness is Mr. John Sitilides, Executive Director of the Western Policy Center. Mr. Sitilides, welcome.

STATEMENT OF JOHN SITILIDES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WESTERN POLICY CENTER

Mr. SITILIDES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gallegly and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean, and I commend your initiative in focusing on this important region. I would also request that my prepared remarks be entered into the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, the entire statement will be made a part of record.

Mr. SITILIDES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the Western Policy Center, we take the position that improved Greek-Turkish relations and solutions to the problems between our two NATO allies form the heart of U.S. strategic interests in southeastern Europe, at the nexus of a broader region encompassing the Balkans, the Caspian region, and the Middle East. Historically, Greece has been a unique ally to the United States. It is one of only seven countries that have fought alongside the U.S. in every major conflict in the 20th century, from World War I through Kosovo.

From 1974 to the mid 1990's, however, Greece and the United States went through a rocky period. Greece became resentful of U.S. support for the military junta ruling Greece from 1967 until 1974, and angry at what it viewed as U.S. acquiescence toward Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. The U.S. grew resentful of anti-American rhetoric by many Greek politicians, Greece's tilt toward regimes and policies that challenged some U.S. interests, and terrorist acts against U.S. officials. These old tensions still color perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic.

But over the past several years, Greece has boldly recalculated its national interests in a manner that harmonizes U.S. and Greek policies more than at any time in decades. As the sole regional member of both NATO and the European Union, Greece is considered the most stable, prosperous, and democratic nation in the Balkans, as well as an active U.S. partner in promoting regional stability in Kosovo, in Macedonia, and throughout the beleaguered region.

Greece has also opened up a new era of relations with Israel, strengthened ties with Egypt and the Arab world, promoted peace in the Caucasus, encouraged Black Sea regional cooperation,

bridged the Western gap toward Russia, and integrated itself into the regional energy grid.

As a result, Greece's geopolitical importance as a U.S. ally has increased significantly. The Greek policy shifts have also created a singular opportunity to resolve the biggest problem in Greek-Turkish relations and the greatest source of political instability in NATO's southern flank: the Cyprus problem.

Greece views the Turkish Army in Cyprus as an occupation force manifesting Turkey's expansionist policy, a perception in Greece that has crystallized the country's profound mistrust of Turkey. That mistrust is also pronounced in differences between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, including the delimitation of the continental shelf and the extent of territorial waters, which, bundled together, form the heart of bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey. The military dynamic in Cyprus, with over 32,000 well-equipped Turkish troops versus Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen, a large reserve force, and a Greek brigade of about 3,000 troops, reveals this problem to be more than simply political.

The essence of the Cyprus problem is security, both personal and strategic. Greek Cypriots fear for the loss of the rest of the island—and their lives—to another Turkish military operation. Turkish Cypriots fear for their well-being without the presence of a militarily superior Turkish Army. The prevailing notion that security issues should be addressed after political issues helps to explain why a Cyprus settlement remains elusive after 27 years. But without some settlement of the Cyprus problem, there will come a point beyond which Greek-Turkish rapprochement will cease. Greece believes that Cyprus' imminent EU accession, beginning its final stage in December 2002, is the optimal catalyst toward achieving that settlement.

However, Turkey is warning that without a political solution to the Cyprus problem, Turkish Cypriots will not join in the EU process, but will instead make similar arrangements with Turkey—a scenario that would clearly exacerbate existing problems in Greek-Turkish relations. Greece is stepping up its efforts to persuade Turkey of the benefits that would accrue to Turkish Cypriots, and to Turkey itself, if the two Cypriot communities were to join the EU in a unified republic, including: a) Turkish Cypriots participating in the European Parliament, the European Commission, and every other EU institution, b) the provision of desperately needed structural assistance for the Turkish Cypriot community, whose per capita income is about one-quarter that of their Greek Cypriot neighbors, c) the application of a wide net of EU principles to foster security, safeguard human rights, and protect the cultural and religious heritage of all Cypriots. And, very importantly, d) the designation of Turkish as an official language of the European Union, which would transform the psychological distance many Turks currently feel from Brussels.

A Cyprus settlement, by building mutual trust and confidence between Greece and Turkey, would also open the door to a resolution of Aegean differences. The U.S., as the key ally of both countries, is best positioned to encourage their focus on the one confidence-building measure upon which all others depend—and direct communication. This is critical because it is people, and not imper-

sonal systems or bureaucratic structures, that make change. The more that Greek and Turkish politicians, military officers, businessmen, scholars, and ordinary citizens work together, the more they can build the elements of trust between them.

To help advance this process further, the following recommendations can be helpful: One, the U.S. should actively promote better Greek-Turkish relations. There should be no more zero-sum thinking in this relationship. Greece needs a friendly ally and neighbor to the east, and Turkey needs Greece to advance its European orientation. The U.S. needs a strong, united southern region in NATO. Greek-Turkish differences may be complicated, but they are not insurmountable.

Two, the U.S. should step up its engagement in solving the Cyprus problem. The benefits of a bizonal, bicommunal Cyprus solution to the United States, Greece, Turkey, NATO, the European Union, and certainly to both Cypriot communities as full EU participants, are too great to allow for neglect.

Three, the U.S. should assist Turkey with its European and transatlantic orientation. This includes promoting full Turkish membership in the EU upon fulfillment of objective criteria.

And four, the U.S. should address issues of Greek-Turkish concern honestly and directly. To help build mutual trust between Greece and Turkey, the U.S. needs to set the example, and that can be done by commending constructive actions and criticizing counterproductive actions by either country. Current policy in the Middle East crisis regarding U.S. reactions to Israeli or Palestinian actions presents a useful model.

Tactically, these recommendations can, in turn, be implemented by: a) enhancing the role of the State Department's Special Coordinating Office for Cyprus by installing a military officer to consult with the Hellenic and Turkish general staffs toward the goal of sizable reductions in force structure, unity of command, and the elimination of offensive military capabilities in Cyprus, b) reaffirming support for the EU Helsinki decisions, which could accelerate the accession of Cyprus and of Turkey, as well as boost the prospects of a Cyprus settlement and Turkey's fulfillment of EU criteria, and c) encouraging a framework for regular high-level communications between Greece and Turkey, to promote direct or multilateral discussions between Greek and Turkish officials on low intensity issues exhibited militarily in the Aegean region. The International Court of Justice will likely adjudicate other issues, especially the delimitation of the continental shelf.

In conclusion, solutions to Greek-Turkish problems, beginning with the settlement of the Cyprus issue, can help Greece effectively address growing challenges in the Balkans and throughout southeastern Europe. Conversely, the longer these problems endure, the more U.S. interests are adversely affected in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Balkans, and in other areas where Greece and Turkey are influential, such as the Caucasus or the Middle East.

Domestic pressure on the Greek government for tangible returns on rapprochement continues to build. Failure could mean renewed Greek-Turkish tensions and attendant problems in NATO and the region. Athens looks to the EU decision expected in about 18 months to welcome Cyprus in the next enlargement round as an

excellent opportunity to achieve a historic breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations. U.S. engagement will be key here. A solution to the Cyprus problem incorporating the political and security interests of all Cypriots and of both Greece and Turkey will favorably impact on practically all the other issues separating Athens and Ankara, especially in the Aegean, and help strengthen U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the surrounding region.

Regardless of the Administration's discernible foreign policy planning, Cyprus and associated issues in U.S.-Greece relations, Greek-Turkish relations, and NATO solidarity will climb up the U.S. agenda next year—that is, much sooner than expected. The responsibility for helping to achieve a positive outcome beyond the political will of Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriot communities will be increasingly viewed as dependent upon the actions—or lack thereof—of the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Sitilides.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sitilides follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN SITILIDES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WESTERN POLICY CENTER

Chairman Gallegly, distinguished members of this Subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen:

I thank you very much for this opportunity to review current U.S. foreign and security policy in the eastern Mediterranean. I would also like to commend you for your initiative in focusing on this important and under-examined region.

At the Western Policy Center, we take the position that improved Greek-Turkish relations—and solutions to their problems—form the heart of U.S. strategic interests in southeastern Europe, including:

- Promoting regional stability, geopolitical security, and Western, democratic values;
- Advancing friendly, free-market political systems, especially among the emerging nations of the Balkans;
- Ensuring U.S. economic and trade access to regional markets, vital shipping lanes, and energy supply routes; and
- Supporting pro-American, pro-Western regimes.

I have been asked to assess the strategic importance of Greece to the United States, including Greece's contributions to NATO security missions in Kosovo and Bosnia; the convergence of U.S. and Greek foreign policy on regional and transnational issues; Greece's ongoing progress within Europe's Economic and Monetary Union; areas for improving U.S.-Greek foreign relations; recent developments in Greek-Turkish relations; and prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus dispute, among other related issues.

SUMMARY

As U.S. strategic interests shift from Central Europe, in a southeastern direction towards the Balkans, the Caspian region, and the Middle East, America's focal point is increasingly found in the eastern Mediterranean, buttressed by two key NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

Historically, Greece has been a unique ally to the U.S. It is one of only seven countries in the world that has stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States in every major conflict of the twentieth century, from World War I to Kosovo.

From 1974 to the late 1990s, however, the U.S. and Greece went through a rocky patch. Greece became resentful of U.S. support for the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974, and angry at what it viewed as U.S. acquiescence towards Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. The U.S. grew resentful of the anti-American rhetoric of many Greek politicians and of Greece's tilt towards regimes and policies that challenged some U.S. interests. These old tensions still color perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic.

But over the past several years, there has been a significant and positive series of changes in Greece's calculation of its national interests. Though not yet fully appreciated in Washington—or perhaps even in Athens—this fundamental shift in Greece's thinking has harmonized U.S. and Greek foreign and security policies more than at any time in decades.

At the same time, Greece—as the sole regional member of both NATO and the European Union—has emerged as the most stable, prosperous, democratic and powerful nation in the Balkans. As a result, its geopolitical importance as a U.S. ally in this volatile region is also higher than at any time in decades.

These changes have created a once-in-a-generation opportunity to resolve the single biggest problem in the region and the greatest source of potential instability in NATO's southern flank—that is, the Cyprus problem. But the potential can only be realized if the U.S. seizes the opportunity and steps up its engagement on this problem.

GREECE IN THE BALKANS

In the Balkans, Greece has been an active and constructive participant in NATO peacekeeping operations, with 2,000 troops deployed in Bosnia and a brigade of 1,700 soldiers stationed in Kosovo. During the NATO campaign in Kosovo, the Greek government withstood overwhelming public opposition to bombing Serbia in order to uphold its alliance commitments. The port of Thessaloniki and the natural terrain features connecting Greece with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo remain key to keeping the logistic lines of communication open to U.S. and other NATO troops.

Greece considers FYR-Macedonia a strategic partner in the Balkans, and has worked closely within the NATO framework to provide support, training, and medical supplies to the army in its battle against Albanian nationalist guerillas, now engaged in terrorist actions in the countryside. The U.S. and Greece enjoy a close working relationship on various Balkan matters, and are cooperating energetically to help preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FYR-Macedonia, even as Athens and Skopje seek a compromise to the name issue.

Greece is among the top five foreign investors in Albania, FYR-Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, whose reintegration with the West will be steered with considerable Greek support. As Balkan countries continue to struggle through the development and institutionalization of Western political, economic, and legal systems, Greece's role in integrating the region with Europe and the international community—capped by a $570 million commitment to Balkan reconstruction over the next five years—will become more pronounced.

GREEK REGIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CONCERNS

Greece has also stepped up regional cooperative efforts against ongoing and emerging transnational security threats of growing concern in Washington. Issues such as strategic missile defense, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, illegal migration, and organized crime figure prominently in southeastern Europe, therefore in Greece's security planning as well, both unilaterally and within NATO and other multilateral defense institutions.

Greece enjoys strong and growing relations with Israel, especially over the past three years. Significant improvements have taken place in the political, economic, and cultural sectors, and a number of private Israeli companies have expressed strong interest in expanding joint ventures with Greek companies.

Greece has traditionally worked closely with Egypt and other Arab countries. It has offered to serve as an intermediary on difficult issues in the Middle East, and has hosted several meetings of Israeli and Palestinian officials in the quest for a lasting peace in the region.

In the Caucasus, Greece has close ties to Armenia, and has provided military training assistance to Armenian officers under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. It has also helped promote a solution to the Nagorno-Karabagh problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Greece has cordial diplomatic relations with Iran and Syria, and has offered to serve as a Western bridge, much like Turkey, to both countries. A visit to Teheran by Greece's Defense Minister in 2000 was quietly encouraged by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, especially as part of a larger effort to communicate support for the release of Iranian Jews detained for trial by Iranian authorities.

In the Black Sea region, littoral countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania have urged Greek participation in military planning activities and in multilateral organizations. Greece is also a leading participant in regional investment

through its position in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) forum, along with Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, and with the establishment of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki.

Greece supports the European Union policy towards Russia, focusing on engagement and energetic support for democratization. Greece is able to utilize historic cultural and religious ties to Russia to maximize back channel communications, as it did during the democratic transition of power in Serbia in 2000.

As the regional energy production grid, spanning the Caspian basin, the Caucasus region, and the eastern Mediterranean, continues to expand in the years ahead, Greece will look to play an active role in the security framework needed to assure the reliable supply of vast energy resources to Western and international economies.

That security framework will rely partly on Greece's naval base in Souda Bay, on the southern island of Crete, which provides large-scale support facilities for every Western naval operation, including the entire U.S. Sixth Fleet, in the eastern Mediterranean, in an area spanning from Italy to Israel.

GREECE IN THE EURO-ZONE

On January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth member of Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In preparation for euro-zone membership, it brought inflation down to about 4 percent; reduced its benchmark interest rate to 4.75 percent; projected a budget surplus in 2001, the first in over 30 years; and reduced the public debt at a faster pace than expected, with further reduction a priority.

The IMF forecasts Greece's economy growth rate at 4% in 2001, the eighth consecutive year of economic growth. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has predicted that the Greek economy would be the fastest growing of all EU economies in 2001 and 2002.

Greece's economy still faces major hurdles. Based on 1998 data, the latest available, Greece has the lowest per capita income in the European Union, with 2.5 million of a population of about 11 million, or nearly 23 percent, living under the poverty line. Five of the 10 poorest regions in the EU are in Greece, with the northwestern region of Epirus continuing to rank as the poorest in all the 15 member states. Greece's unemployment rate, which has been rising steadily, is approaching 12 percent, the second highest in the EU. Greece's black market, constituting 36.7% of overall GDP, is proportionately larger than that of any other EU member.

The IMF has called on Greece to accelerate its structural reforms in order to take full advantage of its membership in the euro-zone, particularly in the tax, public expenditure, labor, and product market sectors. Most of these reforms are strongly opposed by powerful interest groups, such as public sector unions.

The government also faces internal opposition to a series of privatization reforms required by the EU. Considered key to further inflation-rate reduction, privatization has been restricted to floating minority stakes in state corporations on the Athens Stock Exchange. Greece has not offered majority stakes in state companies or management control of them to strategic investors, both major disincentives in international capital markets.

The European Union has also called on Greece to accelerate structural reforms, particularly with regard to the labor market and pension system, while also tightening fiscal policy, attaining price stability, reducing unemployment, and boosting productivity in order to maintain growth and curb renewed inflationary pressures. Air, rail, and bus transport, shipping, schools, banks, hospital services, broadcasts, and state agencies have called several general strikes to protest the government's sweeping pension system reform plan.

U.S.-GREEK COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

In the past twelve months, Greece has begun to come to grips with terrorism, a domestic problem of international consequence. The government, galvanized by the June 2000 assassination of British Defense Attaché Stephen Saunders by the terrorist organization 17 November, is working to develop an effective counter-terrorism program.

Efforts include a campaign to persuade the Greek public that terrorism has damaged the country's interests and international reputation, the strengthening of the police counter-terrorism unit, and the implementation of a multimillion-dollar reward program for information leading to the arrest of suspects.

The Greek Parliament is debating long-awaited legislation to combat terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, and corruption. The bill, strongly supported by both major parties and opposed mostly by the extreme left and civil liberties groups,

was drawn up to help bring Greece's anti-terrorism legislation in line with that of other Western countries.

A key provision of the bill is the introduction of DNA testing of criminal suspects. It also introduces a witness protection program, which includes anonymous testimony and witness relocation; offers amnesty for members of terrorist groups or organized crime gangs who turn evidence over to the state; and lifts confidentiality on telephone use and bank accounts. The bill outlines new parameters for conducting wiretaps and police surveillance of suspects and provides for trial by judges, to prevent the intimidation of jurors.

Despite these and other promising initiatives, as well as closer U.S.-Greek anti-terrorism cooperation, no outstanding major terrorist cases were solved in 2000, nor were any terrorist suspects arrested. To date, no suspect has ever been apprehended for the murders of five American diplomats and personnel perpetrated by 17 November since 1975.

When asked about the state of counter-terrorism in Greece, which will host the 2004 Olympic Games, during congressional testimony earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated that U.S.-Greek cooperation was moving forward, and expressed his confidence that the Greek government would address any terrorist threats surrounding the games appropriately.

DEVELOPMENTS IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

In recent years, Greece has transformed its foreign and security policies towards Turkey—its ally and adversary. Bilateral relations, always uneasy given the historical relationship of their cultures and predecessors, are undergoing a continual process that is enhancing the prospects for security in the eastern Mediterranean and the surrounding region.

The thrust of Greek-Turkish tensions emanates from the Cyprus problem—born in the 1950s, exacerbated in the mid 1960s, and escalated to conflict in 1974, after the Greek military junta instigated a coup and overthrew the democratically-elected president of Cyprus, which led to guarantor power Turkey's decision to invade.

Twenty-seven years later, 32,000 Turkish troops remain a fixture across 38% of Cyprus' territory, despite repeated condemnations as an illegal occupation force by the United Nations Security Council. The U.S. has joined most countries in voting for U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and respect for the territorial integrity of Cyprus. Even though Greece has accepted much responsibility for the 1974 crisis, it views the continued Turkish presence on Cyprus as the manifestation of a country with expansionist policies.

That perception has—more than any other factor—shaped Greece's profound mistrust of Turkey. It is also the most influential factor in generating a series of territorial differences in the Aegean Sea, which bundled together form the heart of bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey.

The two NATO allies are unable, after nearly three decades, to agree to a mechanism for resolving differences over the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf (Exhibit A), the extent of territorial waters (Exhibits B, C), the sovereignty of rocks and islets long considered Greek and now questioned by Turkey, and several other issues revolving mostly around military activities in the Aegean region.

The basis for Greek recalculation of foreign and security policies towards Turkey may be twofold. Greece recognizes the futility of "zero-sum" strategies, especially in an increasingly integrated region in an interdependent and globalized world. It has also decided that a genuinely Western and European Turkey offers the best prospect for lasting security, stability, and economic development in Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and the entire region. These shifts have materialized along a sustained, though occasionally stalled, process over approximately the past half-decade.

In January 1996, a mid-level diplomatic issue regarding Turkey's assertion of sovereignty over a Greek rocky islet nearly blew up into full-scale war—due largely to the lack of direct communication between the two countries' militaries and the attendant inability to defuse an issue that could have torn the NATO alliance apart.

One year later, the Greek and Turkish navies opened up communication lines to avoid similar crises, as well as to review standard procedures for regular naval operations and conducting exercises in high seas. It is no surprise that the number of incidents between the two navies, even in close operational proximity, has since diminished considerably.

By July 1997, Greece and Turkey agreed on a "convergence of views" regarding outstanding differences in the Aegean Sea. In effect, Greece acknowledged Turkey's interest in preserving international access through the Aegean, as well as the right of navigational freedom in international airspace. Turkey acknowledged the inviolability of Greece's borders, and the need to refrain from the threat or use of force.

In December 1997, Greece and Turkey agreed to the establishment of a NATO sub-regional command structure with headquarters in both countries. Greek and Turkish military officers now serve together, on each other's territory and under each other's command. This was an important step toward enhancing NATO operational planning and eliminating jurisdictional air control disputes in the Aegean for NATO purposes.

In September 1998, Greece and Turkey, along with Italy, established the Balkans rapid deployment task force known as the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), to be used for peacekeeping operations in the region, as well as for potential deployment in nearby areas such as the Black Sea, in the event of a crisis.

During the NATO war against Yugoslavia in spring 1999, the Greek and Turkish militaries cooperated regularly, especially to deliver supplies, reinforcements, and humanitarian assistance to the frontlines in Macedonia and Albania near the Kosovo border.

After years of official Greek assertions that, during the Cold War, the country's primary security threat came not from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, but from NATO ally Turkey, Greece's Defense Minister recently acknowledged that Turkey's military superiority was deployed not primarily towards Greece, but largely to guard Turkish frontiers with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, to the east and south.

Earlier this year, Greece and Turkey concluded an agreement to clear the landmines on their common border over the next 10 years, and to simultaneously become signatories of the 1997 Ottawa Convention requiring the destruction of their existing landmines and prohibiting future landmine use and production.

That agreement was signed by Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem. They have worked closely to elevate Greek-Turkish relations beyond the harsh rhetoric and political grandstanding of previous years. Their relationship lubricated the process by which, in December 1999, Greece lifted its long-standing veto of Turkey's candidacy for European Union accession.

This was a watershed moment for Greece. Its previous vetoes positioned it as the front man for other EU countries opposed to Turkish candidacy. Turkish politicians would blast Greece as obstructionist, and Greek politicians would escalate the rhetoric. In the end, the only real loser in this process was Greece. Recognizing that policies formulated primarily to punish Turkey for actions in the Aegean and Cyprus did little to advance its own national interests, Greece sought to replace its zero-sum policy with the implementation of a win-win strategy that would bring Turkey closer to Europe.

From Greece's perspective, a European Turkey means a stable and closely cooperative neighbor, within a shared community of values, with open borders and the resolution of historic problems in the Aegean and Cyprus. Greece expects that the EU will help push for significant domestic changes in Turkey, especially the need for fuller democratization, market transparency, economic and social reforms, and greater respect for human rights. This way, Greece hopes to build the necessary bilateral trust to develop fully normalized relations with Turkey, and peacefully resolve their differences and disputes.

Greece's dedicated commitment to assisting Turkey on its European path has been borne out in numerous ways. Since the first Turkey-Greece EU Committee meeting in February 2000, Greek officials have offered training to their Turkish counterparts on customs a nd financial issues, judicial reform, agricultural issues, and law enforcement concerning illegal immigration, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime in the region.

Greek public support for this revised policy was underscored by the mutual outpouring of sympathy and disaster relief after devastating earthquakes struck Turkey, then Greece, in 1999. It has continued to broaden, if guardedly, so that support for Turkey's EU accession is pronounced in both major Greek political parties, together representing nearly 90% of the electorate. Greek non-governmental organizations, the private sector, local government authorities, and individual citizens are undertaking parallel efforts to support Turkey's accession process beyond official circles.

Private sector initiatives are especially revealing. Greek-Turkish trade has increased from $500 million annually in the mid-1990s to $1 billion in 2000, and many business leaders feel that—if Turkey's current financial crisis is remedied—bilateral trade could top $5 billion by 2005. Turkish businessmen are especially interested in partnering with Greek businesses to penetrate the Balkan reconstruction market. Greek businessmen hope to enter a Turkish market six times larger than their own, and to establish joint ventures for eventual penetration of Central Asian and Caucasus markets.

In fact, Greece and Turkey are embarking on a joint $10 billion natural gas pipeline that will connect their respective natural gas distribution networks to facilitate

the transport of natural gas from the Caspian region, Russia, and the Middle East, through Turkey and Greece, to European Union countries and the Balkans.

Greek officials have encouraged these private initiatives, and have proceeded to work with their Turkish counterparts to formalize bilateral cooperation beyond trade, to include tariff reduction, anti-crime efforts, environmental protection, tourism, and cultural and educational exchanges—as well as against terrorism.

This last area is especially sensitive for Greece. As host of the 2004 Olympic Games, it is as concerned as any host country would be about the security of its citizens and guests. The country's geographic proximity to major terrorist centers in the Middle East and northern Africa facilitates the ability of international terrorists to plan attacks.

Turkey is among a number of countries, including the United States, Great Britain, and Israel, with whom Greece is actively cooperating against regional and international terrorism. Specifically, Greece has sought Turkish cooperation in combating organized crime, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the region, and proposed that they act jointly to evaluate terrorist threats, including exchanging intelligence on individuals or groups linked to terrorist activities.

PROBLEMS IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

But as Greece looks hopefully to an improved relationship with an increasingly Western-oriented and cooperative neighbor, it recognizes the great domestic hurdles Turkey faces in the years ahead. Perhaps no country was as distressed about the Turkish financial crisis as Greece, wary of social unrest and relatively hostile Islamist and nationalist parties that can win over larger numbers of poor Turkish citizens. Greece is very concerned about Turkey's weak political and civic institutions, its disproportionate income distribution, and its human rights record.

On the international front, Greece remains frustrated over continued irresolution of severe differences with Turkey over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Yet underlying these differences, whether they are emotional and visceral in Cyprus, or legal and technical in the Aegean, is something far more profound and cutting—the absence of trust between Greece and Turkey. Trust and cooperation were higher as far back as the early 1950s, when the two countries joined NATO and an alliance headquarters in Izmir, Turkey was staffed largely with Greek and Turkish officers.

THE AEGEAN SEA

The absence of trust and confidence lay at the heart of Greek differences with Turkey over the delimitation of the continental shelf and the extent of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. Normally, these are problems two neighbors, especially allies, are able to reach agreement on, whether through bilateral negotiations, judicial adjudication, or both.

In the early 1970s, Turkey awarded exploration and exploitation rights to a state corporation in maritime areas of the Aegean high seas. It issued a map delineating the seabed between Greece and Turkey by means of a median line equidistant from their respective mainland coastlines.

Greece cited the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, entitling each Greek island to have its own continental shelf, as the basis for its position that the delimitation of the continental shelf should occur between two opposite states—that is, between Greek islands in the eastern Aegean Sea and the Turkish mainland. Greece fears that Turkish efforts to deprive the eastern Aegean islands of their continental shelf platforms will disrupt the territorial and political unity of the islands with mainland Greece.

This stalemate has prevented both countries from engaging in mineral exploration and extraction, or other profitable natural resource exploitation in the seabed. Greece has asked Turkey to jointly submit the issue before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. Turkey views the matter as a political dispute to be negotiated bilaterally, with ICJ adjudication as a possible last resort. Until a delimitation mechanism is agreed to, much of the Aegean seabed remains economically worthless to Greece, as well as to Turkey.

Throughout the Aegean Sea, Greece possesses more than 2,380 islands, islets, and rocks. In the minds of many Greeks, the Aegean Sea is Greek, both by dint of history and of geography. It was not surprising that, after ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in June 1995, Greece began to publicly assert its lawful right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve miles around all its Aegean islands, although it has declined to exercise that right.

However, international law and treaties signed by Greece and Turkey have assigned only 35% of the Aegean "s surface to Greece, and 8.8% to Turkey. The remaining 56% constitutes high seas belonging to no single nation. The expansion of

Greek territorial waters to twelve miles would raise the Greek share of the Aegean to 70%. If Turkey were to extend its territorial waters to twelve miles, its share of the Aegean would increase to only 10%, given that it possesses but a few islands which hug its coastline. Twelve miles of territorial waters for both littoral states would shrink international waters in the Aegean Sea by half, to 26% of total surface area.

The Turkish parliament and military feared that the conversion of a largely international sea into a Greek sea would obstruct the operations of its navy and the workings of the Turkish export economy, 70% of which is shipped to world markets through the Aegean Sea. Greek officials responded that the traditional right of innocent passage protected Turkish transit rights, and that the Law of the Sea created a new regime of "transit passage," granting coastal states a non-suspendable right of passage to commercial ships, as well as warships, submarines—both surfaced and submerged—and aircraft.

Nonetheless, the Turkish government authorized the use of all means necessary, including military force, to prevent Greece from taking such action. While the casus belli policy is illegal under both United Nations and European Union codes of international conduct, it remains in effect today.

Several months after the territorial waters issue was sparked, Greece and Turkey suffered their most dangerous bilateral crisis in a decade. On Christmas 1995, a Turkish ship ran aground on the uninhabited islets of Imia, considered Greek since

lives to another Turkish military operation, while Turkish Cypriots fear for their well being without the presence of a militarily superior Turkish Army.

The specter of mistrust, at the root of this mutual insecurity, has loomed over all efforts to achieve a political settlement. In fact, the notion that security issues can be addressed after political issues is a major reason why a Cyprus settlement remains elusive after 27 years.

Cyprus is a security issue for Greece to the extent that Turkey perceives a strategic threat emanating from the island. Turkey has made clear that it will not tolerate a hostile military presence on Cyprus, located only 40 miles off its southern coast. Regarding Turkish concerns about the personal security of Turkish Cypriots, Greece posits that a unified Cyprus in the European Union would automatically bring all its citizens—Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike—under the human rights safeguards that apply uniformly throughout the bloc.

This is especially significant, as the period leading up to December 2002 presents an opportunity, perhaps urgently, for Greece and Turkey to support a political settlement of the Cyprus problem that integrates the issue of security from all perspectives—personal and strategic—within the negotiations and the ultimate solution.

The urgency is most keenly felt in the growing reality that without some settlement of the Cyprus issue, there will come a point beyond which Greek-Turkish rapprochement will cease. December 2002 is the timeline by which Cyprus is expected to sign an accession treaty with the European Union, denoting that it has fulfilled all the criteria required by Brussels for full membership in the bloc. At that point, the process by which respective EU member parliaments vote to accept Cyprus, and any other countries that have signed the treaty, begins. EU observers predict Cyprus will join the European Union by 2004.

Greece believes that Cyprus' imminent EU accession is the optimal catalyst toward achieving a political settlement. In recent years, it has sought to persuade Turkey of the benefits that would accrue to Turkish Cypriots—and to Turkey itself—if the two Cypriot communities were to join the EU in a unified republic. The benefits include:

- Turkish Cypriots participating in the European Parliament, the European Commission, the EU Council of Ministers, the European Court of Communities, and other EU institutions;
- The provision of desperately needed structural development assistance to the Turkish Cypriot community, whose per capita income is about one-quarter that of their affluent Greek Cypriot neighbors;
- The application of a wide net of EU principles to foster security, safeguard the cultural, religious and national heritage of all Cypriots, and create a common interest in the viability of the federation; and
- The designation of Turkish as an official language of the European Union, which would utterly transform the psychological distance many Turks currently feel from Brussels.

However, Cyprus' accession to the EU may not be the panacea anticipated by Greece. The Turkish leadership is voicing a consistently strong message that without a political solution to the Cyprus problem, Turkish Cypriots will not join in the EU process. Unless the present dynamic of the Cyprus problem is favorably altered, the probability grows that if and when Cyprus joins the EU, then Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration will make similar arrangements between themselves. Through such a scenario, the Turkish side is warning that a Cyprus-EU accord prior to a settlement might actually exacerbate existing problems in Greek-Turkish relations.

Greece feels that continued resistance by Turkey to Cyprus' accession would only harm Turkish foreign policy interests. Turkish threats to impose sanctions on the EU or to annex northern Cyprus are not considered credible, since 70% of Turkish exports are destined for EU markets, and annexation would render Turkey an international pariah while it is indebted to the Western financial system for $40 billion and desperate for tens of billions more.

Greece is also anticipating that the Turkish political and military leadership will gradually come to terms with the lack of resolution to the Cyprus problem in 1974, despite the iterations of many Turkish politicians of exactly the opposite over the years. Prominent individuals in Turkish mass media and business circles are increasingly critical of this long-held view in Ankara, especially in recent months as the likelihood of Cyprus' EU accession grows.

Greece is so confident that Cyprus, which has already fulfilled 23 of 29 stated prerequisites, will become an EU member that it has threatened to veto the accession of any other EU aspirant in the next round of enlargement—including Poland, Hun-

gary, and the Czech Republic—if Cyprus, having fulfilled the necessary criteria, is excluded.

In 1991, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, frustrated that yet another round of Cyprus negotiations had fallen apart, acknowledged that "one way or another, a (Cyprus) solution must be found. This issue is standing in Turkey's way. It really is a major obstacle to Turkey's growth." Greece is betting that the Ozal spirit can be rekindled in the next eighteen months.

GREEK SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Between Cyprus and the Aegean, Greece's key security objectives in the eastern Mediterranean consist primarily of the following:

- *The accession of Cyprus to the European Union, preferably with a political settlement in hand, but even without a solution.*
  - — Greece believes Cyprus' accession would energize domestic political support for further rapprochement with Turkey and build greater security confidence among the Greek public to seriously address Aegean and other bilateral issues.
  - — Conversely, if Cyprus' accession is deferred because of Turkish actions, the Greek reaction may be sufficiently furious to bring rapprochement to an immediate end. The lesson for Greek politicians will be that Turkey is not a country with which constructive relations can be managed.
- *The reduction of tensions between Greece and Turkey, in the form of expanded confidence building measures.*
  - — Greece and Turkey recently agreed to notify each other annually of the schedules and locations of their national military exercises in the Aegean, as a confidence-building measure concluded by Greek and Turkish permanent representatives to NATO.
  - — Current bilateral proposals include establishing a Greek/Turkish Defense Ministry hotline, expanding ministerial visits, and conducting joint naval exercises in the Ionian, Adriatic, and Black Seas.
  - — Greece has also indicated its desire that Turkey rescind its *casus belli* resolution, even if the Turkish position against Greek extension of territorial waters is intact.
- *Expanded Greek-Turkish cooperation in all feasible areas, especially within the framework of agreements negotiated by the foreign ministries and Turkish EU accession preparations.*
  - — Greek and Turkish officers and soldiers working well in close proximity in the Balkans provide an additional model of cooperation.

These objectives influence U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean in important ways. For too many years, many in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the U.S. played up the "zero-sum" aspects of Greek-Turkish relations. A negative decision against Turkey was seen as a victory for Greece, and vice-versa. If the U.S. Congress withheld approval to transfer surface combatants to the Turkish Navy, even for reasons such as human rights abuses, some Greeks and Greek-Americans viewed this as a necessarily positive decision for Greece. Or, if an advanced weapon system such as the F–15 Strike Eagle were not made readily available to the Hellenic Air Force, there were Turks and Turkish-Americans who reflexively saw this as a good thing for Turkey.

"Zero-sum" produced clouded vision, lost focus and counter-productive action, especially in this region of the world. The U.S. government should work towards building strong bilateral relations with Greece, with Turkey, and—most importantly—between Greece and Turkey.

During his recent visit to Washington, D.C., Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou spoke about the possibility of mutual arms reductions by Greece and Turkey. The two allies rank first and second, among European members of NATO, in defense spending as a percentage of GDP, at about 4.5%. Both have announced unilateral defense spending cuts—Greece to boost social spending and accelerate preparations for the 2004 Olympics, and Turkey to persuade the public that sacrifices to deal with financial crises will also be borne by the military.

For NATO requirements and regional stability, the U.S. has long supported the force modernization of the Greek and Turkish militaries. Some claim this policy fuels an arms race in the Aegean and increases the potential for conflict between these NATO allies. At the very least, needed resources have long been diverted from pressing social problems—especially in Turkey.

But the acquisition of modern weaponry, in and of itself, is not necessarily destabilizing. Rather, it is the perception of the intended threat—upon which decisions

to acquire weapons are made—that has been the central issue. In other words, the only real way to achieve mutual arms reductions by Greece and Turkey is to change their threat perceptions.

In the Aegean, Turkey's forceful claim to Greece's sovereign territory, or the diminuti on of international waters if Greece were to extend its territorial waters, would probably lead to conflict. Though neither of these events is likely, the challenge is to get Greece and Turkey to prevent such crises from arising again by developing mutual trust and confidence.

The United States, as the key ally of Greece and of Turkey, is well-positioned to encourage Greece and Turkey, perhaps under the auspices of NATO, to focus on the one confidence building measure upon which all others depend: direct communication. Communication channels at all levels will allow both sides to learn from each other. There is no more important or basic requirement to altering the threat perceptions of Greece and Turkey—and therefore building trust between the two allies—than having good, frequent, and broad-based communication about each other's interests and aspirations.

This is critical because it is people, not impersonal systems or bureaucratic structures, that make change. The more Greek and Turkish politicians, military officers, businessmen, scholars, and ordinary citizens work together, the more they can build the element of trust between them.

Foreign Minister Papandreou admitted as much in relating the success with which Foreign Minister Cem and he successfully defused a recent disagreement regarding the Aegean Sea continental shelf. Their ability to communicate directly and immediate, as counterparts, was indispensable to neutralizing an issue that, in previous years, would have probably led to bellicose statements and heightened tensions.

This positive development in political and diplomatic relations has not yet been replicated at the military staff level. The Hellenic National Defense General Staff operates at a political level similar to most other militaries in NATO, with national policy decisions being made by the civilian leadership. On the other hand, the Turkish General Staff maintains considerable influence over domestic affairs affecting Turkish secularism, as well as matters of defense and national security—especially for issues in the Aegean and Cyprus.

As such, Greek staff officers are prevented by the political leadership from engaging in direct communications with their Turkish counterparts. Meanwhile, Greek and Turkish fighter aircraft are regularly flying over the Aegean Sea, sometimes locking onto one another, sometimes getting into dogfights. In Cyprus, armed Greek and Turkish soldiers face each other along the entire width of the island. This cannot be desirable to Greece.

As uncomfortable as the Greek side may be with the operational imbalance that exists with their Turkish counterparts, they should find a way to overcome this and engage in direct joint staff talks. The September 2001 visit by Greece's Defense Minister to Turkey offers a window of opportunity for progress in military-to-military communications. There are ways to craft a working agenda that would incorporate the notion that the Greek and Turkish military establishments—civilians and officers alike—should explore ways to reduce tensions, without compromising Greece's national positions.

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Therefore, the United States can more effectively achieve its security interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and subsequently in the surrounding region, through the following policy recommendations:

- *Actively promote better Greek-Turkish relations.* There should be no "zero-sum" thinking in this relationship. Greece needs a friendly ally and neighbor to the east, and Turkey needs Greece to advance its European orientation. The U.S. needs a strong, united southern region in NATO. Greek-Turkish differences may be complicated, but they are not insurmountable.
- *Remain seriously engaged in solving the Cyprus problem.* The benefits of a Cyprus solution to the U.S., Greece, Turkey, NATO, the EU, and Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as full EU participants, are too great to allow for neglect.
- *Assist Turkey with its European and trans-Atlantic orientation.* This includes promoting full Turkish membership in the EU upon fulfillment of objective criteria. Millions of Turks who have lived and worked in EU countries, or with relatives who do, will support their political leadership in the effort to implement wrenching reforms that advance Turkey's accession process.

- *Address issues of Greek-Turkish concern honestly and forthrightly.* The U.S. should publicly support either side when its actions are constructive, and speak out when its actions are counter-productive. Current U.S. policy in the Middle East crisis, regarding reactions to Israeli or Palestinian actions, presents a useful model. The U.S. can set the example for building mutual trust between Greece and Turkey by dealing with both in a frank, mature, and direct manner.

Specific recommendations include:

- *Encourage a framework for regular, high-level communication between Greece and Turkey through U.S. channels.*
  - — The U.S. should promote direct or multilateral discussions between Greek and Turkish diplomats and military officers on low-intensity legal and technical issues played out militarily, with mock dogfights, escalating weapons accumulation, and continued force deployment against each other's territory. Other issues, especially the delimitation of the continental shelf, may require adjudication before the International Court of Justice.
- *Enhance the role of the State Department's Special Coordinating Office for Cyprus by promoting a new security architecture that complements political settlement efforts.*
  - — The U.S. should install a military officer to directly consult with the Hellenic National Defense General Staff and the Turkish General Staff to help achieve vastly reduced force structures on both sides of the Green Line, unity of command, and the elimination of offensive military capabilities on both sides.
- *Reaffirm support for December 1999 EU decisions, which serve as the basis for Cyprus' accession, to accelerate the political settlement process.*
  - — This will also help Turkey adapt to the requirements stemming from its own decision to become a member of the bloc.
- *Encourage direct negotiations—without conditions—between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.*
  - — The U.S. should persuade Turkey to adopt a consistent diplomatic position by encouraging Turkish Cypriots to negotiate with Greek Cypriots, mirroring Turkey's call for direct negotiations with Greece.

CONCLUSION

Greece will be an increasingly pivotal country in southeastern Europe, where lagging economic and political development in the Balkans, and armed nationalist movements in Kosovo, FYR-Macedonia, and possibly Montenegro, will pose continued geopolitical dangers to U.S. interests.

Greece, as NATO's frontline state bordering Albania and FYR-Macedonia, will be more effectively positioned to cooperate with the U.S. and other Western allies in confronting these dangers if relations with Turkey continue to improve, and solutions are found to long-standing problems between the two countries. As long as problems persist, U.S. interests are adversely affected in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Balkans, and other areas where Greece and Turkey are influential, including the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Of all these areas, the eastern Mediterranean is the one that offers the greatest promise for security, stability, and economic development. Relations between Greece and Turkey are at their most constructive level in decades. Cooperation is expanding to new fields, and attracting broader support, in both Greece and Turkey. At official and unofficial levels, Greeks and Turks are getting along in ways unimaginable only three years ago.

To date, Greece has moved closer to Turkey based on its own recalculation of foreign and security policy. Growing pressure on the Greek government for tangible returns on rapprochement continues to build. In many ways, the immediate center of gravity for Greek-Turkish relations—and therefore for U.S.-Greece relations—is Cyprus.

It is here that the strongest and most viable opportunity to maintain the momentum of improved Greek-Turkish relations in the near-term, and to achieve historic breakthroughs in the long-term exists. A solution to the Cyprus problem that incorporates the political and security interests of all Cypriots, as well as those of both Greece and Turkey, will significantly and favorably impact on practically all other issues separating Athens and Ankara, and help secure and advance U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the surrounding region.

U.S. engagement will be key to this process. Regardless of the administration's discernible foreign policy planning, Cyprus, and attendant concerns in Greek-Turkish relations, U.S.-EU relations, and NATO solidarity, will become a major issue on the U.S. agenda in 2002—sooner rather than later.

The responsibility for helping achieve a positive outcome, beyond the political will of Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, will increasingly be viewed as dependent upon the actions—or lack thereof—of the Bush administration and the 107th Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.

Mr. GALLEGLY. At this point, we will move on to our next witness, and that is Dr. Ian Lesser, Ph.D. Senior analyst for the RAND Corporation.

Dr. Lesser, welcome.

STATEMENT OF IAN LESSER, SENIOR ANALYST, THE RAND CORPORATION

Mr. LESSER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity to express some thoughts on recent developments in Turkey, in the strategic environment in the eastern Mediterranean, including Greek-Turkish relations and the implications for U.S. Policy. There is a longer statement of my testimony, which I will ask that you insert in the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection your testimony your statement will be made a part of the record in its entirety.

Mr. LESSER. Thank you very much. Let me summarize some of those observations here. Let me offer you really three observations, one on Turkey and what is happening, the second on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and the third on what it means for U.S. Policy. The first observation I would make is that Turkey's ongoing economic crisis has brought the country to a critical crossroad.

Actually, it is an economic crisis that started with a banking crisis, but it is fundamentally a political crisis, and having just been there recently, I can tell you that the effects of this crisis are being felt across Turkish society and at all levels. And it is particularly affecting the modern parts of Turkey, Istanbul, the modern financial sector, other areas.

There is, I think, a potential for growing social unrest in Turkey. We have not seen this so far, there are a lot of explanations for that, but left unaddressed, these problems could get far worse. Above all, I think Turks are searching for new political leadership. They are searching for an alternative to the old political class in Turkey, which has not offered an answer to their problems. They are searching for a solution to a state-dominated society, and increasingly, they are looking for reform.

I think when I speak of a crossroads, there are really two paths possible for Turkey today. One is a path of reform in which the IMF suggested reforms, the economic reforms are taken, implemented. Political reform is also in the cards. Turkey becomes a more modern society. It is more easily integrated and converges with European norms. In short, it becomes a more modern, more globalized, better ally for the West and the United States. The alternative is no reform or failed reform, more chaotic politics, more unrest, more conflict between haves and have-nots in Turkey, a more inward-looking approach, something more nationalist, and

that would obviously have implications for our important relationship with Turkey.

In short, a Turkey in crisis, which is exactly what we have at the moment, is unlikely to be an active and positive regional player. Turkey's foreign policy has become more active in recent years, especially in the Middle East, but it will be difficult for Turkey to sustain that role in our interests unless its economic and political problems are solved.

The second observation I would offer you is broader. The changing geopolitics of the eastern Mediterranean underscore Turkey's strategic importance. Let me mention just some of the elements of change in the region. First, security challenges in Europe have shifted southward. The crises and missions that are likely to confront us in the future are far more likely to be on the southern periphery of Europe, in the Mediterranean, around the Middle East, in the Balkans than in the center of Europe. NATO's new strategic concept, and what Europe is trying to do in its defense initiative acknowledges this. Contingencies are much more likely to be in Turkey's neighborhood than on the Polish border. So Turkey is becoming more central to European security.

At the same time, I would argue that we can no longer think of European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian security as entirely separate areas. They are not. They are increasingly linked, and again, Turkey is at the center of that. If we even think of some of the issues that are of concern to us and our allies, whether it is energy security or missile proliferation or the flow of refugees, these are things that cross borders, they cross regions and, again, much of this is happening on Turkey's borders.

Another example would be the relationship between Turkey and Israel that has developed over the last few years. This is a very good example of how Turkey, as a European security factor is also developing a close relationship with an ally in the Middle East, very important to our interests. Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey's candidacy for European Union membership are potentially transforming developments. And I would argue that they are linked. I don't think that the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, which has been very skillfully managed by both sides, by both Foreign Ministers in particular, and has been extremely valuable, is simply a matter of tactics. It is really strategic for both countries, and at the core of that is an interest in getting closer to Europe.

In the Greek case, the European objective has been transforming over the last years and it has changed our relationship with Greece. For Turkey, failure to have a better relationship with Greece stops its ambitions in Europe. So the two things are really linked. Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkish candidacy in Europe. For me the outlook for Turkey as a member of Europe is distinctly mixed at best, even over the longer term. I think there is ambivalence on both sides. But from the perspective of U.S. interests, I would stress that membership is less the issue than integration and convergence between Turkey and Europe. That is really what matters.

As to the durability of Greek-Turkish rapprochement I think this is an open question. Clearly much has been done, the brinksman-

ship, the very dangerous brinksmanship that we have had a few years ago, no longer exists in the same way, so it is harder for bad things to happen in the relationship. But on the other hand, the core issues of the Aegean and Cyprus have not been addressed, and at some point they have to be addressed.

Let me conclude my remarks about Turkey and Greece by saying if Turkey-EU relations are poor in the future, it will be very, very difficult, in my view, to consolidate the relationship between Greece and Turkey. Really, what Greece is betting on in all of this is that they will be able to "Europeanize" the relationship with Turkey, make it a problem for Europe as well as for Athens, which is perfectly fine from the point of view of their interests. And Turkey is obviously looking for a closer relationship and eventual integration with Europe. If neither of these things is forthcoming, it will be very difficult to move ahead in the relationship.

The third observation I would make is that despite the growing importance of Europe in this equation, American engagement in this region is absolutely essential; and I would suggest that it could be refocused and made more relevant in a number of ways.

I think it is important to think very briefly about what our interests really are in this complex of relations with the three countries we have been speaking of, and I am focusing now on Turkey. I think there are three. One, we have an interest in Turkey's internal evolution: stability, prosperity, reform, a more modern society. It is an absolutely critical enabling interest, because if we do not have progress here, we won't be able to do any of the other things.

The second is that we look to Ankara and also, I would argue, to Athens to play a positive regional role. You have seen a good example of that in the Balkans where both countries have cooperated well. But there are other examples.

Third, we look to Turkey to facilitate our freedom of action including power projection for areas such as the Gulf, the Caucasus and Balkans; and here it seems to me that the key issue is not only our broad shared interests but also whether our policy approaches really converge. Certainly on issues like northern Iraq and Iran our interests may be broadly similar with Turkey, but our policy approaches do not converge, and we need a substantive dialogue with Turkey in order to bring these into line.

Let me talk finally about the next steps in terms of U.S. Policy. I think support for Turkish recovery is absolutely critical. If we do not have that, it will be difficult for Turkey to play a positive role and be a strong ally. But, besides that, I think we need to work on a new strategic agenda with Turkey. We are in many ways still working from the legacy of the Cold War which provided a strong basis but does not necessarily take us into the future effectively.

Let me mention a few key elements.

We need to support Turkey in Europe; and I stress the idea of Turkish convergence with Europe, not necessarily eventual membership which is really for Turks and for Europeans to move ahead with.

Energy security, terribly important to Turkey's own prosperity and development, terribly important in terms of Turkey's role as a bridge between the energy resources in the Middle East between the Caspian and the world markets.

Weapons of mass destruction. I think, within NATO, Turkey is probably the country that comes closest to our own perspective on the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of increasing range.

Dealing with Russia. For Turkey, this is one of the key long-term security issues; and it is certainly important to us.

Defense cooperation with Turkey after Operation Northern Watch. In the years ahead, what are we going to do with Incirlik air base? How are we going to work with the Turks in terms of regional security?

And, finally, Aegean risk reduction. There are the bigger issues in the Aegean, and there is the issue of Cyprus, but in the meantime there is an entirely separate question of what we can do in terms of confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in their interest, and in ours.

And a final thought. This hearing was organized around the idea of a triangular relationship, and that is perfectly laudable. I would argue to you that, in reality, it is really a quadrilateral relationship, with Europe playing an increasingly important role. So I think this topic we are discussing today, as we work toward a more effective dialogue between the United States and the European Union, ought to be very high on the agenda.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would be pleased to elaborate on these issues or others in questions. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Lesser.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lesser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN LESSER,[1] SENIOR ANALYST, THE RAND CORPORATION

TURKEY, GREECE AND THE U.S. IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer an analysis of recent developments in Turkey, in the strategic environment, including Turkish-Greek relations, and the implications for U.S. policy toward the region. As requested, I will focus my remarks primarily on the Turkish dimension of the triangular relationship.

Recent years have seen dramatic changes in the eastern Mediterranean, offering new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy toward its long-standing allies, Turkey and Greece. Washington is in a position to consolidate positive changes in the region and to strengthen its relationships with Ankara and Athens in ways that support key objectives in the Balkans, Eurasia and the Middle East, and also within NATO. Policy toward both countries can no longer be conceived in strictly bilateral terms, but can and should be seen as a complex, reflecting issues that cut across traditional geographic lines.

Turkey's Economic and Political Travails

Prior to November 2000, Turkey's domestic scene appeared to be evolving positively. The offer of EU candidacy had opened a wide-ranging debate about political and economic reform, and the governing coalition enjoyed substantial stability. The economic crisis of November 2000, and especially February 2001 and its aftermath, have had a devastating effect on the economic and political life of the country. The value of the Turkish Lira has fallen by roughly 45 percent against the dollar. Unemployment is growing rapidly, especially in the financial and manufacturing sectors. Ironically, the more modern sectors of the Turkish economy have been most directly

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affected. The effects of the crisis are more evident in Istanbul than elsewhere. Many observers in Turkey and abroad are surprised that Turkey's economic travails have not led to more social unrest, and there is concern that a prolonged crisis could be de-stabilizing. Under these conditions, a military "intervention" in Turkish politics is a remote possibility, openly discussed.

Several points are worth noting. First, the proximate cause of the current economic disaster was a liquidity crisis and a banking collapse, but the underlying causes are structural and political (in the wake of the collapse, it has become clear that Turkey's banking system operated as a vehicle for large-scale political patronage). Polls suggest that Turks have lost faith in the existing political class. For the moment, it is possible that none of the current coalition parties—with the possible exception of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)—could garner enough votes to return to parliament in new elections. Corruption is now a central issue in the Turkish debate. The thirst for new leadership accounts for the tremendous popular support enjoyed by the country's recently-appointed economic czar, Kemal Dervish, a technocrat who spent many years in Washington at the World Bank. So far, Turkey has been able to pass initial legislation concerning banking reform and privatization, prerequisites for IMF and World Bank assistance. But the implementation of the reform program faces stiff opposition from Turkey's political establishment who are loathe to see their power base eroded.

Second, the crisis has shaken Turkish and international faith in Turkey's "dynamic" private sector. Turkey possesses substantial human and natural resources and is capable of recovering its economic momentum—essential for further convergence with Europe. But many of Turkey's large holding companies are embroiled in the country's financial chaos, and much of their profitability in recent years has come from unearned income rather than production. Small and medium sized enterprises, many with hard currency debt, face closure. It is a reality of the current crisis that most of the creditors are Turkish, and the wider implications for the international financial system are limited. Many Turks believe that this fact works against sustained foreign support for Turkey.

Third, the crisis has implications for Turkey's regional and international role. Prolonged economic and political turmoil will leave Ankara with little energy and less capability to play an active external role. Ambitious defense modernization plans are being postponed, and costly regional initiatives (including energy projects) may languish. More profoundly, the crisis could encourage a nationalistic and inward-looking tendency among public opinion and even some elites. This, in turn, could have negative repercussions on Greek-Turkish relations, Turkey's EU candidacy, and perhaps regional cooperation with the U.S. The crisis has already stimulated a lively debate in Turkey about the risks of globalization, with many Turks blaming international institutions for Turkey's travails.

Fourth, and most important, there is a sense that Turkey is now at a critical crossroads. One the one hand, successful implementation of economic reform can encourage more fundamental political reforms, the emergence of new leadership, and more rapid progress on changes central to Turkey's relations with Europe and the U.S. (e.g., on human rights, the Kurdish issue, and the resolution of disputes in Cyprus and the Aegean). On the other hand, failure to implement key reforms—including the dismantling of key elements of the Kemalist state—could exacerbate existing conflicts within Turkish society and render Turkey a less stable and less predictable ally. The latter path would certainly reinforce Europe's inclination to hold Turkey at arms length and place new pressures on American policy. This struggle between reformers and conservatives wedded to the "strong state" is being played out at many levels in Turkish society, including within the government bureaucracy, political parties, business and, quite probably, even inside the military establishment.

As a result of internal disputes and legal restrictions, Turkey's Islamists have become a less potent force on the political scene, although some, including the former Mayor of Istanbul, Recip Tayip Erdogan, remain highly popular. Overall, the confrontation between Islamists and secularists is less clear-cut now than a decade ago. The more significant force on the Turkish scene today is arguably Turkish nationalism—and the behavior of Turkey's nationalist party (MHP) is one of the large open questions for the future. It could also have important implications for Turkish policy on key issues such as Cyprus and U.S. access to Turkish facilities, already constrained by Turkish sovereignty concerns and the lack of a shared regional strategy. The strong reaction to Congressional debate over a non-binding Armenian genocide resolution, and the threat of Turkish retaliation on defense cooperation and trade, points to the continued potential for national sensitivities to impede predictable cooperation.

Ankara has also succeeded in containing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgency; a success that was evident in security terms even before the apprehension

of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. The key question now is whether Ankara can translate this security improvement into political reconciliation with Turkey's Kurds. Progress here will be critical to Turkey's EU prospects, but the current economic crisis has pushed the Kurdish issue to the sidelines, at least for the moment.

A Changing Strategic Environment

The strategic environment facing Ankara—and Athens—has evolved significantly, with implications for U.S. and NATO agendas in the region. At the EU's Helsinki summit in December 1999, Turkey became a candidate for full membership in the Union. At the same time, the Helsinki summit envisioned the opening of Cypriot accession talks, preferably with—but if necessary without—a settlement on Cyprus. With the advanced state of the Cypriot candidacy, the clock is running on the question of Greek-Turkish relations in Cyprus, and the EU factor is now the dominant one in shaping the future of this dispute. Moreover, there can be no question of Turkish membership without a resolution of the full range of Greek-Turkish problems, including air and sea space issues in the Aegean. For Turkey, its EU candidacy provides a clear path toward closer integration and convergence with Europe—a longstanding U.S. policy preference.

But the final status of Turkey within the EU is far from certain, and there is a serious risk that the offer of eventual membership will prove hollow, with negative implications for Ankara's role in Europe and European security arrangements. Turks believe that they have been frozen out of European decision making on a common foreign policy and new EU defense initiatives (ESDP). Under these conditions Ankara has blocked proposed arrangements for EU use of NATO assets, including planning cells, for European-led missions. The issue of Turkey's role in ESDP is a key "test case" for Ankara in its evolving relationship with Europe. There are signs that Turkey may now accept a compromise formula giving Ankara and other non-EU NATO members earlier participation in European defense decision-making in periods of crisis. Ultimately, Turkey shares the U.S. interest in seeing any new European defense arrangements evolve, to the extent possible, in a NATO framework. Above all, Turkey fears a reduction in the U.S. involvement in European defense, and a decline in the credibility of NATO guarantees to Turkey.

Several issues contribute to the longer-term importance of Athens and Ankara as strategic partners for the United States and the West. These include the prospect of continuing demands for peacekeeping, crisis management, and reconstruction in the Balkans. Greece and Turkey are key actors in this regard, both politically and economically. Instability in the Caucasus touches directly on Turkish security, and Ankara will be a key partner in managing a potentially difficult relationship with Moscow in the region. A more nationalistic and competitive Russia would likely seek to challenge Western interests on the periphery—in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East—rather than in the center of Europe. In a more positive climate, these regions could similarly be a focus of cooperation with Russia. To the extent that NATO shifts its strategic attention toward the South, as prospective risks would suggest, Greece and Turkey will be even more central. Turkey, with its large military establishment and modernization plans, is likely to be an increasingly capable partner for power projection in adjacent regions.

Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece have developed close and diversified relationships with Israel. This can offer useful opportunities for U.S. diplomacy and security cooperation vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf and other key areas. Both Athens and Ankara can contribute to Middle East peace arrangements, if the peace process can be restored. Turkey will have a particularly keen interest as a water-surplus state and as a stakeholder in future security arrangements with Syria.

The eastern Mediterranean is at the center of an emerging energy security picture that reaches to the Gulf, the Caspian, and across the Mediterranean. Turkey and Greece are becoming important energy entrepots, especially for the supply of natural gas to European markets. Pipeline decisions, including the future of Turkey's Baku-Ceyhan route, will shape the future of international access to these resources, and will influence regional geopolitics. Turkey's own energy demands will continue to grow substantially, and access to energy is now a leading element in the Turkish security calculus.

Finally, the eastern Mediterranean is exposed to functional challenges, cutting across regional lines, that are also prominent concerns for the United States. Turkey is already vulnerable to ballistic missile attack from proliferators on its Middle Eastern borders, and it could play a central role in theater ballistic missile defense architecture and perhaps in a more comprehensive missile defense, with a boost-phase approach. Both Greece and Turkey are important U.S. partners in counterterrorism. Transnational crime, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of nuclear materials are prominent security challenges for both countries and of increasing con-

cern to Washington. The functional agenda for cooperation with Athens and Ankara includes many of the central challenges for U.S. national security planning in a new era.

Outlook for Aegean Detente

There has been substantial improvement in the relationship between Athens and Ankara. Both countries have a strategic interest in better relations. But the rapprochement remains tentative and subject to reversals, and the core issues of Cyprus and the Aegean remain unresolved. Three years ago, Greece and Turkey were still engaged in a dangerous game of brinkmanship, with a daily risk of accidental conflict and escalation. Bilateral frictions impeded the completion of new NATO command arrangements for the eastern Mediterranean and threatened the cohesion of the Alliance. Through successive Balkan crises, U.S. policy has stressed the risk that regional conflict could spread to Greece and Turkey and reinforce "civilizational" cleavages in the region, a theme reiterated in the context of Kosovo and Macedonia. In fact, Athens and Ankara have taken a cautious, multilateral approach to the Balkans, and cooperation in Balkan stability and reconstruction was one of the few bright spots in Greek-Turkish relations prior to 1999.

Much has been made of the "earthquake diplomacy" accompanying the 1999 disasters in both countries. These events had a significant effect on public opinion and helped to overcome the overheated nationalism that has prevailed at times on both sides of the Aegean. But the real significance of the earthquake diplomacy was the scope it gave to policymakers in Athens and Ankara already committed to détente for strategic reasons. Foreign Ministers Ismail Cem and George Papandreaou have been instrumental in this change of course. Despite considerable support, especially from the private sector in both countries, they are keenly aware of the need to proceed carefully in deepening Greek-Turkish reconciliation. To date, a series of meetings, including high-level visits, has produced nine bilateral cooperation agreements covering peripheral but significant matters, from tourism to counter-terrorism. A package of confidence building measures has been agreed, and is ready to be implemented under NATO auspices. For the moment, the core issues of Cyprus and the Aegean have been left aside, but it is now clear that these very divisive issues must be addressed in some form if the current détente is to be consolidated and extended.

Over the longer-term, the prospects for détente will be heavily influenced by the character of Turkish-EU relations. Europe is central to the strategy of rapprochement for both countries. Friction between Ankara and Brussels would reduce the incentives for bilateral cooperation, and could encourage a more nationalistic and less conciliatory mood.

What Are U.S. Interests? What is at Stake?

This background suggests that U.S. interests are engaged in important ways:

- The United States has a stake in the evolution of Greece and Turkey as "pivotal" states—pivotal because what happens there involves not only the fate of two longstanding allies (with NATO security guarantees) but also influences the future of regions that matter to Washington. This gives the United States a stake in Turkish prosperity, stability and convergence with European norms.
- Washington looks to Athens and Ankara to play a positive role in regional security and development, whether in the Balkans or in relation to energy security or missile defense. This includes the continued positive evolution of the Greek-Turkish relationship. A return to confrontation would negatively affect U.S. bilateral interests as well as NATO interests.
- The United States wants Greek and Turkish policies to contribute more specifically to U.S. freedom of action in adjacent regions. On the diplomatic front, this includes support for U.S. policy aims in relation to both crisis management and reconstruction in the Balkans, as well as to the containment of Iraq and Iran. In security terms, it includes predictable access to Turkish and Greek facilities for regional contingencies and flexibility to engage or hedge in relations with Russia, as appropriate.

Policy Options

Approaches to furthering these objectives differ principally in terms of the extent of U.S. engagement and the question of policy leadership. Given NATO commitments and the strong nature of U.S. interests in Turkey and Greece, disengagement is not a viable option. On at least some important questions, however, it is reasonable to ask whether the United States, Europe, or the parties themselves should take the lead.

1. *Focus on bilateral approaches, and provide a lead from Washington.* This is the traditional course. It acknowledges the resonance of these issues, including the Cyprus question, in U.S. domestic politics. In the current environment, it can also reassure regional allies, above all Turkey, that the United States is not disengaging from European affairs. Moreover, the United States will have an independent stake in shaping regional diplomacy and security in ways that accord with U.S. interests. The issue of access to Incirlik Air Base, for example, is not of central interest to Washington's European allies, and we may not wish to see Turkish attitudes toward Iraq or Iran further "Europeanized." U.S. leadership may also help to ensure that Turkish-Greek relations remain in balance—something that might prove difficult without U.S. advocacy on Ankara's behalf. Cyprus diplomacy would be a key test of the viability of this approach. Certain initiatives, including the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, arguably will not happen at all without active U.S. leadership and support.
2. *Let Europe take the lead.* This approach would acknowledge Europe's increasingly central place in the outlook of both countries. The United States has been a beneficiary of this trend, and may wish to support it. Moreover, the Helsinki summit has made the EU role a permanently operating factor in relation to Turkey, the future of Cyprus, and the Aegean dispute. Improved relations with Brussels provide an incentive for all sides and will be critical to the deepening of Greek-Turkish détente. The United States should welcome an opportunity for some of the diplomatic and burden to shift to Europe, especially with other claims on U.S. attention. In the context of relations with Turkey, a more balanced trans-Atlantic approach can take pressure off of otherwise contentious issues between Ankara and Washington. The United States has pressed for a greater Turkish role in Europe, and it should now take the next steps to encourage it. In the case of Greece, as recent experience suggests, the less bilateralism, the better.
3. *Let the parties solve their own problems.* This option pertains, above all, to the question of how to strengthen Greek-Turkish détente. Both parties are sensitive to the appearance of being pushed into further concessions against their national interests. An arms-length approach from Washington could be helpful here. The same might be said of the EU, but Europe, post-Helsinki, is a structural participant in the process and cannot disengage. At the end of the day, leaderships in Athens and Ankara must decide whether to move forward and how.
4. *Refocus U.S. engagement to allow for a shift of roles.* The overall thrust of U.S. policy toward these allies and their regional roles should change. We should capture the advantages of more European and multilateral approaches and take an arm's length approach where appropriate. At the same time, the United States and its partners should jointly redefine bilateral relationships to address new issues and foster more predictable partnerships. With some important exceptions, Washington should let Athens and Ankara manage the next stages of their reconciliation, and we should recognize that the key decisions and policies regarding Cyprus must come from Europe. Europe is also the leading factor in domestic change for both countries. Reminding Europe of its responsibility vis-a-vis Turkey should remain a feature of Washington's trans-Atlantic policy.

Next Steps

Turkish economic recovery and stability are pre-conditions for progress on many of the issues raised in this analysis, and should be strongly supported. Since Europe is already structurally engaged in the Greek-Turkish equation, and the United States has a stake in deepening this engagement, a U.S.-led approach is inappropriate. Similarly, the parties themselves must take the initiative in further developing Greek-Turkish relations. On wider, regional issues, Greece and Turkey should be integrated in transatlantic strategies. Washington should stay engaged in policy toward Greece and Turkey, but should refocus its engagement toward the following priority next steps.

- Encourage Turkish reformers and recognize the importance of strong support from Washington in restoring confidence in the Turkish economy. This should include continued backing for IMF-led financial assistance.
- Continue to stress the importance of closer Turkish convergence with and integration in Europe. But the United States should recognize that Turkey's prospects for full EU membership remain mixed at best. Convergence rather than membership is the real objective from the perspective of U.S. interests.

Washington should press its European partners to adapt their plans for ESDP to give Ankara a greater role in European decision making on defense—or at least to broker a compromise that will avoid a Turkish break with Brussels and the risk of paralysis over European-led initiatives at NATO.

- On Cyprus, the goal of a "bi-zonal, bi-communal federation" remains appropriate. The United States can have a role, but not necessarily the leading role, in any settlement arrangements for the island. Cyprus is increasingly an EU-led issue, and the key incentives for compromise will come from Brussels. If Cyprus is offered EU membership against a background of tense Turkish-EU relations, we should be prepared for a strong Turkish political reaction. This possibility increases the importance of having effective Greek-Turkish risk-reduction measures in place.
- Engage Greek and Turkish leaderships toward the development of a new, more relevant strategic agenda. For Turkey, key elements of this agenda can include energy security, ballistic missile defense, dealing with Russia, and integrating Turkey in Europe. Dialogue on a common strategic agenda can help to increase the predictability of Turkish defense cooperation, including access to Incirlik Air Base for Gulf and other contingencies. The United States should also consider exploring with Ankara new activities of mutual interest that could be conducted at Incirlik, looking beyond Operation Northern Watch. With Athens, new agenda discussions can usefully focus on Balkan reconstruction, security cooperation in the Adriatic, and possible roles for Greece in the Middle East peace process.
- Offer tangible support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. With the discovery of new proven reserves in the Caspian, there is a better chance for the pipeline to prove economic. To date, Washington has offered strong diplomatic support but little substantive backing for the pipeline, despite a clear strategic rationale. If it is serious about promoting energy security and Turkey's regional role, Washington should be prepared to contribute, together with the private sector, appropriate assistance and credits toward the pipeline's construction.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Our third witness is Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, Senior Associate, National Democratic Institute. Welcome very much, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NELSON LEDSKY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, FORMER U.S. CYPRUS COORDINATOR

Mr. LEDSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Let me start out by saying I am speaking in a private capacity. I do work for the National Democratic Institute, but I have had nothing to do with Cyprus or Greece for the last 8 years. I have followed developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, over those 8 years and indeed over a period of 20 years before that.

I think I was the first American diplomat to arrive in Cyprus in 1974 after the Turkish invasion, the first American diplomat to meet Archbishop Makarios when he came to Washington in 1974. I was with Clark Clifford on his mission to the eastern Mediterranean in 1977 and 1978. I was President Bush's Special Cyprus Coordinator during the first Bush Administration from 1989 through 1992.

I would like to associate myself with the views of my two colleagues with respect to the position of Greece and the position of Turkey, the attitude of the United States toward both, and the attitude of both of those countries toward each other.

I think enormous progress has been made over the last few years in reconciling Greek-Turkish differences, improving Greek-Turkish relations and beginning to solve some of the problems that have ex-

isted between Greece and Turkey since the 1960's. I regret to say that with respect to Cyprus, however, the situation is markedly different; and I want to be perfectly honest and perfectly brutal. If you wish, I would be the skunk at your picnic.

Negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem have reached near rock bottom. We have never been farther from a solution than we were in 1974.

Whereas in 1974 and 1975 and 1976 and 1977 Mr. Clerides, then acting President, and Mr. Denktash, then Prime Minister of northern Cyprus, met biweekly on the island to discuss issues connected with the separation of the two communities, meetings between the two now have proven impossible to organize. Indeed, what has become a triumph of the U.N. is merely to organize proximity talks with Mr. Denktash in one room, Mr. Clerides in the other and a U.N. Official shuttling between the two. Even those meetings, which took place last year and the year before, have been impossible to organize for the remainder of 2001; and Mr. Denktash just recently brushed aside the Secretary General's invitation to come to Geneva to resume proximity talks with him.

The U.N. has been at the center of the Cyprus negotiations since the 1960's; and it would be my contention that there will be no negotiated settlement on Cyprus without the active involvement, indeed the active work of the United Nations and its officials. And the first requirement of American policy is to support the U.N. Negotiations of Secretary General Kofi Annan and his Special Cyprus Coordinator, who are trying valiantly to put the U.N. talks back on track.

It is particularly regrettable that we find ourselves in this situation in the year 2001 because we have come on various occasions very close to a negotiated Cyprus settlement that would have achieved the goals which the Chairman articulated at the beginning of this hearing, namely the construction of a bizonal, bicommunal federal state on Cyprus in which the two communities were politically equal but separate in terms of organizing their communities.

The instrument to create such a Cyprus began to be negotiated in the late 1970's. I would like to say that Clark Clifford played an enormous role during the Carter Administration in beginning the process of getting the Greek Cypriots to admit there could be nothing less than a bizonal, bicommunal settlement in which the Turks had a zone of their own in which their community could operate freely.

These ideas were incorporated in international documents in 1977 and 1979, and we went from those documents slowly to a negotiated "set of ideas" which the Security Council of the United Nations endorsed in August and October, 1992. It is these documents, including a map which was attached and published alongside them, which have been the basis for negotiations over the last decade and which I believe could form and eventually will form the basis of a Cyprus settlement.

Why are we so far from that settlement today? The answer can be summed up, as some do, by saying that Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has been intransigent. Some would say the Turks have been unyielding in their instructions to Mr. Denktash

to talk but not to act. Some would say the President of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, has moved farther and farther from the set of ideas endorsed by the Security Council in 1992.

I think there is no simple answer to the question of why we have moved away from the negotiated settlement that was in sight a decade ago.

One thing is clear. In 1990, the government of Cyprus filed an application to join the European Union and claimed at the time, and I think with great sincerity and great honesty, that entry into the European Union would provide a means to resolve most of the issues related to Cyprus without the necessity of an agreed negotiated settlement. The Greek Cypriots believe entry into the European Union would provide an economic stimulus to the Turkish Cypriots, and help settle the so-called three freedoms—of movement, of settlement, and of labor—that the Greek Cypriots had sought to achieve since the 1970's. European Union membership for Cyprus would bring this about in an orderly, logical, straightforward manner.

The United States Government, beginning in the 1980's, endorsed the Cypriot application and indeed today supports the entry of Cyprus into the European Union. There is nothing wrong with such entry. Indeed, many of the things the Greek Cypriots say would occur probably would occur following Cyprus' entry into the European Union.

However, the Turkish Cypriots have made clear from the late 1980's that an entry by Cyprus into the European Union through an application by the Greek Cypriots, acting alone, would destroy prospects for a negotiated settlement. If you want to call it a threat, you may call it a threat. If you want to call it a prophecy, you may call it a prophecy. But however you characterize their actions, the Turkish Cypriots have increasingly refused to come to the table and negotiate seriously about the issues which they fear will be settled through Cypriot entry into the European Union.

The entry of Cyprus into the European Union is, as Mr. Sitilides said, just a few short months off. Final decisions will be taken next year. Entry of Cyprus could occur in the years 2004 or 2006. It is not clear. Much depends on whether the individual members of the European Union are asked to ratify the accession of Cyprus, or whether ratification is done by governments without reference to the wishes of the people in the European Union.

The Turkish government, fearing entry of Cyprus in the European Union before they, the Turks, are able to enter the European Union have, like a deer before headlights, frozen—refused to make any move. They are waiting to see what happens.

There is, of course, the possibility that the Europeans will act more slowly than they have suggested. There is the possibility that some members of the European Union will vote against Cypriot membership for the European Union simply because of their belief that a divided Cyprus, a Cyprus at war with itself, will be a poor member of the Union and will create a security threat to the community, rather than enhance its strength in the Mediterranean region.

Whatever the reasons, the Turks in Ankara are angry. The Turks are suspicious of Europe, the Turks are reluctant to move

the Turkish-Cypriots back to the negotiating table. The United States, therefore, which has supported European entry of Cyprus, faces an important and I think critical dilemma. We can push ahead urging the Turks to get Mr. Denktash back to the negotiating table. We can proceed to urge the Europeans to admit Cyprus as quickly and as smoothly as possible, recognizing that once Cyprus is a member of that community the Europeans become responsible for what goes on on the island and the security of that portion of Cyprus which they have control—that is, for the Greek part of the island.

With 30,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus, a figure which Mr. Sitilides correctly stated, the *danger* exists that the Turks will stay on the island and will only be able to be removed by a European force. Some Europeans are reluctant to face that reality. Others say that Europe is building such a European force. If necessary, it will be used on Cyprus.

The British negotiator for EU entry for Cyprus often talks of a train wreck waiting to happen. I believe he is correct. This is the train wreck ready to happen. It could happen in 2002. It could happen in 2003. It could happen sometime thereafter.

The answer for the United States is not simply to appoint a new Presidential Envoy. We have had Presidential Envoys since before my time and indeed since my time. Those envoys have performed a very valuable function. They have worked with the U.N. and they have worked with Turkey to prepare a document. The issue at hand is, however, no longer that document but the situation with respect to future EU membership of Cyprus.

Let me answer any questions you have.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

We will entertain some questions from our Members. We are probably going to have a vote in a few minutes, so we will try to get a couple of questions in or as many as we can before we have to go vote.

I have a couple quick questions for Mr. Sitilides.

In a recent article in a Greek American newspaper, a Greek writer stated, and I quote, it is not a secret that varieties of anti-Americanism are alive and well in Greece. The majority of the population probably espouses a serious mistrust of the U.S. and its intentions toward Greece.

My question for you, Mr. Sitilides, is how would you respond to this assessment and your opinion of what the general feeling inside Greece is as it relates to the United States.

Mr. SITILIDES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would disagree with that analysis. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, after 1974, with the end of the rule of the military junta and the Cyprus crisis, there was much more sentiment against the United States and a stronger level of mistrust. I think much of this has abated over the last 27 years for a number of reasons.

First of all is the fact that, as I mentioned, Greece has recalculated a number of its interests and its policies have harmonized with those of the United States. Greece and the U.S. face a number of common issues and common threats in the region, and I believe there is a much more sophisticated perspective in Athens today to-

ward the United States, Europe, and international affairs generally.

There is also a very personal connection here, Mr. Chairman, and that is the fact that hundreds of thousands in Greece, if not several million, have family in the United States or have travelled to the United States. They are frustrated over the Cyprus issue, as far as I can tell personally, and there is a sense that the U.S. has favored Turkey over Greece over the years for geostrategic purposes.

Whether that perception is correct or not is another debate—but, it is there. But I don't think it is as pronounced as it may have been earlier for substantive reasons and for emotional reasons, it doesn't exist to that degree today. Probably some pockets of it, but not as blatantly as some might hold.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Ledsky, the Turkish military insists on keeping some 30,000 plus of its soldiers in Cyprus, and I think common sense will tell you that is not helpful toward the negotiation process. The question I have for you is, do you see this as—is the threat to the Turkish Cypriot so great as to justify such a large military force on the island?

Mr. LEDSKY. The answer is clearly no. That size force is not needed to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the much smaller Greek forces that are on the island. And the Turks have from time to time moved some troops on, moved some troops off. I think it is fairly clear that in a settlement one element has to be the removal of Turkish troops or the vast majority of Turkish troops from the island. I think this is understood by the Turks. This is understood by the Turkish Cypriots.

This was part of the negotiations in early 1992. There is a kind of gentlemen's agreement that was written into the document of 1992, and my understanding is over the last year there has been repeated quiet negotiations involving the U.N., the Turks and U.S. negotiators to arrive at a security balance for Cyprus which would be put in force at the time of the negotiated settlement. I don't think this is one of the major problem areas that still has to be resolved. Indeed, I think it is an area that is well on its way to resolution.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lesser, your written testimony states that the current economic crisis in Turkey could have adverse repercussions on Greek-Turkish relations. Perhaps you could comment on that, but also comment on whether these economic problems would inspire Turkey to perhaps retrench, view its situation as less powerful, and perhaps now would be an auspicious time for them to cut what deal they could to resolve the Cyprus issue and lay a foundation for better economic relations with Greece and all of Europe.

Mr. LESSER. Yes, well, thank you. Let me try to say a few words about that. It is a very, very good question. I think it can be answered on a number levels.

Clearly, the scale of what has happened in Turkey economically has caused everyone, including the economic policymakers, to focus

on the internal scene; and it has simply left a lot less energy to deal with everything else, including the issues that you mentioned. I think it is interesting to note that Greece, within Europe, has been extremely supportive of an economic support package for Turkey because they see it as in their interest to have a stable Turkey on their borders, and I think that is a correct assessment.

In terms of hastening a solution to Cyprus, clearly one can find people, usually outside of the government, usually in the business sector in Turkey, who view the subsidies to northern Cyprus and the cost of the military presence there as a drag on the Turkish economy, and they would like to see it end. Clearly, that is part of the equation and works in favor of a settlement.

On the other hand, if this economic crisis leads Turkey in the direction of less political stability, one of the beneficiaries of that may be nationalist elements in Turkey, and they have very hard-line views on issues like Cyprus. So, really, the resolution of Turkey's internal problems, politically as well as economically, will have a lot to say about the future; and it could go either way.

Thank you.

Mr. SHERMAN. Just to follow up on that. Do these business interests that you mention in Turkey and some other clear thinkers recognize that the cost of occupying Cyprus, that iceberg—the visible portion is the subsidies and the cost of maintaining the 30-plus-thousand troops? The submerged portion is the reluctance of companies to invest in a country that is in some ways in a military conflict, the reluctance to visualize Turkey as 3 or 4 years away, as opposed to 20 or 30 years away from the EU. The effect on investment and economics of this continuing conflict makes the cost of maintaining 35,000 troops insignificant.

I wonder if Mr. Sitilides could comment on that as well and try to explain why it is that Turkey and its, I guess, puppet regimes are averse to Cypriot accession to the EU.

Mr. SITILIDES. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, let me address the first part. There are different figures that are bandied about regarding the cost of maintaining the Turkish force in Cyprus, and I think the commonly accepted figure is around $200 million a year, approximately.

This is a very difficult issue. If I had a concrete answer, I would have taken it from others who would have solved the Cyprus problem years ago, including Ambassador Ledsky sitting next to me.

There are several important issues in Cyprus, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that have not been sufficiently addressed today. We believe that part of the problem, in addition to the efforts undertaken to achieve a political settlement, involves strategic issues for Turkey. Looking toward Cyprus 30 miles off its southern coast, the notion exists in Turkey that it will never tolerate a hostile military presence in Cyprus. Through the years, because of the problems in the Greek-Turkish relationship, the Greek military presence in Cyprus was viewed as hostile by Turkey. As long as these security issues are not appropriately addressed by those that make these security and defense-related decisions in Turkey—and I would posit specifically the Turkish General Staff, which has been inadequately engaged in this process—I believe it is difficult to achieve the kind of security progress, as part of the

larger Cyprus settlement equation, that has been necessary over the years.

Mr. SHERMAN. Perhaps you could also comment on whether forward-thinking elements in Turkey are aware of the total economic cost, including the psychological impact on investors in their whole visualization of Turkey and Turkey's future from the failure to solve the Cyprus problem.

Mr. SITILIDES. In my own trips to Turkey over the years, and in discussions with Turkish business leaders and many in the mass media as well, there is a growing sense that the Cyprus problem is a very weighty albatross around Turkey's neck in its relationship with Europe and internationally.

One interesting note, Congressman, and this is just a personal observation: in the last 2 to 3 months, there has been daylight in the Turkish mass media regarding the Cyprus issue. I personally have been surprised—and there are those here who have been dealing with this issue longer than I have, who can offer comment as well—of the extent to which the Turkish leadership's position on Cyprus has been publicly criticized by renowned columnists in prominent media in Turkey, including many who took a hard line on Cyprus or who ignored it as an issue that was considered solved after 1974.

So there seems to be some type of change, at least among certain segments of the opinion-making leadership in Turkey. We do not have a sense that that has actually penetrated decision-making circles yet, because we are still hearing much of the same rhetoric, and some of it is becoming even tougher. And there is a feeling it will become even more difficult in the months ahead, especially leading up to this December 2002 vote in the European Union. The Turkish side may take an even tougher line in the months ahead and a more intransigent line on the Cyprus issue. It will make this issue a more difficult one to crack, except if we begin to find ways to address security issues that complement the efforts to achieve a political settlement.

But I think there is significant daylight in Turkey in certain segments, especially among the elite, in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and the Aegean region. Business leaders have a terrible time dealing with the Cyprus issue when they are dealing with their American and European friends. They know it is a problem, but they are not the ones in the end who are going to resolve this on the Turkish side.

Mr. BEREUTER. [presiding.] The time of the gentleman has expired.

We will start the clock now because we are approaching a vote on floor.

I want to compliment the Chairman in his absence (he will be gone for about 20 minutes) for the excellent panel he has brought together and to all of the witnesses for the wisdom, good counsel, and high degree of specificity of some recommendations that you have given us.

I want to use my time to make some comments to the audience and for the record here as a friend of Turkey, as a friend of Greece, and as a friend of Cyprus, but whose first responsibility is our own national interest.

First of all, the Chairman read a quotation a few minutes ago to you, Mr. Sitilides, about the anti-Americanism that allegedly exists in Greece. You made comments, I think, to some extent, the author of the statement and you are both right.

As I have spent a lot of time in the 19 NATO countries, I think there is more anti-Americanism in Greece today. Greek-Americans probably don't see that as much because of the special relationships they have and the ties to the United States. I think there is a big improvement in Greek-American relations, and I think there is an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations that we ought to build upon.

Nevertheless, when it comes to Greece, for example, we need to crthen6.09sruishrthmt to es more ggrlesiaveionbringing terror(ists)]TJT 01098 Tw[(tojusticee thin

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playing a bridge role in assisting this NATO alliance—whether or not they are a member—to help reduce tensions between their two neighbors to the south. They are certainly to be encouraged in that respect.

I think Americans have every right to be impatient with the pace of the European Union as it keeps these countries, including Cyprus and about 14 other countries, in limbo. If we want to have a Europe free and whole, then NATO needs to expand. But, in many cases, the European Union more quickly needs to be expanding, and it has to be a little less selfish with its resources.

So having lectured everybody except the Congress of the United States, let me end my comments.

Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In an effort to be brief, I would just like to associate my remarks with Mr. Bereuter's in their entirety. I think he hit every point exactly correctly.

I would like to ask of Ambassador Ledsky, if I could, if we could assume that, for argument's sake, that Mr. Denktash and the Turkish economy, they do the reforms that they need to do. Then in the period of 1, 2, 3 years, the reforms, as we all hope, they will have an impact in a positive way on the Turkish economy and there is some light at the end of the tunnel with respect to the Turkish economy. If we assume that, I am confused as to best-case scenario with respect to Cyprus. What should the American policy be? And my confusion stems from the point that it seems that you start from a given that we must continue to support the Greek side in its effort to gain access to the European Union, and that when that occurs, that inevitably will create a strain. There seems to be little or no suggestion as to how America, more importantly, the European Union can overcome it. So what is the best-case scenario? What do we do to create the best case scenario?

Mr. LEDSKY. You have asked the $64 question. I honestly don't have an answer. I see things moving in directions which conflict with each other. My own view is that if the Turkish body politic moves in the right direction in the next 3 or 4 or 5 years, and I think it will, because I am an optimist on Turkey, good things will happen. They have happened over the last 3 or 4 years, and I think more will happen over the next 3 or 4 years. At some point in time, a negotiated Cyprus settlement along bizonal, bicommunal federal lines is not only possible, but will come about because of some of the reasons you have suggested on the panel, namely, that the Turkish business community, the Turkish intellectual community, the Turkish Western community understands the burden of Cyprus, understands the expense of Cyprus, understands that it brings little gain and hence will move toward a negotiated settlement.

The danger, as I see it is that accession by Cyprus to the EU in its present form, being negotiated simply between the Greek Cypriot administration and the European Union in Brussels will bring about a Cyprus in which the Europeans are engaged partially but not wholly, will bring about a situation where the Turkish forces will become nervous about the presence of European forces across the green line and where something dangerous could occur.

My view is that America has been, to some extent, pushed out of the picture by Europe. We have become, in some ways, powerless for the next 18 to 24 months. There is nothing we can do. We have to wait for this European train to move forward to whatever destination it is going, trying in the meantime to make sure that the Europeans understand the consequences of their actions. Understand the security risks they are taking on themselves. But there is nothing much we can do, and that is why I am actually coming to a point where I think the idea of American leadership and a new American Presidential Envoy, a new American initiative, should be avoided in the period ahead.

Mr. BEREUTER. Time of the gentleman has expired. We have two votes, about 25 minutes, and I would like to see if Mr. Menendez and Mr. Crowley would like to make comments. Then we will adjourn the hearing, but you have about 6 minutes to divide between you, if that is all right.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I think we can do that.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman if it pleases, I am just going to submit a statement for the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection that will be the case.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak in strong support of the U.S. relationship with these three important countries: Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. However, I would like to speak, in particular, about two key issues which have do doubt been the focus of this hearing today—That of Cypriot accession to the European Union (EU) and the ongoing division of Cyprus.

In its Conclusions at Helsinki, the European Council, in December of 1999, welcomed the launch of proximity talks that year aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Council further noted that, while a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate accession of Cyprus to the EU, it would *not* be a precondition to accession. In his confirmation hearing held on March 20, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman stated that we must impress upon the Turkish Cypriots and the people in Ankara that they have got to get involved in the stalled proximity talks. A settlement to the problem would surely be a welcome development for all the governments involved.

Most of us understand that accession of Cyprus to the EU will provide a much-needed impetus to a political solution. But, what Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash must understand is that Cyprus will accede to the EU whether or not he returns to the negotiating table. Because Cyprus is divided, I fear the people living on the northern part of the island under Mr. Denktash's rule, will not benefit from EU membership. The north must rejoin the rest of the island so that its people can share in the wealth, both political and economic, which EU membership has to offer. Mr. Denktash's recalcitrance will not block the Cypriot government from reaching its goal. What Mr. Denktash must decide is whether or not he wants to be a productive part of Cyprus' future. I truly hope, for the sake of all Cypriots, that he elects to do so.

The people of Cyprus, with their long and rich cultural and political history, deserve far more than to see their island forever divided because of misguided political aspirations. There must be a reunited Cyprus, one that is bizonal, bicommunal and federal, created on the basis of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. I urge Mr. Denktash to return to the negotiating table once again so that a negotiated settlement can be reached. EU accession for Cyprus will benefit everyone: the U.S., Greece, Turkey, and all of Cyprus' other allies. Cyprus must take its rightful place in the community of nations as a strong, unified country with the opportunity to grow and prosper economically, to be afforded the same legal, political and social rights as other nations. Cypriot accession to the EU will begin that process, but resolution of the political problem dividing the island will provide the ultimate closure Cyprus needs to move forward.

In closing, I would like to commend my colleagues, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney and Congressman Michael Bilirakis, for introducing a House Concurrent Resolution in support of Cypriot accession to the EU. I am proud to be a co-sponsor of that bill.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will also submit statements for the record for Mr. Pallone, Mr. Gilman, Ms. Lee, and the ATAA.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman Gallegly and Ranking Member Hastings for holding this hearing today and for allowing me the opportunity to give an opening statement. Mr. Chairman, today's hearing comes at a critical time for this region of the world. During my twelve years in Congress, I have been working with many of my colleagues to bring a just resolution to the Cyprus problem—a problem that is currently creating the most tension between these three nations.

Given the instability in the adjacent regions of the Middle East and the Balkans, now is good time to heal the wound in Cyprus that has been poisoning the relations between Greece and Turkey, both important allies of the U.S.

Earlier this year, I joined 59 of my colleagues on a letter to President Bush requesting that he make the reunification of Cyprus a high and urgent priority in his Administration. The United States, which is trusted by all sides in this conflict, has the ability to help move this process forward. We must continue to support the United Nations framework for negotiations between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.

I was encouraged by statements made by President Bush reaffirming U.S. backing of the peace process, however I am concerned that once again Turkey is not willing to cooperate. Currently, peace negotiations are at a standstill. Over the years, I have become quite familiar with the Turkish side's well-known negotiation tactics. The Turkish side agrees to peace negotiations on the Cyprus problem only for the purpose of undermining them once they begin and then blames the Greek Cypriots for their failure. Once again, face-to-face negotiations that were scheduled for January have never occurred because Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash refuses to attend.

While the U.S. should do everything possible to re-start the U.N. negotiations, it should be made crystal clear to the Turkish leadership and Mr. Denktash that their unacceptable demands for recognition of a separate state in order to return to the negotiating table are completely unacceptable. No effort should be made to appease the Turkish Cypriot leader in order to return to the negotiating table. And not only should Mr. Denktash return to the negotiating table, but he should negotiate in good faith in order to reach a comprehensive settlement within the framework provided for by the relevant United Nation Security Council's Resolutions. These resolutions establish a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single international personality and sovereignty and a single citizenship.

Cyprus is also currently a leading candidate for accession to the European Union. In December 1999, the European Council determined that if no settlement to the Cyprus problem had been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession would be made without a settlement being a precondition. At the same meeting, the council also decided to grant Turkey European Union accession status, and at a separate meeting last December the council said that Turkey must strongly support the U.N. Secretary General's efforts to bring about a successful conclusion to the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The European Council also addressed another issue critical to the region at the December 2000 meeting—the disputes in the Aegean. I believe the historical record proving Greek sovereignty over the disputed territories is very clear. Greece's view, which is shared by the European Union, that the two parties should take the issue to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, is generous to say the least. Once again this year, I am a cosponsor of legislation calling for the same process to be followed in the dispute over the islets of Imia.

Before the meeting last December, I sent a letter to the President of the Council of the European Union, urging he keep the Cyprus and Aegean statements in the Accession Partnership Document (APD) that was being negotiated with Ankara for Turkey's possible admission into the European Union. Since these important statements remain in that document, I believe it in the best interest of Turkey to cooper-

ate with the U.N. and the rest of the international community on both Cyprus and the Aegean in order to advance its own goals with the European Union. So far, however, we have regrettably seen only the full backing offered by Turkey to Mr. Denktash in his decision to boycott the U.N. talks, as well as threatening statements if EU accession takes place.

Mr. Chairman, I believe relations between Greece and Turkey will be dramatically improved by a settlement of the Cyprus question, since for a number of years Cyprus has been a national cause for Greece and a number one priority of its foreign policy. We should work to ensure that the recent signs of improvement in Greco-Turkish relations are also felt in Cyprus and on the efforts to resolve the problem. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding today's hearing and your bringing this fine panel before us today.

The problems of the Eastern Mediterranean deserve close scrutiny—and more than that, they deserve action—by our Administration and this Committee.

There is a new spirit of cooperation across the Aegean, but, regrettably, it has yet resulted in a complete normalization of relations between our allies Greece and Turkey, and most tragically, it has not yet paid off for the people of Cyprus.

It has been nearly 30 years since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The political leadership in northern Cyprus, and the political and military leaderships in Turkey, have not come to grips with the reality that Cypriot accession to the European Union is going to happen with or without their cooperation.

They need to realize that the interests of Turkish Cypriots and of Anatolian Turks would be greatly enhanced by Cypriot admission to the EU. Once Cyprus comes in and the deadlock there is broken, Greece will not block Turkey's accession, as its Foreign Minister informed us quite openly during his recent visit.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask your consent that a letter I wrote to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld asking that he engage the Turkish military leadership on the issue of Cyprus be inserted into the Record of this hearing.

Enclosure:

U.S. CONGRESS,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, June 4, 2001.

Hon. DONALD H. RUMSFELD,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY RUMSFELD: Cyprus is at a critical juncture in its history. I respectfully suggest that your personal attention and involvement is needed. A resolution of the tragic division of Cyprus would benefit U. S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and would strengthen NATO by improving relations between our two key allies Greece and Turkey. It would defuse an ongoing regional arms race.

A solution to the conflict on Cyprus would have positive- economic effects as well. It would increase the likelihood for Turkish accession to the European Union. We must persuade Turkey that it is in its best interests to allow a political solution on Cyprus, and that a Cyprus settlement, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, would benefit all parties involved.

It seems to me that a high-level approach to the Turkish military is in order, as the military seems to have been the "spoiler" in several past attempts to settle the conflict. I would be interested in your thoughts on this suggestion, especially in light of your recent travel in the region.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Hastings, for holding this hearing about the Eastern Mediterranean, one of the historically most important and volatile regions of Europe.

The progress these countries have made in searching for peaceful solutions to difficult problems represents a true accomplishment and a model for others. I applaud the role they have played in, as the Foreign Minister of Greece put it, moving from "a situation of perennial crisis to permanent stability."

In addition to seeking solutions to long-standing issues of their own, these countries have worked to help bring stability to the Balkans, one of the most unstable regions on earth.

Progress toward peace has been made, but more remains to be done, most notably in Cyprus. It is my hope that United Nations negotiations will help lead to a lasting solution. The occupation of Cyprus must end. And, it is absolutely vital that respect for human rights underlie any future policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is located at the juncture of three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. As a geographic and cultural nexus, these ancient civilizations will remain at the center of international relations in the years to come.

Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY OF TURKISH AMERICAN ASSOCIATIONS

REGARDING CYPRUS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

The Assembly of Turkish American Associations is grateful for the opportunity to submit its views on United States policy towards Cyprus, both towards the Greek Cypriot administration and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus established in 1983.

We believe that sound United States policies would be promoted by understanding the following key points:

1. *Distrust.* Substantial but understandable mistrust obtains between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus attained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. During the years 1955–58 as independence was negotiated, Greek Cypriots forged a terrorist organization (EOKA) featuring the likes of George Grivas and Nicos Sampson wedded to employing terrorist crimes to gain unity or ENOSIS with Greece. British personnel, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriot dissenters alike were targeted for EOKA's villainy.

Turkish Cypriots did not look on the prospect of ENOSIS with equanimity. The example of Crete was riveting. After long years of Ottoman rule, the island was annexed by Greece in 1913, and persons of Turkish extraction or heritage were expelled or otherwise eliminated from the island. In modern terminology, Crete underwent ethnic cleansing, and Turkish Cypriots did not relish a second edition of Crete if Cyprus similarly succumbed to Greek sovereignty.

Accordingly, the 1960 Constitution that accompanied Cypriot independence enshrined an equal partnership dispensation that would prevent Greek Cypriot domination of Turkish Cypriots and vice versa. National security and foreign policy was shared equally by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president. The legislative branch, the judiciary, the civil service, the armed forces, and municipalities similarly divided power between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, generally in a 7–3 ratio in favor of the former.

The 1960 Constitution also explicitly prohibited ENOSIS, and was reinforced by international covenants authorizing unilateral intervention by either Turkey, Greece, or Great Britain to maintain its integrity, for example, the Treaty of Guarantee. Greece and Turkey retained skeletal forces on Cyprus, and Britain retained military bases.

With a few road bumps, the partnership Constitution operated smoothly for three years. Current President of the Greek Cypriot administration, Glafcos Clerides, in his memoirs confesses that Turkish Cypriots had not brandished their blocking powers to frustrate Greek Cypriot policies. Despite the clear absence of justification, then Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios insisted in November 1963 that Turkish Cypriots accede to thirteen revolutionary constitutional amendments that would reduce them to serfdom. When Turkish Cypriots balked, President Makarios launched a campaign of genocide (known euphemistically as The Akritas Plan), a term employed by reporters from acclaimed newspapers, such as The Washington Post. Newspaper reports of genocide were confirmed by peace envoy and United

States Undersecretary of State George Ball. He writes in his memoirs that President Makarios was uninterested in peace but craved the opportunity to turn Cyprus into his private abattoir and continue happily to kill Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriot bravery foiled the genocide attempt, but Turkish Cypriots were nevertheless herded into tiny enclaves constituting but three percent of the island and subjected to a punishing Greek Cypriot embargo. The United Nations Security Council passed various resolutions hoping to bring peace and a constitutional dispensation to Cyprus, and a peacekeeping force was dispatched in 1964 and has remained ever since.

Fighting erupted intermittently between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, with the aggressors more often the former than the latter, until 1974. Then a coup against Greek Cypriot President Makarios was initiated by the Greek military and their Greek Cypriot collaborators. Its aim was illegal ENOSIS and the elimination or extermination of Turkish Cypriots from the island. The coup success proved evanescent. Terrorist Nicos Sampson vaulted into the presidency for a few days, but the coup collapsed soon thereafter. As authorized by the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey dispatched a rescue mission to Cyprus on July 20, 1974 to thwart the second attempted genocide by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Turkey had sought British intervention to forestall the ongoing mayhem, but the latter was unmoved, forcing the former to act unilaterally. Turkey's rescue mission was declared legal by the Athens Court of Appeal in a 1979 decision, and by the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. It has never been declared a war under international law. The Turkish Cypriot fear of genocide was well founded. In a February 26, 1981 Athens newspaper publication, Nicos Sampson boasted that, "if Turks did not launch the operation, we not only could succeed in ENOSIS, but also eradicate the Turks from the Island."

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto between a Greek Cypriot administration in the south and a Turkish Cypriot administration in the north. Both are democratic, and both receive independent human rights reports by the United States Department of State. Turkey maintains troops in the TRNC to deter Greek Cypriot aggression. The Greek Cypriot administration spends more per capita on its military than any other nation in the world. It attempted to install advanced S–300 missiles purchased from Russia a few years back. Its military is virtually merged with Greece's through joint exercises and planning and otherwise. Its legislature features an official policy of illegal ENOSIS as the objective of Greek Cypriots, and maintains a punitive embargo on the TRNC which denies Turkish Cypriots customary international commerce, communications, travel, and otherwise.

This history explains why Turkish Cypriots are exceptionally wary of a second matrimony with Greek Cypriots without a prolonged courtship featuring numerous confidence building measures to overcome deep and legitimate feelings of distrust and ulterior designs for ENOSIS.

2. *Prevailing Status and Negotiations.* At present, only the Republic of Turkey recognizes the sovereign independence of the TRNC. That makes no sense. Even President Clerides has confessed to TRNC President Rauf Denktas that he exercises no sovereignty over northern Cyprus. And under international law, the TRNC qualifies for statehood because it exercises effective sovereignty over a specified territory with a discrete population. Moreover, the United States and the United Nations encourage the Greek Cypriot administration to negotiating intransigence by falsely treating it as governing all of Cyprus and adhering to its punitive embargo on the TRNC. Greek Cypriots thus are given no incentive to compromise their demand for a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would be politically overwhelmed. That largely explains why negotiations over Cyprus have sputtered and stalled for decades with virtually no progress.

At present, President Denktas has proffered a confederation proposal similar to the American Articles of Confederation. The Greek Cypriots have rejected the idea out of hand, but have not countered with a proposal of their own, other than instant sovereign unity which is extremist by any measure. No negotiations are underway because the Greek Cypriot administration refuses to recognize the TRNC as a political equal as declared in United Nations Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots are negotiating unilateral entry into the European Union in violation of the 1960 Constitution and international law, which prohibits Cypriot union with any other political entity, either individually or collectively.

3. *United States Policy.* In forging policy on Cyprus, the United States should be attentive to the following. The Greek Cypriot administration serves as a money laundering haven for the Russian mafia and indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic and his thieving cronies. Greek Cypriots vociferously denounced NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. They aided and abetted convicted terrorist

Abdullah Ocalan of the Marxist-Leninist PKK by providing a counterfeit passport, and have otherwise been sympathetic to Kurdish and sister anti-Turkish terrorists.

The TRNC supports NATO and United States intervention in the Balkans. It is unswervingly committed to fighting terrorism. It is devoted to and practices democracy. It is working diligently with the United Nations to identify missing persons from the previous fighting on Cyprus, and to negotiate a global property settlement with Greek Cypriots to insure fairness to all those displaced by the previous conflicts.

The United States could overcome the punitive and counterproductive embargo on the TRNC without officially recognizing its sovereign independence, just as it conducts trade with Taiwan and Hong Kong without treating them as independent nations.

We are convinced that United States recognition of the sovereign equality of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would jump-start serious negotiations towards a dispensation that is fair and just to both communities.

Turkey is vastly more important to the national security and energy interests of the United States than is Greece.

Thank you for entertaining our views.

Mr. BEREUTER. So you will have the 5 minutes, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I thank the panel. You know, Mr. Ledsky, I listened to your response to my colleague and I am somewhat perplexed and somewhat concerned and I have travelled to Cyprus several times, and I get a different set of circumstances. I don't understand why the Turks would find themselves agitated by Cyprus's accession into the European Union, the same European Union they seek to be part of, and so therefore, why do you fear that which you seek to be a part of, if you truly seek to be a part of it number one.

Number two is, I heard your comments and I hope you are right that we are well on the way to a resolution of demilitarization, but having been on the island, I am deeply concerned that I don't see signs of demilitarization and I have heard the Greek Cypriot side offer to pay for an international peacekeeping force and to demilitarize on both sides of the island and to use resources that would otherwise have been used for militarization for investments in the northern side, which clearly could use it from my visit to the northern side as well.

So how is it that one would suggest that the Turkish concern of the EU's accession of Cyprus under the present set of circumstances is justified when you, in fact, have a Turkey who is now at Helsinki been granted the status of a candidate country for accession, and wants to be a part of the very European Union you are concerned about? And lastly, don't you think it is wrong to have the Turkish Cypriots, who I think on balance have been much more intransigent in this process in terms of offering solutions they put preconditions that if you don't recognize us, then we won't even come to the negotiating table.

How do you allow them to produce a veto, which almost seems, in essence, what they would be allowed to do?

Mr. LEDSKY. You asked some very tough questions. Let me answer your middle question because it is the easiest. I never said the island was on its road to demilitarization or that an understanding on demilitarization had been reached. I said that in the U.N. Negotiations, the security issue had been tackled, that there was a gentleman's understanding of how the security issues on Cyprus would be resolved, and they will be resolved under this gentleman's agreement with a much reduced level of Turkish forces on

the island, only a token Turkish force as I understand it. That is not demilitarization. There will be a Turkish military presence on the island under all of the documents that have been negotiated.

I did not, also in response to your final question, say that the Turkish Cypriots were justified in their fears, justified in their reluctance to have the government of Cyprus negotiate for U.N. Entry.

I think you are quite correct, the Greek side has been much more straightforward, much more giving, much more sympathetic to the plight of the people on the other side of the island. On the other hand, the psychology in the north and the psychology in Turkey is very much we do not want to receive a handout from our so-called big brother. We are a political equal on this island. We ourselves want to be part of the negotiation. We don't want charity or offered employment or offered economic assistance by the Greeks. There is, after all, generations of suspicion and dislike which have to be overcome, and all I am saying is this is the Turkish Cypriot attitude. I am neither justifying or saying that it is justifiable.

Mr. MENENDEZ. In the context of your answer, I understand it, but let me just simply say it seems to me when I listen to younger Turkish Cypriot business people, they want accession, they understand what it means for their opportunities, and I hope that as a country we continue to support the accession, because I think it can be the breakthrough that we all hope for and thank the panel.

Mr. BEREUTER. We need to rush. I want to thank the witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their assistance to this Subcommittee. We very much appreciate it. This Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:53 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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